From the start of the Gaza war, international (ad some Israeli) commentators have criticized Israel’s failure to present a “day after” plan. Recently, Yaakov Katz, a former editor of The Jerusalem Post, added another voice urging policymakers to lay out a detailed vision for post-war Gaza.
Their concern is understandable, but their timing is wrong.
A serious "day after” plan must wait until the war is closer to a conclusion that establishes a clearer picture of facts on the ground. There is a reason the world’s most successful post-war rebuilding effort—the Marshall Plan—was not launched immediately after World War II. It was implemented in 1948, three full years after the war ended, and only after a premature alternative plan had been abandoned.
That alternative, the Morgenthau Plan, proposed not at the start of the war but only in late 1944, aimed to dismantle German industry and transform Germany into a pastoral society, which would have caused starvation and numerous deaths. It was driven by trauma and retribution rather than a strategic approach. Fortunately, it was shelved in favor of a more rational, future-oriented vision once the conditions were understood.
The European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan, named after U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, prioritized economic recovery, political stabilization, and ideological transformation. It was not just about physical rebuilding—it was about reshaping thinking. For three years, the U.S. military occupied Germany and laid the foundation for democratic reeducation and de-Nazification.
This historical distinction is instructive. Many voices now calling for a Gaza reconstruction plan are skipping over the essential precondition: a decisive military outcome. Hamas’s infrastructure may be weakened, but its ideological grip remains intact. Gazans are still caught between competing narratives. No diplomatic initiative can alter that reality.
Only victory can.
Rushing to outline post-Hamas governance while the war rages is not only premature—it’s counterproductive. It encourages pressure to commit to plans before facts are clear, to identify partners before they emerge, and to design systems that may later prove unworkable. Reconstruction requires more than resources; it requires legitimacy and security.
Events in the region are shifting rapidly. Hezbollah has been degraded, and Iran’s air defenses compromised. Few anticipated rising anti-Hamas sentiment on the 'Gazan Street', or that 49% of Gazans would request Israeli assistance to emigrate. With the Iran nuclear negotiations faltering and no Arab state yet volunteering to manage Gaza, the geopolitical landscape is still fluid.
Victory must first be defined and achieved. Traditionally, these criteria mark a war’s end:
- Decisive military defeat: Hamas must be rendered incapable of fighting. The IDF’s current mobilization suggests the war’s final phase may be approaching.
- Strategic territorial control: Establishing buffer zones along Israel’s border and internal corridors dividing Gaza are solidifying control.
- Economic strangulation of the enemy: Israel has moved to prevent Hamas from seizing and profiting from humanitarian aid. A weakened Iran will reduce vital support.
- Destruction of political infrastructure: A January 2025 poll by the Palestinian Institute for Social and Economic Progress found only 5.3% of Gazans would now vote for Hamas.
- Diplomatic leverage from a position of strength, leading to de facto or de jure surrender.
None of this implies that Israel should remain idle while waiting for these conditions to be met. Quiet, strategic coordination should begin now. Israel can collaborate behind the scenes with the U.S., the EU, and moderate Arab states, such as the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia, to explore future stabilization frameworks. But those efforts must remain preparatory, not prescriptive.
The deeper challenge lies not in politics but in education. Hamas’s strength is rooted in ideology. For decades, Gazan children have been raised on incitement—in classrooms, on television, in mosques. Replacing Hamas without dismantling that ideological apparatus will merely invite its return.
The Marshall Plan was successful in part because it tackled this issue head-on. Nazi-era propaganda structures were repurposed to spread pro-democratic values. Schoolbooks were rewritten, teachers were retrained, and students were introduced to new civic ideals. It was slow, complicated work—but transformative.
Skeptics may argue that Germany and Gaza are incomparable. Yet the historical data suggest parallels. In the 1933 elections after Hitler took power, the Nazis received 43.9% of the vote. By war’s end, that support had cratered. In Gaza’s 2006 elections, Hamas received 44.5%. Today, they would receive only 5%. Crushing defeat can trigger cultural realignment.
Israel must now think in terms of generations. A functioning, peaceful Gaza will not emerge weeks after the war’s end. It will take years. What matters most now is not rushing to publish a blueprint, but creating the conditions under which it can take root and flourish.
The “day after” must await the right day—the day of Hamas’s unequivocal defeat.
Let us win the war first. Then, with the dust settled and a clearer view of current facts on the ground, we can envision a lasting peace built on that reality.
Dr. Robert Schwartz, a psychologist and former assistant professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, has published research on positive psychology and commentaries in The Jerusalem Post, Arutz Sheva, The Christian Science Monitor, The American Spectator, and others.
Robert Schwartz, Ph.D.
