The Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency, or Shabak) conducted a prolonged wiretap for about six months on a former employee suspected of leaking classified information to journalists, i24NEWS reported.
The surveillance was carried out using advanced spyware as part of what was defined as a “security prevention operation.”
The information gathered reportedly included Shin Bet failures during the October 7 attacks and an internal investigation into claims that individuals associated with the far-right Kahanist movement had infiltrated the police.
According to the report, the suspect, identified as "A," was interrogated last April and released without any restrictions, yet technological surveillance on him continued. Israeli law allows the Shin Bet to conduct wiretaps for security prevention purposes without court approval, but only with authorization from the Prime Minister every 15 days or, at most, every three months, and under quarterly oversight by the Attorney General.
In practice, the orders were allegedly rubber-stamped by the Prime Minister without thorough examination, and the Attorney General failed to conduct the required oversight, even though the wiretap was an exceptional and sensitive measure.
Haaretz recently revealed that the Shin Bet shared information obtained from this wiretap with the Grunis Committee, which was reviewing the candidacy of Maj. Gen. (res.) David Zini for head of the Shin Bet. Although nothing problematic was found in the meeting under scrutiny, the very use of information from a classified wiretap is a serious violation of the agency’s internal confidentiality protocols.
The Shin Bet responded: “The Israel Security Agency operates under and in accordance with the law in all its actions. Naturally, the agency’s operations are not made public, nor are the authorizations granted for them, when confidentiality is required.”