The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center - named for Major General Meir Amit - revealed a special document that the IDF seized in the Gaza Strip during the ground maneuver, a document Israeli intelligence did not possess before the war. The document contains handwritten instructions from Yahya Sinwar on how to mislead the IDF before the October 7 massacre.
The information center noted that Sinwar’s document indicates the slain Hamas leader “identified the IDF’s weak points - and his instructions were designed to exploit the failures to maximize achievements, even before the attack and especially in the opening stages of the raid.”
The document contains precise and shocking instructions to film the slaughter of civilians, step on the bodies of soldiers, burn residential neighborhoods, and blow up tanks, as published yesterday in the New York Times.
The Times also revealed, for the first time, recordings collected by Intelligence Unit 8200 in which Hamas terrorists and commanders were heard scrupulously carrying out the instructions Sinwar wrote in the document, including massacring civilians and burning buildings, while broadcasting the atrocities to the world.
Regarding the deception phase, Yahya Sinwar wrote that in the weeks before the raid “intensive” operations should be carried out in the Gaza Strip, but that these should be perceived by Israeli intelligence as routine movements. “It is necessary for the forces to carry out intensive movements weeks before each activity which the enemy will see as routine activity,” Sinwar wrote. “This will serve as camouflage for the major move. Care must be taken that this happens especially in the places where the move is to be carried out.”
Regarding the start of the invasion, Sinwar wrote that first the gates in the border fence must be breached, and Hamas units must enter Israeli territory quickly and in a timely manner. He emphasized the need to use bulldozers and heavy engineering equipment to breach the gates and remove obstacles in order to facilitate the entry of additional invading forces into Israel.
Hamas understood that if its forces reached villages and bases in less than 15 minutes, the IDF would not be able to thwart the raid. Therefore, the plan includes an initial breakout squad of 10 to 12 terrorists on motorcycles, who were to arrive within minutes at community fences, breach them, engage the standby squad, and then be followed by at least two platoons of Nukhba - about 60 to 100 terrorists.
“A few minutes (10 to 15 minutes) after the start of the attack, it is necessary to begin summoning all the forces in accordance with the plan prepared in advance and in as many places as possible (each company in a different place) so that the forces will be available to reinforce the attack, expand it, or for a defensive effort if necessary, or to control the overall situation. There must be a clear division in accordance with the plan prepared in advance. Each brigade commander must have a plan ready for summoning the forces, their deployment, the manner of communicating with them, and their operation according to central instructions from the commander of the apparatus and the central operations commander.”
Sinwar further wrote: “There should be phases or waves in this plan. The first is the first wave of the attack, and there are a second, third and fourth wave. Each wave is known in advance and has its own documents, maps and objectives in sealed envelopes kept by the brigade commander.”
“It must be ensured that images emerge that will cause a burst of intoxication, madness and momentum among our people, especially among the residents of Judea and Samaria, Israeli Arabs, Jerusalem and our entire Islamic nation,” Sinwar wrote. He added: “It must be emphasized to those in charge of the units that they must make these things happen deliberately. That is, record and broadcast the images as quickly as possible: soldiers’ heads being stepped on, shooting at point-blank range, slaughtering people with knives, exploding tanks, prisoners kneeling with their hands on their heads, and so on."
"Events must be planned in advance that will produce images of terror - several burning car bombs that will explode in a post or building and create terrible destruction, heart-rending sights, terrible fire. Five or ten such images will sow fear in them. Allah will come upon them without them expecting it and strike terror in their hearts. Two or three operations must be organized with the aim of burning down an entire neighborhood or kibbutz, etc. - they will pour gasoline or diesel from a special tanker, burn the place down and broadcast the images."
"Each brigade commander must have a ready plan for calling in the forces, deploying them, communicating with them and operating them according to central instructions from the commander of the apparatus."
"The objectives of the Northern Brigade must look first and foremost towards the coastline. The objectives of the Gaza Brigade must be in a northeasterly direction up to a certain angle. The objectives of the central camps must be in a northeasterly direction with a tilt towards the east. The objectives of the Khan Yunis Brigade should be towards the east. The objectives of the Rafah Brigade should be towards the southeast."
"If we are not prepared to fully exploit the opportunity, then the enemy will manage to take control of the chaos and move to a counterattack or he will receive assistance from outside, and then the situation will turn against us in the worst possible way. Therefore, it is necessary to be prepared for the flow of forces, the development of the attack, its expansion and reinforcement to the maximum during the first six to ten hours in order to establish solid facts on the ground that will thwart any possibility of a counterattack."