An intelligence report from Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades, revealed in new research by Lt. Col. (res.) Yehonatan Dahoah-Halevi of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, shows that the terror group had already determined in July 2023 that “the crisis in Israel is a decisive factor in harming the readiness of the Israeli military.”
Dahoah-Halevi told Arutz Sheva - Israel National News that Hamas understood at the time that Israel was in a period of weakness.
He explained, “The Hamas leadership followed the political crisis, public protests, and refusal of reserve duty in Israel. Their analysis, based on statements by senior Israeli officials, led them to conclude that Israel was at a historic low in relations with the US and the West, and internally — due to escalating protests, eroded cohesion, military insubordination, and an assessment that Israel was heading for civil war.”
The preparations for the murderous October 7 attack, he stressed, were initially meant to be carried out a year earlier.
Dahoah-Halevi recounted: “The attack plan against Israel began forming in 2014, originally based on a cross-border tunnel invasion. After the border barrier was built, it was updated to a ground incursion. The plan was approved by Hamas leadership at a September 30, 2021 conference in Gaza under Yahya Sinwar, under the name ‘Operation Ensuring the End of Days,’ outlining a plan to conquer ‘Palestine’ and eliminate the Jewish presence in Israel.”
“The plan was completed in early 2022, during the Bennett-Lapid government, and was meant to be executed during the High Holidays that year, when Yair Lapid was Prime Minister. The rise of the right-wing government in December 2022 was seen by Hamas as a greater challenge due to its policies, but also an opportunity, as they believed the government would lose international support. The political crisis in Israel in 2023, which escalated and harmed military readiness, was seen as a golden opportunity to implement the attack plan.
“Accordingly, the recommendation to Sinwar was clear: On July 25, 2023, Al-Qassam’s military intelligence sent a document analyzing the impact of reserve duty refusals — in protest against the judicial reform — on the IDF’s operational readiness. It concluded that the political crisis and the protest’s seepage into the army served Hamas by harming national resilience and military capability, but advised Sinwar to wait for the crisis to deepen. There is no information on Sinwar’s direct response.
“In the two-and-a-half months until October 7, further protest developments, including statements about a ‘nonexistent army’ in September, were reported in Hamas media. A senior Hamas figure said Sinwar closely monitored Israel’s internal crisis, including rifts within the IDF, and gave instructions to pinpoint the right moment for an attack that could help bring Israel down. The attack was planned for a Jewish holiday, with the IDF crisis being a contributing factor in Sinwar’s decision to strike on October 7.”
In the new study, Dahoah-Halevi notes that acts of refusal between August and September 2023, as reported in Hamas channels, became a decisive factor in the choice of timing for the October 7 massacre, originally planned for one of Israel’s holidays.
“Hamas leadership had already decided the attack would be carried out on a Jewish holiday, using tensions over the Temple Mount and Al-Aqsa Mosque as a pretext to spark an intifada among Arabs in Judea and Samaria and Israel, and to rally Arab and international support,” he said. ”Hamas viewed Al-Aqsa as an ‘atomic bomb’ for all-out confrontation. Sinwar said that ‘Sword of Jerusalem’ (Operation Guardian of the Walls, 2021) was a prelude to a larger campaign. The IDF crisis and reports of declining operational readiness were a contributing factor in Sinwar’s decision to choose October 7.”
When asked about Israel’s main mistake that allowed Hamas to exploit its weaknesses, Dahoah-Halevi said: “The prolonged political crisis in Israel damaged cohesion and military readiness, teaching Hamas that the balance of power was shifting in its favor. Israel’s main mistake was the political crisis that harmed national security, while just across the border, an existential military threat was taking shape.”