A special investigative team, established due to public mistrust in the IDF’s official inquiries, presents a disturbing picture of the senior military leadership’s handling of the Hamas attack on October 7, according to a report by Ayala Hasson.
The team, led by Major General (res.) Sami Turjeman, included Major Generals (res.) Amikam Norkin, David Sharvit, and Brigadier General (res.) Ofer Levi, and relied on interrogations, recordings, and operational investigations.
Key findings include:
- Former Military Intelligence chief, Aharon Haliva, rejected a request to hold an assessment meeting after Hamas operatives activated Israeli SIM cards two days before the attack, calling the discussion "unnecessary."
- The South Command’s intelligence officer was on maternity leave, and the then-commander of the Southern Command, Eliezer Toledano, claimed battalion commanders were not mobilized due to information exposure limitations.
- Operations Chief Shlomi Binder arrived at the Kirya base at 9:00 AM and did not make documented decisions for hours, something which he bears significant responsibility for.
- Senior staff at the IDF General Staff believed until late in the event that the attack involved only a few hundred terrorist, but over 5,000 infiltrated.
- Regarding the Air Force, an urgent request from the Gaza Division to bomb the border fence, through which the attackers entered and exited, was only answered after more than two hours due to a lack of personnel and prioritizing strikes on Hamas control centers.
- The Shin Bet also played a role in the findings: About 20 minutes before the attack began, a representative from the agency notified the Gaza Division that the "Takila" intervention team was en route, but minutes later, canceled the mission. The Shin Bet refused to cooperate further with the investigative team beyond the joint committee.