As the United States pushes forward with President Trump’s 20-point comprehensive plan for Gaza, a new administrative reality is being constructed on paper. We are told of a "National Committee for the Administration of Gaza" (NCAG)-a technocratic body of fifteen Palestinians led by Dr. Ali Shaath, designed to manage the day-to-day misery of the Strip while the politicians haggle over the future.
But beneath the glossy brochures of "reconstruction" and "stability" lies a structural flaw so massive it threatens to bury the entire project before the first brick is laid. That flaw is the "No-Disarm" clause-or more accurately, the dangerous silence regarding the physical weapons still held by Hamas.
The Illusion of Technocratic Control
The central conceit of Phase 2 is that Gaza can be governed by "technocrats" while Hamas remains an armed militia in the shadows. On February 17, 2026, senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi made the movement’s position chillingly clear: Hamas will not "surrender arms nor raise the white flag." They view the demand for disarmament-even the 60-day ultimatum reportedly proposed by Israel-as a "religious war" and a non-starter.
This creates a farcical situation. The NCAG is supposed to oversee infrastructure, health, and education. But who provides the security for the engineers? Who guards the warehouses of aid? If the "technocrats" make a decision that displeases the men with the RPGs, who wins the argument?
History has shown us this movie before. In Lebanon, the "technocratic" government is a thin veil for Hezbollah’s armed hegemony. In the Palestinian Authority, "security coordination" often exists only where it doesn’t cross the red lines of the armed factions. To believe that Dr. Shaath’s committee can exercise sovereign power in Gaza while Hamas maintains its tunnels and its arsenal is not diplomacy; it is a delusion.
The "International Force" Trap
Phase 2 also envisions an "International Stabilization Force" (ISF), commanded by U.S. Major General Jasper Jeffers, to oversee the transition. While nations like Morocco and Indonesia have signaled a willingness to join, the mission profile remains a suicide trap.
An international force can only "stabilize" an environment where the combatants have agreed to stop being combatants. If Hamas refuses to disarm, the ISF is not a peacekeeping force; it is a target. Without a mandate to forcibly demilitarize the Strip, these international troops will quickly find themselves in the same position as UNIFIL in Lebanon-providing a human shield for the very terrorists they were sent to marginalize.
Why Partial Disarmament is a Total Failure
There are whispers in Washington that the administration might consider allowing Hamas to keep "some" light weapons as part of a phased approach. This is the ultimate "Phase 2" poison pill.
In the Middle East, the distinction between "light weapons" and "terrorist capabilities" is non-existent. An AK-47 in the hands of a Hamas operative is not a tool for community policing; it is a tool for enforcing the movement’s radical ideology and ensuring that no moderate Palestinian Arab voice can ever truly rise.
As long as Hamas remains an armed entity, "Phase 2" is nothing more than a rearmament period. It is a chance for the tunnels to be reinforced with "reconstruction" concrete and for the command structure to be rebuilt under the cover of a diplomatic ceasefire.
The Only Path to a Real Day After
If the world is serious about a "Gaza after Hamas," then the disarmament cannot be the result of the process; it must be the prerequisite. You cannot build a "National Committee" on a foundation of IEDs. You cannot have "technocratic governance" when the guy holding the clipboard is being watched by a guy holding a Kalashnikov.
The 60-day window given by the Israeli cabinet is not an "ultimatum" to be negotiated; it is a reality check for the international community. If the Board of Peace, chaired by President Trump, cannot or will not facilitate the total surrender of Hamas’s military wing, then "Phase 2" will not lead to reconstruction. It will lead, with mathematical certainty, to the next October 7.
True sovereignty requires a monopoly on the use of force. Until the only weapons in Gaza are in the hands of a legitimate, vetted, and non-terrorist security force, any talk of "peace" is just a countdown to the next war.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx