
Could a senior ISA official offer, on his own initiative, to rig an election so that the prime minister could remain in office? No one would dispute that if such a thing came to light, the country would erupt in outrage and protests. Unless the prime minister in question was from the left.
What is now universally regarded as the destruction of democracy was seen as natural under Mapai's rule during the first decade after Israel's establishment. Elections for the third Knesset were held on July 26, 1955, the seventh of Av, 5715.
Even during the election campaign, Ben-Gurion made clear-and no one doubted it-that he intended to return to the Prime Minister's Office afterward and send the incumbent prime minister, Moshe Sharett, back to his natural place at the Foreign Ministry.
In his book The Confidant, the late Rafi Eitan, then a senior ISA official and later leader of the Pensioners' Party in the 17th Knesset and a minister in Ehud Olmert's government, recounts a remarkable story in a chapter titled "Prime Minister, if you instruct me, I can ensure your election victory." Eitan says he himself made that statement in a conversation on the eve of the 1955 Knesset election with Yitzhak Navon, then Ben-Gurion's secretary and later Israel's president.
Eitan was referring, quite simply, to the possibility of the ISA rigging the Knesset election to ensure that Ben-Gurion would continue to serve as prime minister. According to Eitan's account, Navon was not appalled by the proposal, did not throw Eitan out of the room, and merely remarked, "The time for that has not yet come."
Eitan writes on page 137, "Had he expressed interest in my proposal, I would have acted without hesitation. It would have been possible, for example, to open ballot boxes while they were being transported from polling stations to the Central Elections Committee, remove envelopes containing slips bearing any letter other than Aleph (Mapai's ballot letter-H.H.), and fill them with Aleph slips. I could also have thought of other methods. I never did this, but others did, and even today things of this kind can be done."
Others did? Who were these others, what did they do, and when? Rafi Eitan took that secret to his grave; perhaps others will reveal it someday.
Eitan notes, "I do not know whether Ben-Gurion shared my concern and also feared that Mapai would be defeated in the election. Had he truly feared losing the election, would he have considered my proposal? I have no answer to that question either. Ben-Gurion did believe in democratic government, but the future of the State of Israel mattered more to him than democracy. At that time, he believed that Menachem Begin posed a danger to Israel's very existence, and it is possible that, had he truly feared a Herut election victory, he would have considered my proposal."
Herut, led by Menachem Begin, did not win that election, but the outgoing coalition lost ground. The two main partners in the governments that served before the election both lost seats: Mapai fell from 45 to 40, and the General Zionists from 20 to 13. Herut doubled its representation and became the second-largest party in the Knesset.
Israel's seventh government, sworn in on November 3, 1955, had the support of 80 coalition lawmakers, including members of three Arab parties: the Democratic List for Israeli Arabs, with three MKs, including Seif el-Din el-Zoubi and the Druze lawmaker Jabr Muadi; Progress and Work, with two MKs; and Agriculture and Development, with one MK. All three were minority parties that served as Mapai's 'satellite parties,' far removed from any Arab nationalist ideology, whose members supported Israel as a Jewish state.