
The crisis over the draft law, sanctions on yeshiva students and the alienation of traditional voters are the main factors behind Shas's losses in the latest election, according to strategic adviser Moran Ajami, who previously worked with the party and knows its voter base well.
In an interview with Arutz Sheva - Israel National News, she analyzes the mistakes that led to the result, internal disagreements within the haredi leadership and the options now facing the party.
According to Ajami, understanding the election results requires returning to the crisis surrounding the draft legislation advanced by Yuli Edelstein. At the time, she says, the haredi parties were offered a compromise framework that, while not adequately addressing the needs of reservists, could have regulated the status of yeshiva students and prevented some of the sanctions subsequently imposed.
She recalls that Edelstein made clear to representatives of the haredi parties that without legislation regulating their status, it would be impossible to prevent measures against yeshiva students. She says, "They decided they could have their cake and eat it too. That did not happen. If you took them back now, they would sign off on Yuli Edelstein's law."
She argues that the outcome severely harmed the haredi community, particularly yeshiva students and married men engaged in full-time Torah study. The absence of an agreed draft law led to continued sanctions and intensified the financial and personal difficulties they face.
Ajami describes the consequences for haredi families' daily lives, from restrictions related to the status of those liable for military service to cuts in public transportation, housing and daycare benefits. She also mentions restrictions on leaving the country, which affected members of the community who regularly travel abroad. She says the cumulative impact has generated considerable frustration with the haredi political leadership.
In her view, however, the damage to Shas was not confined to the haredi community. A separate process was unfolding among traditional voters that was no less significant for the electoral outcome. She explains that Shas relies on two distinct constituencies: the haredi community of yeshiva students and married Torah scholars, and traditional Jews, who regard Rabbi Ovadia Yosef's legacy as central to their identity but also identify with right-wing values and military service.
She says that for much of the traditional public, IDF service and concern for reservists are core values that do not conflict with their attachment to tradition and rabbis. When a reservist is required to serve for extended periods while hearing harsh statements against drafting haredim, she says, a crisis of trust with the party develops. She explains, "If one of them feels he is collapsing, serving 800 days in the reserves while his family is at home and no one is helping him, and then various people whom he had regarded as unquestionable authorities come along and say, 'We will die rather than enlist'-they simply leave. They have not moved to the other camp-but they have moved to Ben-Gvir and Likud."
United Torah Judaism, she says, also lost support among groups that might previously have voted for it. She cites the Chabad Hasidic movement, whose voters had previously weighed voting for haredi parties against right-wing lists. She argues, "All of Chabad's votes went to Ben-Gvir," presenting this as part of a broader shift in voting patterns.
On the question of Deri's leadership, Ajami offers a nuanced assessment. On the one hand, she regards him as a leader with considerable political abilities; on the other, she believes that during the draft crisis, he made a decision that severely damaged his party.
She says, "Aryeh Deri is an exemplary figure in terms of wisdom, political insight and understanding of Israeli society." She adds, "I think Shas under his leadership was very good until the draft crisis-that was where he followed the Ashkenazi rabbis. Had he acted differently, the results would have been different."
Ajami also describes a sharp dispute within the haredi community itself, particularly between the Sephardi and Ashkenazi leaderships. She says this disagreement was reflected within Shas's Council of Torah Sages as well. She says, "There was a genuine split," adding, "The other camp said, let's agree to some kind of draft law. Rabbi Yitzhak's camp said no, because only the Sephardim would be drafted, while the Ashkenazim would be able to walk freely in the street."
Given these disagreements, Ajami does not believe shifting decision-making authority from Deri to the Council of Torah Sages would resolve the crisis. On the contrary, she warns that such a move could make it even harder for the party to function, saying, "If decision-making now shifts to the council, there is no Shas."
Ajami is more pessimistic about the possibility of winning back traditional voters. She says regaining their trust would require a fundamental change in the party's position on conscription and public acknowledgment of the harm caused to them. Such a move, however, could alienate the haredi voters who have remained loyal to Shas, leaving Deri in a political bind.
Despite her bleak assessment, Ajami sees an opportunity for Shas to rebuild its political strength through government formation talks. She says the haredi parties could use the political situation to regain their position as kingmakers between the blocs, particularly as long as the political boycott of Netanyahu continues.

Ajami also raises the possibility that a government led by Gadi Eisenkot, if formed with the haredi parties, could reach agreements with them on conscription. In her assessment, an arrangement reached with a prime minister with a military background could help the haredi parties present the law to their voters and begin rebuilding trust.
She says the most problematic scenario for Shas is a continuation of the current situation without passage of a draft law. She explains, "Shas will lose only in a scenario in which there is no draft law. If there is no draft law, the sanctions continue and Shas continues to lose."
Conversely, she believes that if a draft law is passed as part of a coalition agreement, the haredi parties will be able to present it as an achievement. Even if government formation talks fail and the country heads to another election, she believes Shas could try to win back right-wing voters. She says, "Shas could argue that it was the one that brought down the left-wing-Arab government, and a great many votes currently parked with Ben-Gvir would return to it."
