The security fence near the Qalandiya checkpoint and the northern Jerusalem neighborhood of Neve Yaakov has become a major point of friction due to infiltrations by Palestinian Authority (PA) Arabs into Israeli territory.
A security source told Yedioth Aharonoth that there are currently about 6,000 infiltrations through breaches in the barrier each week, compared to 3,000 before the war. A significant portion of the terror attacks carried out in pre-1967 Israel have been influenced by these infiltrations.
According to the report, PA Arabs are using intermediaries to help them enter Israel, paying between 300 and 600 shekels for this service. The method of infiltration involves cutting through the barrier and crossing to the other side, where a driver waits to take them to their destination.
Security forces are trying to address this troubling phenomenon by conducting round-the-clock ambushes to capture the infiltrators. Since the start of the war, a temporary order has been enacted allowing security forces to shoot at infiltrators crossing the barrier, particularly targeting the lower body, in order to allow them to deal with the situation.
On Tuesday, State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman published an extensive audit report examining the effectiveness of the Seam Line barrier and the crossings in the Jerusalem perimeter sector.
The report points to serious deficiencies in security, operations, and the implementation of government decisions over many years. The audit assessed the operational readiness of the responsible authorities, particularly in light of the October 7 massacre and the Swords of Iron War.
According to the report, of the several hundred kilometers of the seam line route, only 61% is equipped with a physical barrier. In other areas, significant openings remain, allowing Palestinians to pass freely without inspection. In some locations, including stretches of 11 kilometers on one route and six kilometers on another, no obstacle exists at all-posing what the Comptroller described as a substantial risk of terrorist infiltration.
Additional shortcomings cited include the absence of a regulated operating concept for the crossings, failure to implement key government decisions regarding their civilian management, and an inadequate response by the Shin Bet to professional recommendations. Despite a Prime Ministerial decision in 2005, not a single crossing in the Jerusalem perimeter sector has been civilianized to date.
The report further notes that the Israel Police have been operating the crossings for two decades without a formal operating doctrine and without permanent command. Of the 16 crossings in the sector, only two are overseen by commanders formally authorized for the role. Engelman warned that this situation creates serious security gaps and undermines coordination among the IDF, police, Border Guard, and civilian security personnel.
On the operational level, the audit found that Border Guard forces were diverted from routine security missions in the area to other tasks, weakening the overall response along the seam line. In addition, gaps in reporting between the IDF and police regarding infiltration incidents point to a partial and uncoordinated response.
The Comptroller also identified infrastructure deficiencies, manpower shortages, inadequate inspection equipment, and failures in inter-ministerial coordination. One example cited was the delay in opening the subsidence road at the Qalandiya crossing, caused by disputes between the Ministry of Transportation and the police.
Among Engelman’s recommendations are completing the process of civilianizing the crossings, establishing a clear police operating doctrine, improving intelligence-sharing among all relevant agencies, and immediately installing barriers in areas where openings exist. The report also calls for a reassessment of the barrier’s route in accordance with updated threat assessments.