The IDF investigations into the failures of October 7th published on Thursday evening describe the creation of the security approach that fell apart on that bitter day at 6:29 a.m.
For years, the IDF and defense establishment developed an approach that was based on incorrect assumptions and let Hamas gradually build a system that made the surprise attack possible. IDF investigations found that the failure began long before October 7th, 2023, during the period after 2014's Operation Protective Edge.
The investigation describes how Yahya Sinwar, who took the lead of the terror organization in 2017, led a significant strategic change, from relying on underground warfare to a massive ground attack. All the while, the Israeli defense establishment remained "stuck" on old approaches.
The investigation found that for years, the Israeli security approach to Gaza was based on one central assumption: Hamas is a rational organization that is "deterred and adheres to the arrangement." Even after Sinwar took control in 2017, IDF intelligence continued to describe Hamas as a "rational organization" that is interested in "quiet" in the Gaza Strip for civil development. The investigation found that "there was a series of misconceptions throughout the year."
The threat from Gaza was not estimated to be the greatest threat. It was found that after Operation Protective Edge, Hamas created an orderly body with an "operational headquarters" led by Ra'ed Sa'ad. Under his command, Hamas began planning the "great project" - a plan for a massive attack on Israel, which included a ground invasion by thousands of terrorists. While all this was happening, IDF intelligence continued to estimate that Hamas was concentrating on building tunnels.
The investigation discovered that the Israeli approach was significantly shaped after Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021. In contrast to Hamas which saw the operation as a "victory" because of the successful launches at Jerusalem and the understanding that it could move on to a multi-front war against Israel with Hezbollah, Israel thought it "achieved deterrence" and stated that it harmed Hamas's underground infrastructure.
One of the investigation's more concerning conclusions concerns the "Wall of Jericho" document - Hamas's attack plan which was obtained by Israel in 2022. Although the document precisely described Hamas's intentions to flood the Gaza Division's defenses using 4,000 terrorists and to reach cities in the Israeli interior, it was considered to be a "future idea" that aimed to build up forces and not a real threat. The document was shown to the IDF Intelligence Directorate Chief and the Commanding Officer of the Southern Command in May of 2022, but it was noted that they did not know if it was a concrete plan or just conceptual planning by Ra'ed Sa'ad.
Another key point was in November 2022, during a study session titled "Profile of a War" which discussed "Wall of Jericho" as a future scenario. The assumption in the military at the time was that Hamas was able to invade with up to two companies and about 70 terrorists - while in fact, on October 7th, approximately 5,600 terrorists partook in the invasion.
Another operational failure found by the investigation was the redirection of resources to other fronts, mainly Judea and Samaria and the northern arena, at the expense of Gaza.
An additional mistake was the overreliance on the barrier along the Gaza–Israel border which was completed in 2021. The barrier was not planned to contend with a massive surprise attack. Its purpose was to allow the security forces to have control over massive demonstrations and disrupt limited infiltrations. Despite this, an excessive sense of confidence in its abilities was developed, even when the troop numbers were decreased due to constraints.
The IDF inquiries describe how Hamas deluded Israel using sophisticated deception. The IDF estimates that there was a "deception effort" in which Hamas avoided escalations with Israel that would have endangered its plan.