Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx
A deal for 6.5 million Chinese electricity meters could give Beijing a foothold in Syria’s power network. As Damascus reconnects with Turkey and Jordan, Israel faces an unanswered question: who will control the data generated near the Golan Heights?
On Sunday, November 8, the Syrian Electricity Company signed a major contract in Damascus with China's Wasion Group. The company will supply 6.5 million prepaid smart electricity meters over three years, with the first shipment expected in about four months. The order includes six million meters for homes and 500,000 for businesses and industrial facilities, along with software and supporting equipment. Syrian Electricity Company chief executive Omar Shaqrouq said the system would let the utility monitor electricity use across the country in real time. About 1.2 million subscribers previously had no meters.
For Syrians, the deal promises easier payments and better electricity management. For Israel, it raises a question beyond billing: who will control information produced by a modern power network beside the Golan Heights?
After years of war, replacing meters and repairing the power system are basic needs. But the supplier matters. China is gaining a place in infrastructure used by homes, businesses and public services. The security implications depend on who can see the information, maintain the equipment and change how the system operates.
Neither Damascus nor Wasion has explained where meter data will be stored, who will manage it or how much remote access the Chinese company will receive. Smart meters record electricity use and send readings to utilities, often without a worker visiting each site. Over time, those records can reveal patterns about homes, businesses and public facilities. That does not mean Wasion will automatically receive the data, but the unanswered question matters.
These devices do not record conversations, track people like phones or provide a map of military bases. Their value, if misused, lies in the records they collect over time. A factory's power use at night, a hospital's changing demand or a neighborhood's sudden drop in consumption may help explain what is happening when compared with satellite images, public records or other intelligence. Such clues are indirect, but in a sensitive border region even indirect information can matter. The question is who can combine the records and under what safeguards.
The issue has a regional dimension. On November 4, Syrian Finance Minister Mohammed Yisr Barnieh and Saudi Fund for Development chief executive Sultan Al-Marshad signed six development loans worth more than $403 million. They will support hospitals, civil defense centers, housing repairs, government services and the Aleppo power plant. A $30 million project will provide 300,000 smart water meters, not electricity meters. There is no evidence Saudi financing is paying for Wasion's contract. Riyadh is helping fund Syria's recovery while a Chinese company has won a major electricity contract.
Saudi Arabia had also explored the market. On March 9, the Saudi Industrial Export Company, SADIRAT, signed a non-binding agreement with GTRONICS and Significa to study a partnership and financing for a smart-meter project. The Saudi Exchange said the memorandum had no immediate financial impact and remained valid for 12 months. No SADIRAT supply contract had been announced by November 8, when Syria signed with Wasion.
Syria's purchasing process was also delayed. Official documents show tender 4/2025 was extended to March 15, with a meeting scheduled for March 16. A separate March report quoted economist Mohammad Bakr saying 45 companies had joined an earlier tender, but no result was announced. Records do not establish whether the two processes were connected or whether Wasion won through the earlier tender. Saudi-linked companies explored the opportunity, but the November supply contract went to a Chinese manufacturer.
The meters are arriving as Syria rebuilds links with neighbors. On October 29, Syrian officials met Turkey's transmission operator to discuss restoring the Aleppo-Birecik power line, which could allow Turkey to send up to 500 megawatts. In August, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said exports could eventually reach 800 to 900 megawatts. Those are projections, not proof that the full amount is already reaching Syrian consumers.
Jordan is also helping keep Syrian power stations running. On November 9, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said gas had flowed through Jordan to Syrian power plants since January 2026, and that Syria was ready to facilitate future supplies to Lebanon. Lebanon repaired its section of the Tripoli-Syria pipeline on November 3, but the full connection through Syria is not yet operational. Syria's recovery is increasingly tied to regional energy routes.
China's role in Syrian power infrastructure is linked to its telecom presence. On February 26, Reuters reported Washington had urged Damascus to avoid Chinese telecom equipment over security and privacy concerns. Huawei technology accounted for more than half of the infrastructure used by Syria's mobile operators, Syriatel and MTN. Syrian officials said US export restrictions made Western equipment harder to obtain.
On February 28, the Syrian Future Movement's Economic Office recommended Chinese suppliers for rapid 4G expansion and limited 5G deployment, alongside Western or open-source cybersecurity tools. This was not government policy, but it illustrates Damascus's dilemma: Chinese equipment is available, while Western governments warn about dependence on it.
Wasion sells meters that can use cellular connections or radio networks. Damascus has not said which the Syrian system will use or whether it will rely on Huawei equipment. Washington warns that China's National Intelligence Law could require Chinese companies to provide information to state authorities. Beijing rejects espionage allegations. Neither the law nor Wasion's nationality proves that it will hand Syrian data to Chinese intelligence.
The intelligence risk should not be exaggerated. The 500,000 meters for businesses and industrial sites would not automatically identify a radar station, military base or weapons factory. Electricity use alone cannot explain what happens inside a building. But if a foreign supplier could see detailed records, unusual changes in consumption or operating hours might provide clues when combined with other information. A large database could add another layer to the picture of activity across Syria.
There are also doubts about whether Syria can operate the system reliably. Economist Mohammad Bakr warned that damaged power lines, weak telecom coverage and unstable internet could undermine the rollout. He argued that prepaid payments should go through licensed banks rather than local electronic services. Wasion's payment arrangements remain undisclosed. Linking electricity use to payment records could create a sensitive store of personal and commercial information, requiring clear rules on access and protection.
The agreement comes as President Ahmed al-Sharaa balances competing foreign relationships. His government seeks American support, works with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and faces Chinese pressure over Uyghur militants in Syria. A February 2026 UN report said the army's 84th Division reportedly included more than 3,500 foreign fighters, mostly linked to ETIM/TIP, also known as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement and the Turkistan Islamic Party. Countries differed over how fully they had been integrated. Beijing has publicly urged Damascus at the UN Security Council to act against the group.
There is no evidence China is monitoring Israeli military activity through Syrian meters, or that Wasion will access the full database. But Israel and the United States should seek answers before the first shipment arrives. Damascus should disclose where information is stored, who manages it and whether foreign technicians can connect remotely. Washington and Gulf donors should press for independent audits, limits on outside access and clear rules for data use. Safeguards should cover contractors and payment providers, with independent oversight to investigate misuse and report security failures before nationwide rollout is complete.
The United States should make it easier for vetted non-Chinese suppliers to compete in Syria, while preserving security safeguards. If they cannot enter the market, Chinese firms may face less competition. Israel should assess whether military sites near the Golan need additional protection from foreign-managed systems.
Syria needs electricity. Smart meters could help its utility measure use, reduce losses and collect payments more efficiently. Those are real benefits for a country rebuilding after years of war. The question is whether they will come with rules that protect sensitive information and keep control in Syrian hands.
For Israel, the concern is not the presence of Chinese meters in Syrian homes. It is the possibility that a foreign supplier could gain access to information from critical infrastructure beside a volatile border.