A sharp dispute has erupted between Israel Railways and the developers of the Better Rail app, after the railway demanded that the developers stop accessing its information interfaces and remove the application from app stores.
The dispute began with a warning letter sent on August 9 to Guy Tefter, one of the app’s developers. The developers clarified in their response that Better Rail is an open-source project operated by a team rather than by Tefter alone. In a response sent Monday, the Better Rail team rejected the allegations, saying the app is free, contains no advertisements, uses open-source code, and did not penetrate Israel Railways’ systems or cause the damage attributed to it.
Israel Railways claims that Better Rail makes direct and automated use of information from its systems and APIs and incorporates that information into its own service. The railway argues that this constitutes unauthorized commercial use in violation of its terms of use. According to the railway, its information interfaces are protected by various technological measures, including code, permissions, blocks and access controls. It claims that internal interfaces require a dedicated key and that the manner in which Better Rail obtained the information could therefore constitute unlawful access to computer systems.
The railway further argues that some of the information obtained from its systems differs from the raw data transferred to the Ministry of Transport. It claims that Better Rail used an additional layer of information, structures and technological outputs that are not publicly available and that some of this material constitutes commercial secrets. A major part of Israel Railways’ complaint concerns the alleged burden placed on its computer systems. The railway claims that data requests by external parties harmed the stability of its digital services and resulted in additional infrastructure and cloud costs.
The warning letter cites a crash involving the search and trip-planning systems in August 2025, as well as three consecutive failures on May 19, 2026. According to Israel Railways, internal investigations found that unauthorized external use, including activity attributed to Better Rail, contributed to the failures, instability and expenses estimated at hundreds of thousands of shekels or more. The railway had previously contacted the developers on June 22, when Avishag Kaspi, head of the passenger information systems domain in its Technology Division, asked them to stop using the interfaces. Israel Railways said the developers did not dispute that they were using the interfaces but instead asked when access was expected to be blocked so they could prepare for the change.
The railway subsequently demanded that Better Rail immediately stop accessing and using its interfaces and data, cease displaying and distributing the information, delete information and outputs obtained from the systems, and remove the app from app stores and other distribution channels. It also demanded detailed information about the way the data was obtained, the automated tools used, the frequency of access, the types and volume of data collected, and any profits allegedly generated through the activity.
Israel Railways gave the developers seven days to confirm in writing that they had complied, warning that it could otherwise pursue legal remedies and contact authorities over matters it claimed could have criminal implications.
Better Rail has rejected the factual and legal basis of the warning. The developers argue that the app is not a commercial service as characterized by Israel Railways. They say it is completely free, contains no advertising, does not operate according to a revenue-generating model and has publicly available source code. As a result, they say there are no profits from the use of the information to report to the railway.
The developers also dispute the railway’s characterization of their previous interactions. They point to a June 22 message from an Israel Railways representative that began by congratulating them on their work and acknowledging the effort invested in the app.
According to Better Rail, the same message stated that there had been access to some of the information interfaces “over the years" and that the interfaces were expected to be blocked as part of a regulatory process. The developers argue that this indicates the railway was aware of the access and contradicts the later characterization of their activity as covert or involving the circumvention of security measures.
Israel Railways directed the developers to obtain information through the Ministry of Transport through an official and regulated channel. Better Rail says that by July 16, approximately three weeks before the warning letter, it had already informed the railway that it was transitioning from Israel Railways’ API to the Ministry’s data sources.
However, the developers say they encountered significant discrepancies between the regulated data and information displayed on Israel Railways’ own website and app. Among the differences they identified were missing continuous segment information, discrepancies in stop times, missing updates during unusual operating conditions, and differences in the number of stops made by certain trains.
Better Rail claims that on one day, approximately 90% of stops in the data showed a waiting time of one to two minutes, compared with only about 2% on the railway’s website. The developers argue that such discrepancies can affect trip planning and connections between trains and other forms of public transportation. They also cited rail service changes in Ashkelon and Ashdod on July 16. According to the developers, GTFS continued to display the regular Thursday schedule even after changes had appeared on the railway’s website. They also claimed that the data showed train 630 as skipping Holon and Bat Yam, while the official website showed it stopping at both stations.
Better Rail says it found similar discrepancies in the data program, which provides real-time information. As one example, the developers cited a July 7 incident involving train 522 from Beit Shemesh to Netanya. According to their account, the train terminated in Herzliya and stopped at platform 3 rather than platform 6, while train 525, which was supposed to travel from Netanya to Beit Shemesh, began its journey from Herzliya using a different platform.
The developers claim that these changes were not reflected in the program but did appear in Israel Railways’ official app. They said railway representatives acknowledged some of the discrepancies and attributed some to the format established by the Ministry of Transport or to known problems with the regulated data channel.
Better Rail also strongly rejected the suggestion that it hacked into railway systems. The developers said they did not bypass passwords or authentication mechanisms, use stolen permissions or enter areas restricted to authorized users. Instead, they maintain that they accessed information interfaces that were open and accessible.
They also pointed to what they described as an inconsistency in the railway’s warning letter. According to Better Rail, Israel Railways simultaneously claimed that accessing the interfaces required bypassing security mechanisms and a dedicated access key while stating that the interfaces were expected to be blocked in the future. The developers argue that if the blocking had not yet been activated, they could not have bypassed it.
The developers likewise rejected the claim that the information constitutes a commercial secret. They argue that publicly displayed travel times, stations and operational information do not become confidential merely because the data is stored on railway systems. They also maintain that factual information does not automatically receive copyright protection.
Better Rail cited legal rulings in support of its position that facts and data do not become exclusive property simply because an organization collected and presented them. It further argued that Israel Railways’ status as a government-owned company has particular significance when dealing with operational information concerning public transportation.
The developers also disputed the railway’s claim that Better Rail contributed to system crashes and excessive loads. They said the warning letter did not provide traffic data, server logs, technical analysis or other evidence showing what portion of the system load, if any, originated from the app.
Better Rail has asked Israel Railways to provide the investigations and technical checks underlying its claims, as well as the traffic data and calculations used to reach its estimate of hundreds of thousands of shekels in damages.
The developers maintain that the traffic generated by Better Rail is “marginal" and relatively stable, and therefore could not explain localized load incidents.
At the same time, Better Rail says it is not opposed to ending its direct access to Israel Railways’ interfaces and has already begun transitioning to regulated data sources. However, it argues that the Ministry of Transport’s information must be completed or that an official, documented interface must be established that allows developers to provide passengers with complete and reliable information.
The developers also raised potential competition-law concerns, arguing that preventing Better Rail from accessing complete information while Israel Railways continues operating its own app could raise questions about fair competition. They said they reserve their rights on the issue while acknowledging the railway’s right to protect its systems and regulate access.
In its final response, Better Rail rejected the demands to shut down the app, delete its information, and remove it from app stores. The developers said they are prepared to operate within a regulated framework, but insist that any official data channel must provide developers with the complete information needed to offer the public a reliable transportation service.