Since the beginning of the war, I have had the privilege of speaking with many soldiers of all ranks who have fought against both Hamas and Hezbollah. Nearly all of them have expressed deep anger that the senior officers they believe were responsible for the "conceptzia" that preceded the October 7 massacre have not been held accountable for what they view as a catastrophic failure of leadership. Some of those officers, the soldiers pointed out with frustration, are even seeking elected office.
Even more troubling to them is their belief that neither the IDF's High Command nor much of Israel's political leadership is committed to achieving a decisive military victory. Instead, they argue, the objective has once again reverted to the pre-October 7 managing the threat rather than eliminating it.
Without exception, the soldiers I spoke with also criticized what they see as overly restrictive rules of engagement that unnecessarily endanger their lives. In their view, these policies stem either from concerns about international political pressure-particularly from the United States-or from placing excessive emphasis on the welfare of enemy civilians at the expense of Israel's own troops, who are not a far-removed army, but everyone's husband, fathers and sons. Many argued that the IDF's "Purity of Arms" doctrine should be replaced or substantially revised to better reflect both Jewish ethical values and sound principles of modern warfare.
When I asked soldiers about the recent disciplinary problems reported within the Givati Brigade, many responded by noting what they saw as a double standard. They recalled that, during the controversy surrounding the government's judicial reform proposals, Air Force reservists publicly threatened to suspend their volunteer service. In their view, few-if any-of those reservists faced meaningful disciplinary consequences. Whether one agrees with that comparison or not, it reflects a widespread perception among many frontline soldiers that standards have not been applied equally.
The soldiers are especially frustrated that they continue to fight over territory for which their fathers bled decades ago. Why, they ask, was this land never annexed? Why were previous generations asked to sacrifice so much, only for successive governments to relinquish control of territory that later became a battleground once again?
I also learned not to raise the issue of haredi military exemptions. Few subjects provoke greater resentment among combat soldiers. Many believe the burden of national defense is being distributed unfairly. For my part, I find it difficult to understand why successive governments, including those led by Likud, have continued political arrangements that many Israelis believe undermine national cohesion and military readiness, but it looks as though that may be approaching a solution after the coming elections.
One soldier, a friend of mine, asked whether I thought the IDF could one day experience something resembling the French Army mutinies of 1917. It was a thought-provoking question. History reminds us that even the finest armies can reach a breaking point if soldiers conclude that their sacrifices are being squandered by poor leadership. It is therefore worth recalling what actually happened in France during the First World War.
The French mutinies of 1917 were not a wholesale collapse of the army. They consisted of widespread protests, refusals to participate in costly offensive operations, and incidents of desertion following the disastrous Nivelle Offensive. At their height, the unrest affected a large portion of France's frontline infantry divisions.
Importantly, however, the soldiers did not abandon the defense of their country. They remained in their trenches and continued to repel German attacks. Their revolt was directed not against France, but against military leadership that they believed was employing disastrous tactics that produced horrific casualties with little strategic gain.
In other words, the mutinies were not driven by a desire for surrender or peace at any price. Rather, they reflected a demand for competent leadership, realistic strategy, and a doctrine capable of achieving victory without needless sacrifice.
Is the IDF on the verge of such an event? I do not believe so. However, many of the soldiers with whom I have spoken feel that unless senior military leadership is held accountable for past failures and meaningful reforms are implemented, frustration within the ranks will continue to grow. History teaches that there is only so much any army can ask of its soldiers before confidence in its leadership begins to erode.
Like the French soldiers of 1917, today's combat troops are not asking for surrender. They are asking for leadership, doctrine, and strategy that they believe will enable them to defeat the enemy decisively without paying what they see as an unnecessary butcher's bill in lives.