To describe Donald Trump’s foreign policy as “isolationist" is incorrect. Isolationism implies strategic withdrawal - a retreat from alliances, institutions, and global responsibilities. Trump’s posture reflects something different: a nationalist effort to renegotiate the terms under which the United States engages the world.
This distinction is not semantic. It is structural.
During Trump’s first term, U.S. defense spending rose from approximately $611 billion in FY2016 to roughly $778 billion by FY2020. And today, American global deployments remain extensive. American actions in Venezuela and Iran are not the gestures of a state seeking retreat. They are the actions of a state pursuing strength.
From a nationalist vantage point, the United States confronts two distinct forms of competition.
The first is external and systemic: China.
Economically, militarily, and technologically, Beijing represents the most formidable long-term challenge to American primacy. China’s GDP, measured in purchasing power parity, rivals that of the United States. Its official military expenditures exceed $225 billion annually and continue to expand. Its investments in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, naval capabilities, cyber infrastructure, and global logistics networks signal ambition extending far beyond regional influence. This is structural competition.
The second form of competition is subtler but politically consequential: Europe.
The European Union is not a military adversary; it is a normative alternative. The European project represents a synthesis of market capitalism with expansive social protections, regulatory oversight, and welfare guarantees. It models a system in which the state assumes broad responsibility for mitigating economic volatility and reducing inequality.
This model is increasingly appealing to broader segments of American society. The popularity - particularly among younger voters - of figures such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Bernie Sanders, together with the normalization of social-democratic rhetoric within the Democratic Party, reflects an openness to European-style policy frameworks. For many conservatives, this represents the most significant ideological challenge to the American ethos since the upheavals of the 1960s.
American political culture - especially within conservative traditions - privileges entrepreneurial risk-taking, capital mobility, labor flexibility, and comparatively lean welfare commitments. European governance places greater emphasis on social insurance, labor protections, collective bargaining structures, and redistributive mechanisms.
From a nationalist Republican perspective, Europe’s way of life does not threaten American security. But it complicates social and political cohesiveness at home by strengthening voices calling for the United States to abandon rugged individualism and embrace social-democratic values.
In this sense, Europe poses a challenge not through armies but through example. It shapes debate by offering an alternative model of prosperity.
Viewed through this lens, Trump’s insistence that NATO allies increase defense spending represents more than a financial grievance. For decades, Europe allocated a smaller share of GDP to defense while sustaining comparatively expansive social expenditures. In 2023, U.S. defense spending reached approximately $877 billion - far exceeding the collective defense outlays of European Union member states.
A nationalist strategy rebalances this equation. If European states assume greater responsibility for their own defense, fiscal trade-offs become unavoidable. Increased military spending competes with welfare guarantees, infrastructure investment, healthcare systems, and pension commitments. Even gradual adjustments place pressure on public finances and political consensus.
Comparisons to Ronald Reagan are instructive. In the 1980s, Reagan expanded U.S. defense spending dramatically while advancing the Strategic Defense Initiative. The underlying logic was competitive pressure: sustained economic and military strain would expose structural weaknesses in the Soviet system.
Today, with respect to China, tariffs, export controls, and supply-chain restrictions can be understood as forms of economic containment designed to slow Beijing’s ascent. With respect to Europe, compelling member states to shoulder heavier defense burdens may soon test the fiscal viability of Europe’s social model.
If such pressures generate strain within Europe, the implications will extend beyond the continent. European welfare systems are frequently invoked in American debates about economic structure and inequality. Should those systems falter under expanded defense obligations, their appeal in American political discourse could diminish.
Whether curbing or dismantling the European welfare state would revive confidence in the American Way of Life - grounded in market dynamism, regulated immigration, and leaner welfare structures - remains uncertain.
Ultimately, whether Trump’s strategy strengthens or narrows America’s long-term position, depends less on fiscal arithmetic than on political cohesion and social resilience - both at home and abroad.
Rafael Castro is an independent political analyst and a graduate of Yale and Hebrew University. An Italian Noahide by choice, Rafael can be reached at rafaelcastro78@gmail.com