CH-53 attack helicopter
CH-53 attack helicopterOfer Zidon/Flash90

In the coming days, the IDF is expected to hand the findings of the second Turgeman Commission after the commission examined the functioning of the Operations Directorate on October 7th and during the night leading up to the massacre.

According to Yedioth Aharonoth, at the center of the conclusions lies the hours-long delay to implement the order to divert the Air Force's efforts to the Gaza border fence and the routes used by the terrorists to invade Israel.

The order, which Gaza Division Commander BG Avi Rosenfeld gave at 9:47 a.m., was only implemented a while later, once it was too late.

Instead, Operation "Sword of Damocles" was launched, a large-scale attack plan that had been coordinated in advance by the Southern Command, Operations Directorate, and the Air Force to strike deep-seated targets in the Gaza Strip. The jets that were in the air, as well as the intelligence collection means, were routed to the mission, leaving the front in the Gaza envelope nearly defenseless.

A senior officer, who had arrived to assist in the fighting, had previously told the commanders: "Immediate fire on the routes could have changed the battle situation on the ground." However, in practice, implementation was delayed, and in some communities, no military assistance arrived until the terrorists had already withdrawn.

The second Turgeman Commission is currently determining why the planned operation was not stopped when the massacre began, and who was in charge of making the decisions during that stage. According to the command structure, the operational responsibility is vested in the Operations Division in the Operations Directorate; the commission will determine whether it acted correctly.

The commission is also examining whether it was possible to bypass the chain of command, which was compromised after the commanders of the Southern Brigade were killed, and to take control directly from the IDF headquarters in the Kirya Base in Tel Aviv. One example of this was the force of Egoz Unit commandos who failed to reach Kibbutz Nir Oz, leaving without reinforcements for hours.

The night before the attack is also under review. According to the information collected, a discussion took place between the Chief of Staff, the Operations Directorate Chief, and the Commander of the Southern Command, during which the possibility of a Hamas operation was raised.

The commission is examining why no directive was issued to raise operational alertness within the Operations Division, to prepare forces, and to be ready for an emergency scenario, even if it did not appear certain.