An internal IDF investigation, revealed this morning on Galei Tzahal, shows that the October 7th massacre caught the IDF completely unprepared for a prolonged, multi-front war.
According to the report, the document was not shown to Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and was not reviewed by the Turgeman Committee that examined probes of the events.
According to the findings, the IDF's pre-war reference scenario envisaged 21 days of fighting in Lebanon followed by 14 days in Gaza - a deployment of just five non-continuous weeks. The result was a system-wide underestimation of the war's duration and corresponding infrastructural preparedness.
Under that assessment, the quantities of ammunition and spare parts stockpiled were also insufficient. The IDF, the investigation states, had to launch an immediate procurement campaign in the war's early months, which delayed the ground offensive and response to other threats.
Another issue highlighted in the probe points to a dangerous dependence on U.S. emergency stockpiles. In the year before the war, the United States transferred more than 100,000 artillery shells from depots that had been located in Israel to the war in Ukraine. When it became clear those depots had been emptied, the IDF was exposed to a critical shortage of ammunition.
The investigation was conducted by an officer at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel from the Planning Directorate, and it sharply criticized various levels, including the Ground Forces, General Staff directorates and the Ministry of Defense.
Despite the severity of the conclusions, the document was not presented to the Chief of Staff or reviewed by the Turgeman Committee. It was, however, forwarded to the State Comptroller's Office.