The first phase of the American-brokered Gaza ceasefire has been implemented for the large part, securing the release of all living hostages and most of the hostage bodies . Yet, the long-term prognosis for stability remains grim, not because of the primary combatants, but because of the calculated refusal of regional Arab allies to assume responsibility for securing the peace.
The news last week provides a stunning illustration of this political evasion. King Abdullah of Jordan explicitly drew a red line, warning that while the region is willing to provide training for local Palestinian Arab police, nobody will want to touch the essential task of peace-enforcing in Gaza. Jordan subsequently ruled out sending any of its own forces, citing the fact that Amman is too close politically to the conflict.
This definitive refusal by both Jordan and Egypt to deploy troops into Gaza exposes a critical structural deficit in the entire post-conflict security plan. It confirms that key Arab powers are willing to cheer from the sidelines, but they refuse to assume the military and political burden necessary for long-term stability. Their evasion is a strategic failure that guarantees the fragility of the truce and maximizes the risk of a relapse into major conflict.
The Critical Distinction: Evasion Disguised as Capacity
King Abdullah’s comments were carefully calibrated to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable security roles. He stated that peacekeeping, meaning supporting local Palestinian Arab police forces trained in Jordan and Egypt, is a role they are willing to undertake.
But he drew the line at peace-enforcing, which he described as running around Gaza on patrol with weapons.
This distinction is crucial, and it reveals a cynical political calculation. The training of a Palestinian Arab police force is a necessary, low-risk, low-cost endeavor that generates positive diplomatic optics. It allows Jordan and Egypt to claim a role in the political solution without incurring any security liability.
Peace-enforcing, by contrast, is the dirty, high-risk work required to achieve the non-negotiable term of the ceasefire: the disarmament of Hamas. The Iran-backed terror group has already stated its refusal to lay down its weapons, insisting it will only disarm if the "occupation" ends. Any external force tasked with enforcing the truce will inevitably face hostile fire, political condemnation, and potential casualties.
By refusing to deploy forces, Amman and Cairo are signaling that they are unwilling to pay the high political price of confronting a non-state actor like Hamas, even to ensure the success of a regional peace plan. They are prioritizing domestic political comfort over regional security stability, effectively shifting the entire burden of enforcement onto the shoulders of a fragile, potentially hostile, international force.
The Collapse of the Security Architecture
The absence of a substantial, legitimate regional Arab component in any international force is fatal to the long-term prospects of the Gaza plan. Any non-Arab external force deployed without this regional backing risks being immediately perceived by the local population as a de facto occupation army. This lack of legitimacy dramatically increases the difficulty of the mission and the probability of a swift relapse into organized violence.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sissi, who has been integral to mediating the initial phase of the peace deal, himself termed the proposal the last chance for peace in the region. Yet, Egypt’s refusal to commit forces means that they are asking the international community-likely Western and neutral partners-to shoulder the military risk for a conflict that is fundamentally regional. This diplomatic stance places America and its allies in an impossible position: they are forced to choose between the high-risk deployment of their own troops into a hostile environment or watching the hard-won ceasefire collapse.
The Broader Strategic Cost
The refusal to enforce the peace in Gaza has consequences far beyond the immediate conflict zone. It signals a broader regional reluctance to contain instability, leaving the vacuum open for Iran and its proxies. While the Houthis have currently paused their attacks on shipping following the ceasefire announcement, their actions remain contingent upon the fate of the Gaza agreement. By weakening the security architecture of the ceasefire, Jordan and Egypt are increasing the chance that the Iran-Yemen axis could resume its attacks, destabilizing global trade and threatening vital US interests.
The path to long-term stability demands that regional powers assume ownership of the security environment. The current policy of evasion, disguised as capacity building, only guarantees that the region will remain dependent on external intervention and perpetually vulnerable to the next round of violence.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx