The Rightist Case against the Death Penalty for Islamic terrorists
Proposals to introduce a death penalty for convicted terrorists are advancing in the wake of the October 7th massacres. The desire to damn terrorists is just and understandable. Still, as a matter of national security, diplomacy, and social cohesion, a death penalty regime would be counterproductive for Israel.
First, terrorism is not just violence; it is PR. Perpetrators seek a platform that converts their crimes into narratives of grievance. Capital punishment would extend that platform. High-profile trials and scheduled executions generate long, predictable news cycles. Defense teams will use the dock to reach international audiences, framing defendants as historical avengers and citing episodes from, say, 1936 or 1947 to imply moral equivalence. Much of the global media is primed to amplify that framing. The result would not be deterrence; it would be publicity. An execution fixes the perpetrator’s story in the public record in a way that imprisonment does not. It risks transforming a convicted murderer into an international hero.
Second, a death penalty creates clear leverage for kidnappers. Before any execution date, Jewish communities and Israeli travelers would face a heightened risk of abductions designed to delay or commute sentences. Israel’s proven willingness to take extraordinary risks to save innocents is humane and right; it is also observable to adversaries. A formal execution calendar gives them an obvious pressure point. In practice, the threat expands beyond the individual on death row to broader demands for prisoner releases, thus increasing-not reducing-coercion against the state.
Third, capital punishment would deepen internal divisions and erode external support. Abroad-especially in countries where the death penalty is rejected-it would alienate Jews and non-Jews who are essential to Israel’s advocacy, philanthropy, and political support during crises. The net effect is to trade uncertain deterrence gains for certain diplomatic and communal costs.
Fourth, the policy would entangle Israel in prolonged legal and diplomatic contests. Capital cases are, by design, lengthy. Appeals, petitions to international bodies, and allied governments’ interventions would multiply. Even if Israeli courts handle such cases efficiently, the very existence of a death penalty invites secondary forums-UN committees, European institutions, and human-rights NGOs-to scrutinize every step. This constant litigation environment is a force multiplier for adversarial advocacy.
Fifth, the deterrence value is actually negative. Islamic terrorists seek glory through death. For suicide attackers, execution is a reward; particularly if death adds damage to the international image of Israel and if his death turns him into an international star and hero of Islam. The death penalty will embolden, not demoralize, terrorists.
To deter terrorism there are more effective, lower-risk means available: No conviction, no public platform: no interviews, no statements, no social media, no courtroom dramatics. Instead of spectacle, incapacitation and obscurity. Intelligent and stealthy responses that are so silent and lethal as to instill dread and fear in terrorist hearts and minds.
The core argument is simple: capital punishment would convert Arab terrorists into international heroes. It guarantees extended coverage, predictable pressure points for extortion, and an ongoing source of division between Israel and the world. It would hand enemies a propaganda tool without offering deterrence.
Israel should learn from the Jeffrey Epstein and Baader-Meinhof episodes that even the most democratic states can punish the wicked extrajudicially.
Rafael Castro is a Yale- and Hebrew University-graduate. A Noahide by choice, Rafael can be reached at rafaelcastro78@gmail.com