Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s new “strategic defense pact” is more than a symbolic gesture between two longstanding partners. By suggesting that Islamabad’s nuclear deterrent could extend to Riyadh, the agreement risks introducing nuclear proliferation into the heart of the Middle East and creating one of the most destabilizing security arrangements of the 21st century.
The pact, signed on September 18 by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, states that an attack on either country will be treated as an attack on both. Saudi commentators have gone further, explicitly comparing the arrangement to NATO’s Article 5 and hinting that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could be part of the package. That possibility would place nuclear weapons within the political reach of a monarchy that has long financed Islamist movements and leveraged religious ideology as a tool of foreign policy.
An Old Suspicion, Now Real
For decades, analysts speculated that Riyadh was quietly underwriting Pakistan’s nuclear program in exchange for future guarantees. Saudi officials denied such claims, but the timing and rhetoric surrounding this pact have revived those fears. By couching the deal in collective security language, the Saudi and Pakistani leadership have opened the door to what amounts to nuclear freelancing outside established alliances and norms.
The implications are grave. Saudi Arabia’s regional posture is not that of a status quo power seeking stability. From its export of Wahhabi ideology to its interventionist policies in Yemen and beyond, Riyadh has consistently acted in ways that destabilize its environment. Pakistan, meanwhile, has a deeply checkered history of nuclear stewardship: the A.Q. Khan network sold sensitive technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, while elements of the Pakistani security apparatus have long tolerated jihadist groups. Linking these two records under a nuclear umbrella magnifies, rather than reduces, risk.
Regional Consequences
The regional timing is telling. Just days before the pact, Israel carried out a precision strike in Doha against Hamas leaders. For Riyadh, that operation underscored both Israel’s reach and Washington’s limits. For Islamabad, struggling with financial crisis and diplomatic isolation, Saudi Arabia’s embrace provided both resources and prestige. What emerged was a convergence of insecurity — Riyadh’s desire for deterrence and Islamabad’s need for relevance — forged into a high-risk alliance.
For Israel, this presents a two-front challenge: containing Iran’s advancing program while factoring in a Saudi regime potentially emboldened by Pakistani nuclear cover. For the United States and Europe, it calls into question the credibility of long-standing security commitments. A Middle East in which nuclear deterrence is wielded by authoritarian regimes with Islamist ties is fundamentally different from one in which nuclear weapons remain the monopoly of recognized, responsible states.
A Necessary Policy Response
The West must move quickly to address this threat before it hardens into a new security reality. Several steps are essential.
First, Washington should make clear that any transfer of nuclear assets, technology, or operational control from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia will be met with immediate and severe sanctions. This message must be explicit, not implied, and it must be backed by bipartisan consensus to ensure credibility.
Second, Europe cannot afford to hedge. The European Union has a direct interest in preventing nuclear instability that could spill into North Africa and the Mediterranean. Coordinated U.S.-EU measures would send a powerful signal to both Riyadh and Islamabad that nuclear freelancing will isolate, not empower, them.
Third, Israel and Western intelligence services must intensify monitoring of potential proliferation channels. The A.Q. Khan episode proved how rapidly illicit networks can expand when left unchecked. Vigilance now could prevent a repeat of that history, this time with Saudi financing and state sponsorship behind it.
Finally, Washington should reassess its broader Gulf posture. For too long, Riyadh has been treated as an indispensable partner despite its destabilizing behavior. This pact demonstrates that the kingdom continues to view security through the prism of deterrence by proxy rather than genuine reform or integration into a stable regional order. U.S. policy must shift from indulgence to conditionality.
A Dangerous Precedent
The Saudi-Pakistani pact illustrates a troubling trend: authoritarian regimes bypassing established alliances to construct ad hoc, high-risk security guarantees. This is not NATO. It is a transactional arrangement between two states with long records of empowering Islamist movements. To treat it as a normal defense agreement would be a profound error.
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan present their defense pact as a step toward security and stability. In truth, it is an act of nuclear opportunism that threatens both. For Washington, Brussels, and Jerusalem, the challenge is immediate: prevent this pact from normalizing the idea that nuclear umbrellas can be rented by regimes that export extremism and fuel instability.
Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx.