Dr. Salem AlKetbi is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate
On August 8, 2025, the White House witnessed the signing of an historic agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump and attended by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The agreement stipulates the creation of a strategic corridor stretching from Azerbaijani territory to the Nakhchivan Republic through the southern strip of Armenia, continuing its path to Turkish territory and from there to Europe.
This corridor, which passes through the sensitive Zangezur region, forms part of the Middle Corridor project aimed at connecting Central Asia to the European continent without passing through Iranian or Russian territory. In truth, this agreement was not a passing event in the regional political calendar, but a pivotal milestone that could reshape maps of influence and trade routes in the Caucasus.
This raises the question: what will the Caucasus, Europe, and the world gain from this corridor, what risks might it face if Iran decides to obstruct it, and how will Washington respond if the American security company responsible for its protection comes under direct attack?
I believe the answer lies in understanding the project’s dimensions as both an economic and strategic venture, combining the promises of development with the risks of escalation.
Economically, the corridor is not merely a transport route but a comprehensive project including logistical facilities, customs centers, and commercial and industrial service zones, capable of stimulating vital sectors in the Caucasus. According to announcements, a licensed American security company will be tasked with its protection, granted full authority to use force and engage immediately with any threat, alongside direct coordination with local agencies and the deployment of fixed checkpoints and mobile patrols.
From my perspective, the presence of such a company is not only a security element, but also a political and economic message: this corridor will not be left to an uncertain fate or to the blackmail of obstructive forces.
To be sure, the economic benefits this corridor can provide extend beyond the Caucasus. For Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is an opportunity to reposition themselves on the global trade map and open up to the markets of Europe and Central Asia.
For Europe, which has sought for years to reduce its dependence on traditional energy and transport routes, this corridor represents a new artery for economic security. In truth, Europe’s experience with the energy crisis following the war in Ukraine has made the idea of diversifying routes not a luxury but a strategic necessity impacting the continent’s economic and political security.
Observers believe that this corridor, if completed and stabilized, will significantly weaken Iranian influence, as it geographically isolates Iran from one of the most important regional transit routes and deprives it of leverage it has used for decades. This isolation is not just an economic loss but a decline in Tehran’s ability to influence regional balances, especially in the Caucasus, where it has long sought to remain a key player.
It is no secret that Iranian escalation, if it moves from the realm of statements and maneuvers to field action, could subject the corridor to its first real security test. In this context, if the American security company operating to protect the corridor comes under direct attack, the U.S. response will test Washington’s credibility in protecting its investments and allies.
Experiences in Iraq and Syria indicate that the response is often calculated, through precise strikes against Iran’s proxies and their operational structures, to establish deterrence without sliding into a full-scale confrontation. A major attack resulting in significant American casualties might push the U.S. administration, even under internal pressures to avoid escalation, towards a qualitative response that could include targeting field commanders or sites linked to the Revolutionary Guard.
As for the idea of establishing a permanent U.S. military base in Armenia in response to potential threats, it seems to remain a less likely option, because such a base would be a fixed and easy target for threats, similar to U.S. bases in Iraq that face repeated attacks. More likely, as observers note, Washington will rely on a distributed deployment network, small protection points, and rapid reaction forces from regional locations, supported by mobile air defense systems - a model that offers greater flexibility and reduces the chances of the project being directly targeted.
In the broader picture, the corridor can be seen not as a transport project alone, but as a test of development’s ability to triumph over the obstacles of geopolitics. Its success would mean security and economic stability in a region long plagued by tension, transforming it into a true bridge between East and West. Its failure, however, would reinforce the narrative of obstructive forces that major projects cannot survive in a volatile regional environment.
Ultimately, without a doubt, the fate of this corridor will depend on the will of the parties to protect it from the winds of politics before its asphalt paving is even completed.
The corridor intended to be a bridge for intercontinental trade may turn into a testing ground for the wills of nations. Either the caravans of development will cross it in broad daylight, or the winds of conflict will blow over it in the darkness of politics. History, in truth, shows no mercy to those who miss their opportunity when it passes by, for geography may grant you the passage, but will alone grants you the road.
