Introduction
The geopolitical balance in the Middle East has shifted dramatically since Israel’s Twelve-Day War against Iran. That conflict marked the end of a period in which Iran projected power across the region with relative ease and impunity. For decades, Iran leaned on Russia as its main partner against Western and Israeli pressure. Yet Moscow’s grinding war in Ukraine, coupled with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, has sharply reduced Iran’s ability to project power in the region.
China is maneuvering into this vacuum. Unlike Moscow, Beijing does not support Tehran’s hegemonic and expansionist agenda; nor does it seek open confrontation with Israel or the West. Rather, it sees Iran as a convenient wedge: a means to distract and pressure Washington while expanding Chinese influence, both in its neighboring Far East and the Middle East, a region central to Beijing’s energy security and global strategy.
Reports that Chinese-origin missile fuel materials were involved in a deadly explosion at an Iranian port underscore the seriousness of Beijing’s role. Other accounts — though still unverified — suggest possible transfers of advanced air defense systems.
What is clear is that China is stepping up its footprint in Iran just as Russia falters. If unchecked, this support could prolong Tehran’s capacity for destabilization.
Yet unlike Moscow, Beijing is risk-averse. Its ambitions are constrained by broader strategic priorities — a tension that creates an opening for U.S. policy.
China’s Strategic Entry Point
China’s relationship with Iran has always been pragmatic. Energy is the foundation: Beijing imports the vast majority of Iran’s crude exports, providing Tehran with a lifeline in defiance of Western sanctions. Beyond oil, Iran occupies a strategic position on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), linking East Asia to the Mediterranean via overland and maritime routes.
Militarily, Beijing once kept its distance, confining itself to deniable, dual-use technology transfers and modest arms sales. But that line is blurring. According to Associated Press, Chinese-made propellant chemicals were implicated in an April explosion at the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas, killing tens and injuring hundreds.
In early June, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran had ordered material from China for hundreds of ballistic missiles. A few weeks later, in early July, Middle East Eye reported—citing Arab officials—that Beijing had quietly supplied Iran with advanced air defense systems following Israel’s strikes during the Twelve-Day War.
While the full scope of Chinese assistance is uncertain, the pattern is clear: Beijing is exploiting the Russian vacuum and Tehran’s vulnerability. China has now emerged as Iran’s most valuable partner — not out of ideological solidarity, but as a calculated move to expand leverage in the Middle East.
The Decline of Russia
Russia once served as Iran’s indispensable ally. Its military intervention in Syria preserved Assad, secured Iran’s access to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and gave Tehran strategic depth against Israel. Moscow also provided advanced air defense systems, intelligence, and diplomatic cover at the United Nations.
But Ukraine has drained Russia’s resources and credibility. The fall of Assad removed Moscow’s strongest foothold in the Levant. For Iran, the loss of Syria meant the loss of its vital corridor to Lebanon, severely weakening Hezbollah’s ability to deter Israel. When Israel and Iran clashed directly during the Twelve-Day War, Tehran’s diminished axis deeply exposed it to Israeli aggression.
There is also a growing perception among Iran’s political elite that Moscow has betrayed Tehran to serve its own strategic interests. A senior Iranian official recently issued unprecedented accusations, alleging that Russia—long regarded as Iran’s strategic ally—supplied Israel with Iranian air defense intelligence both during last year’s Israeli strikes and the recent Twelve-Day War. He went so far as to say that the latter conflict demonstrated Iran’s supposed strategic alliance with Russia was nothing but an “illusion.”
This dual erosion — Russia’s decline as patron and Iran’s loss of strategic depth — created the opening China is now filling. By stepping in where Moscow cannot, Beijing positions itself as Tehran’s indispensable new partner.
Beijing’s Calculated Support
China’s involvement, however, is cautious. Beijing sees value in keeping Iran afloat. Limited support — dual-use materials, fuel precursors, or defensive systems — enables Tehran to pressure Israel and the United States without altering the balance of power. For China, this is a low-cost way to tie down Washington and probe Western red lines while enhancing its bargaining power with Gulf states and Israel.
On the other hand, in recent years China has presented itself as a mediator, brokered a thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and signed large infrastructure and investment deals across the Gulf. Its footprint in Israel’s ports and technology sector underscores its multi-vector approach. Against this backdrop, aiding Iran is less about backing an ideological ally than cultivating leverage. This balancing act fits into Beijing’s broader regional strategy.
Factoring in China’s Risk Aversion
The United States cannot afford to overlook Beijing’s growing military role in Iran. But it must remember that China is not Russia: it will not prop up Tehran at any cost. Beijing is a different actor—opportunistic yet cautious, and always guided by long-term global priorities.
China is deeply invested in stable ties with the Gulf’s Arab states, whose energy exports underpin its economy. It has cultivated strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and its Belt and Road Initiative depends on predictable trade routes across the Middle East. Beijing has also expanded its presence in Israel, signaling how much it values ties with the Jewish state despite tensions with Washington.
Above all, China is wary of an over-mighty Iran. Tehran’s ambitions for regional hegemony and its pursuit of nuclear weapons do not serve Beijing’s interests. A nuclear-armed, expansionist theocracy on China’s western periphery could destabilize the Gulf, antagonize Arab partners, and threaten Belt and Road investments. In Beijing’s calculus, Tehran is a tool, not to be empowered beyond control. For this reason, China’s patronage is cautious and conditional.
Policy Recommendations
China’s hesitation to unconditionally support Iran creates an opportunity for U.S. intervention. The first priority should be to raise the costs of Beijing’s support. Publicly exposing and sanctioning dual-use transfers can complicate clandestine supply chains and force Beijing to weigh reputational and economic risks more carefully.
At the same time, targeted diplomatic engagement should stress that enabling Iran’s military buildup will erode China’s standing with Gulf states and Israel — relationships Beijing prizes.
Equally important is reframing the competition. Washington must emphasize that China is not a neutral economic actor but a key enabler of Iran’s potentially destabilizing behavior. By drawing attention to this role, the United States can build consensus among European and Middle Eastern partners for a united stance, blunting Beijing’s narrative of non-interference and highlighting the contradictions in its position.
Still, the central pillar of U.S. strategy should be to exploit the mismatch between China’s caution and Iran’s recklessness. Washington and its allies should make clear to Beijing that an unrestrained Iran threatens not only Western interests but also China’s own: energy security, Belt and Road projects, partnerships with Gulf Arab states, and economic ties with Israel.
Beijing does not want Iran to collapse, but neither does it want Tehran to ignite a regional war or trigger nuclear proliferation. By pressing China to use its influence in service of stability, Washington can transform Beijing’s managed enablement into a stabilizing force. This will not end tensions or halt Iran’s ambitions, but it can help establish boundaries and reduce risks of escalation.
In an era where China’s presence in the Gulf is a reality, the task is to channel it toward outcomes that restrain Iran rather than embolden it.
Conclusion
The aftermath of Israel’s Twelve-Day War has revealed both Iran’s fragility and the changing balance of Middle Eastern geopolitics. Russia’s decline — accelerated by its Ukrainian quagmire and Assad’s fall — has left Tehran weakened and exposed. China has stepped in to exploit the gap, providing lifelines of economic and military support.
But Beijing’s commitment should not be overstated. China is a cautious power, balancing its interests across the region and unwilling to empower Iran beyond a certain point. For Washington, this distinction is critical. U.S. policy must focus on exploiting Beijing’s risk-aversion to constrain Iran’s destabilizing behavior. By doing so, the U.S. can curb or complicate Tehran’s rearmament, drive Iran toward de-escalation with the West, and harness China’s opportunism as a force for stability rather than conflict in the Middle East.
Dr. Reza Parchizadeh is a political theorist and strategic affairs specialist focusing on Eurasia and the Middle East, great power competition, and international security. He has advised American and Israeli governments on national security issues and spoken at the U.S. Congress on foreign and security policy. Widely published in outlets like Al Arabiya, BESA Center, Middle East Forum, The Jamestown Foundation, and Israel National News, he concentrates on Iran, Israel, Turkey, the Arab world, and how external powers, including Russia and China, shape the regional dynamics in the Middle East.