That October 7th stands among the darkest days in the history of Zionism is beyond dispute. Given the magnitude of the suffering and destruction it wrought, the natural and intuitive reaction is to demand massive increases in military readiness and hardware even once the war is over.
Such measures, although understandable, may not be strictly necessary.
Indeed, the tragedy of October 7th might have been inexpensively and effectively averted—if only a few dangerous assumptions had been avoided and some simple countermeasures adopted.
The flawed thinking that led to October 7th is colloquially referred to as the Konzeptzia: the belief that peace and quiet in Gaza could be bought by funneling Qatari funds to Hamas.
This mindset reflects two deeper pathologies within Israeli and broader Jewish strategic thought:
1. A persistent failure to seriously engage with and understand the values and worldview of adversaries.
2. The expectation that non-Jews—especially Muslim Arabs—will respond to Zionist gestures as Jews would under analogous circumstances.
These flaws are evident in the way many even well-educated Israelis see their enemies as fanatical, irrational, or primitive. These labels ring true from a Western or Judeo-Christian perspective. Yet from within the internal logic of Islamic ideology, Hamas’ goals and strategies are rational and, tragically, effective.
From a Western point of view, Hamas may appear to have lost. But from a Hamas-Islamic perspective, the opposite is true:
1. Muslim casualties are seen as martyrs now enjoying the highest realms of paradise.
2. The murdered Israelis are, in their view, suffering eternal punishment.
3. Saudi-Israeli normalization talks have been nearly derailed.
4. Israel is hated globally in ways unseen since 1948.
5. The region's strongest military has fought forjl two years and has not yet completely defeated a jihadist militia.
6. Gaza will likely be rebuilt with international aid.
7. Israeli faith in peace and coexistence with Arabs is shattered.
It is astonishing that Israel's intelligence and security establishment failed to anticipate the implications of Saudi-Israeli normalization for Hamas. Such an agreement would have dealt a devastating blow to the religious legitimacy of Palestinian Arab jihadism. Saudi Arabia, as custodian of Mecca and Medina, holds immense symbolic weight. For Hamas to wage war on Israel after such a deal would have been akin to a Catholic country rejecting a diplomatic partner already recognized by the Vatican.
Given the stakes, we still don't know why the IDF was not placed on high alert near Gaza and Lebanon to deter a possible disruption of the peace process. This failure did not require a PhD in Islamic Studies to foresee—only common strategic sense.
The second major failing was Israel's disregard for soft power. Billions are spent on tanks, drones, and elite pilot training. Yet cost-effective initiatives with high return on investment are routinely neglected.
Take Gaza: The IDF now fights a war some think it cannot conclusively win—not because of a lack of valor or equipment, but because Hamas built tunnels, hides among civilians, and indoctrinates its fighters. And yet, all of these obstacles could have been mitigated in advance.
Since 2007, Hamas has ruled Gaza with an iron grip, raising a generation steeped in hatred for Jews. While UNRWA is often blamed, even if UNRWA had reformed, indoctrination would have continued, because Hamas controls both mosques and media.
Consider World War II: Radio London inspired occupied Europe. During the Cold War, Voice of America undermined Communist morale. A similar Arabic-language radio station for Gaza—offering music, honest news, and political discussion—could have exposed Hamas corruption, abuses, and hypocrisy, and highlighted both Israeli medical care for Gazan children and the high quality of life available to Arabs ready to coexist with Israel.
Such a radio station might have weakened public support for Hamas and hastened defections and mass surrender of Hamas fighters. Like Al Jazeera enhances Qatar's soft power, this outlet could have given Israel a valuable tool. Listener calls could have yielded vital intelligence—including about tunnel locations and Hamas terrorism plans.
This opportunity still exists. Such a project would be inexpensive but impactful.
Soft power can work beyond Gaza. The Arabic internet is flooded with antisemitic propaganda. Israel should make its best books on Judaism and Jewish history available in Arabic.
Such outreach wouldn’t make the Arab world sing "Hava Nagila," but it could inspire allies, informants, and honest critics.
The same principle applies in the West. Zionist organizations often focus on galas and awards. But perhaps a small team of IDF recruits should send personal thank-you emails to thousands of dedicated pro-Israel advocates on their birthdays - that could have an outsized morale impact.
Israel's adversaries understand grassroots activism. While pro-Israel lobbyists cultivated elite contacts, anti-Israel activists mobilized local churches, pastors, and organizers—people whose voices move votes. AIPAC may have every Democrat's number in Congress, but those Democrats heard from constituents first.
Israel must learn to think Jewish again. That means recognizing that Israel’s enemies are not merely irrational, but passionately committed. Their century of failure hasn’t broken their spirits because they fight for beliefs as passionately as we defend ours.
To prevail, we must understand those beliefs—and confront them with force, but also with the most powerful weapons of the Jewish tradition: truth, intelligence, and the love of justice.
Rafael Castrois a graduate of Yale and Hebrew University, and an independent political analyst. Rafael, a Noahide by choice, can be reached at rafaelcastro78@gmail.com