Egypt and Jordan: more minuses than pluses
The idea of resettling the Palestinian Arabs of Gaza has become the focus of attention of politicians and the media, and this is undoubtedly good news.
The bad news is that the idea is extremely problematic to implement, since almost all Muslim countries - and above all, Egypt and Jordan – refuse to accept the masses of Arabs from Gaza.
The reasons for this are obvious. Without mentioning the desire to maintain an enclave hostile to Israel in order to put pressure on Israel and blackmail it, the governments of both countries have more weighty concerns.
Palestinian Arabs comprise about 60-70% of Jordanian citizens, and the Muslim Brotherhood, or Hamas, is very strong there. The entire population of the country is small: about 11.5 million people, not to mention the masses of refugees from Syria and Iraq who comprise about 30% of the population.
The monarchy is still very unstable. How will things develop if, for example, half a million aggressive residents of Gaza are resettled there? An explosion can occur.
In Egypt, they will also become a destabilizing force. Being extremely indoctrinated with Islamist ideology, they will inevitably, as in Jordan, provide powerful support to the Muslim Brotherhood, which poses a threat to the al-Sisi regime.
In addition, it is not clear where Egypt can settle them. The Nile Delta, where Cairo is located, is one of the most densely populated places on the planet: more than 40 million (!) people are concentrated here. It is essentially a giant anthill. Most of the country is desert, a desert unsuitable for normal life.
How will the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of hate-ridden Gazan Arabs in Jordan and Egypt affect Israel's security?
Here we face numerous risks. In Jordan, they will allow Hamas to form a mini-Hamastan, which will threaten Israel's most weakly fortified border. They will also almost certainly become proxies for Iran and Turkey, who are united in their hatred of the Jewish state.
In Egypt, if they are stationed in Sinai, they will pose a threat to Idrael’s border communities. In addition, if Israel fails to ensure full control of the Philadelphi Corridor, they can return to Gaza through tunnels.
Most other Arab states will also refuse to accept Gazan Arabs for similar security reasons.
However, in our opinion, there is an exception to this rule, and it can and should be used. This exception is Libya.
Failed state: six or more quasi-states
Libya is a country with a huge territory and a relatively small (7 million people) population. The population density is about 4 people per square kilometer, with most of it concentrated in the coastal areas. It is one of the least densely populated countries in the world.
But what is more important is that Libya today consists of several quasi-states.
• The officially recognized Government of National Accord or Unity (GNA/GNU) sits in Tripoli in the west of the country. Its authority is limited exclusively to the capital of Libya and its environs.
• In the east, in Tobruk, there is an alternative government subordinate to the House of Representatives, which competes with the GNA/GNU and supports the commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar. Haftar controls 90% of the country's territory, including part of the southern province of Fezzan.
• In the southwest there is an independent region with the largest city – Sabha. This is part of the Fezzan province, populated by nomads, and is not subordinate to either the GNA or Haftar.
• To the northwest of Tripoli, in Zintan, there is an independent entity with its own armed forces.
• To the east of Tripoli is the city of Misurata – a self-proclaimed city-state, closed to other Libyans.
• The coastal city of Sirte is controlled by local militias and terrorist groups. This zone of control is the most unstable and is a battlefield for various armed militias and formations.
When interests converge
Thus, we are dealing with several entities.
All of them (or most of them) are extremely interested in:
• first, the influx of a fresh population capable of successful integration;
• second, investments to develop local industry, agriculture and infrastructure and to strengthen their armed formations;
• third, political dividends and international recognition, which will help them to emerge from isolation into the international arena.
This is especially true for two leading players: the NTC and Khalifa Haftar.
General Haftar, in alliance with the House of Representatives, controls most of Libya with the province of Cyrenaica (whose capital is Benghazi, the second largest city in Libya) and its leading oil and infrastructure facilities, and remains the unrecognized leader of the opposition. He also controls part of the historical territory of Fezzan, which is of strategic importance due to its oil fields and cross-border trade routes.
The Fezzan region is rich in natural resources, but sparsely populated and in dire need of an influx of labor. In addition, Haftar needs a militia that would allow him to resist the raids of tribal militias, Tuaregs and Tebu, as well as the activities of smugglers. In this regard, additional human resources would be extremely useful.
Despite having rich resources, the territories under Haftar's control suffer from a lack of investment in infrastructure, health and education. This could easily be replenished with Western and Arab aid.
In turn, the GNA/GNA authorities in Tripoli, although they have international support, also suffer from an acute shortage of people. A massive influx of people from Gaza would bring new labor resources and allow them to realize their political ambitions and strengthen their legitimacy in the world, attracting the attention of the media and business community.
The excessive influence of the militias makes the GNA/ GNU rule unstable and complicates its rivalry with Haftar. In fact, the GNA/ GNU does not have a regular army, which makes the authorities in Tripoli very vulnerable.
Recently, the authorities of this fictitious state have been trying to strengthen their political and economic positions. Together with the Secretary General of the Council of Arab Economic Unity, they are planning a conference on the reconstruction of Libya, with the development of a comprehensive strategy for attracting investors at the regional, international and Arab levels.
The other players are less significant, but can be used to solve the problem of the Arabs of Gaza, since they suffer from problems similar to those of the PNC/PNA and Haftar.
For all of them, the combination of political, economic and demographic dividends is undoubtedly an excellent incentive to accept refugees.
In turn, in the current situation of the extreme fragmentation of Libya, the United States could easily influence almost each of the parties to the conflict, using the carrot and stick method.
An entity that agrees to accept and accommodate Palestinian Arabs would receive generous financial and political support, including international recognition.
And, on the contrary, in case of a refusal to cooperate, this entity faces the threat of diplomatic, economic and military support from the other side, as well as sanctions and even an oil embargo.
As for the Arabs from Gaza themselves, integration in Libya can be carried out much more easily than in other countries due to related religious, cultural and linguistic factors.
There is no doubt that they will feel much more comfortable in Libya than in Yemen or Morocco, not to mention African countries or Indonesia.
In our opinion, this proposal applies best to Khalifa Haftar.
And if the Palestinian Arabs of Gaza move there, they will not pose a threat not only to Israel, but also to the stability of the Hashemite regime and Egypt.
Geopolitical gains
Implementation of the project in Libya will bring geopolitical dividends to the West.
If any party to the conflict in Libya becomes a partner of the United States in implementing the project (primarily Haftar, who controls most of Libya), Washington gains leverage in this key North African country. This allows strengthening the influence of the United States and containing the expansion of states hostile to America: China, Russia and Turkey.
The EU countries also receive undoubted benefits from the project: obtaining a friendly state (or quasi-state) in the Maghreb, a stable source of energy resources and a barrier against mass migration on the long Libyan border.
In our opinion, cooperation with Haftar is the ideal option in this puzzle.
This will ensure a solution to the plight of the Arabs of Gaza, bring security and stability to the Middle East, including Israel, and moderate regimes friendly to the West, as well as number of geopolitical and energy dividends to the United States and its allies.
Alexander Maistrovoy (Jerusalem) is a journalist and publicist, published in Arutz Sheva/Israel National News, Gatestone Institute, Times of Israel, Jihad Watch, Frontpage Mag, Сanada Free Press, American Thinker, Liberty Unyielding and others. He is the author of Agony of Hercules or a Farewell to Democracy (Notes of a Stranger) and Jewish Atlántida. Mystery of the Lost Tribes (In Russian and Finnish).
Dr. Alexander Rybalov (Jerusalem) earned his PhD in Computer Science from City University of New York and worked at AT&T Labs. He made Aliya in 1999 and served as a Senior Data Scientist in several high-tech and financial companies, as well as a lecturer at the Jerusalem College of Technology. He is the author of 30 publications including a book ‘Country of Millionaires’ (in Hebrew) with more with 2000+ citation index.