It wasn't an easy wait for those of us who understood.
I even personally spent thousands of dollars on a broadband satellite modem and a solar panel system in expectation that we wouldn't have phone service or electricity.
If you understand Hebrew it is worthwhile to watch the Gallant interview in which he blames Gantz, Eisenkot and Netanyahu for not attacking Hezbollah on October 11th and calls that failure "the greatest security blunder since the establishment of the State of Israel."
You will be shocked to learn that then DM Gallant not only wasn't aware on October 2023 of the "Jericho Wall" document which spelled out Hamas' plans but that Gallant wasn't sure the IDF COS knew about it either.
The open source reports are that the chain of command in Military Intelligence blocked material on Jericho Wall because it didn't jibe with their disastrously wrong assessments.
You might share my disappointment that Amit Segal, who was interviewing Gallant, didn't pivot from this stunning news to ask Gallant why he didn't support legislation so that members of the security system - of any rank - can reach out to the prime minister and defense minister with information which they deem to be critical (today they could and did go to prison for such an act). What a difference that would have made!
You may not be surprised to learn that even though Gallant does understand that "Jericho Wall" predates the judicial reform initiatives and that Hamas and Hezbollah have been preparing for many many years to destroy Israel that he STILL thinks that somehow the attack was launched in part because of judicial reform and Israeli activity on the Temple Mount.
This is the link to view the interview of former DM Gallant on Channel 12
https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/2025_q1/Article-f0dc39bc717d491027.htm
This is the link for Haim Ramon's scathing attack
https://x.com/ramonhaim/status/1888589858710372734
And here is a ChatGPT0 translation of former Minister Chaim Ramon's post:
The interviews given by Defense Minister Gallant to Yedioth Ahronoth and Channel 12 News were full of half-truths and outright lies. But it seems to me that Gallant reached the peak of his falsehoods in his description of his positions regarding the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, both regarding his claim that he proposed attacking Hezbollah in October and regarding his opposition to attacking Hezbollah at the end of August.
Gallant recounts how, on October 11, he proposed opening a second front against Hezbollah in Lebanon, but Bibi did not allow him to. Gallant explains that if we had started the war against Hezbollah first, including a ground maneuver into Lebanon, "we would have achieved the physical elimination of a significant portion of Hezbollah," and then we could have "taken divisions from the north, transferred them south, operated in Khan Yunis and Rafah simultaneously with operations in Gaza," and salvation would have come to Zion, with Gallant as Israel's great savior.
Gallant is lying and misleading in almost every word of his account. On October 11, the IDF was still completing its takeover of the southern border. At that stage, when Hamas and Hezbollah were at the peak of their strength and preparedness, Israel was at the peak of its weakness, the IDF was battered, and even the Chief of Staff himself had low confidence in the ground forces' capabilities.
(Even weeks later, when the Chief of Staffpresented the war plan to the war cabinet, he explained that the ground maneuver would begin with a slow and gradual attack only in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, instead of a rapid, simultaneous attack across the entire Strip, "to restore the IDF's self-confidence after October 7"- and Gallant supported this).
Furthermore, until that time, the prevailing security assessment was that the IDF was not capable of waging a war on two fronts simultaneously, certainly not when one of those fronts was against Hezbollah. In other words, Gallant's proposal would have resulted in halting any possible maneuver in Gaza for the entire duration of the campaign in Lebanon.
Gallant mockingly describes Netanyahu's fear that thousands of Israeli civilians would die from Hezbollah's residual missile capability if Israel opened a second front, but he "forgets" to mention that the IDF's reference scenario at the time was as follows: A full-scale attack on Hezbollah at the height of its strength would cost the lives of hundreds of soldiers, and even if Israel managed to destroy the vast majority of Hezbollah's missiles
in a surprise attack, the residual capability that remained would still result in the deaths of thousands of civilians.
Noam Amir recounts how, three months before October 7, military reporters attended a briefing at the National Security Council with senior IDF officers. The scenario presented to them for a war against Hezbollah was as follows: On the first day of the war, Hezbollah would fire 6,000 rockets at Israel; on the second day, 5,000 rockets; on the third day, 5,000 rockets; and only on the fourth day would the IDF succeed in reducing Hezbollah'sdaily rocket fire to 1,400-2,000.
The military reporters asked the Home Front Command commander how the command would handle such a scale of fire. His response was: "There will be destruction on an unimaginable scale." The reporters then asked the Air Force commander, "Can the Iron Dome handle 6,000 rockets?" His response: "There is a reasonable chance that in the first few days, there will be no Iron Dome. It will take us at least three to four days [to activate it] because Hezbollah knows how to strike it."
At that time, the IDF was at its weakest: The emergency warehouses contained only two to three weeks' worth of ammunition; the maneuvering divisions were far from full operational readiness, many of their reservists had yet to be mobilized, and those who had been mobilized were only just beginning refresher training. In the north, there was only one division, while the other divisions were either in the south or in the process of mobilization.
(As a reminder, just two days earlier, IDF forces had completed the clearing of Hamas forces from the Gaza border communities).
The northern settlements had not yet been evacuated, and thousands of Radwan Force fighters were positioned just a short distance from the border, inside tunnels and heavily fortified positions.
In other words, if Israel had launched an attack against Hezbollah on October 11, it would not have had enough ground forces in the north to confront the Radwan Force troops stationed at the border, and they could have penetrated Israel, seized several communities, and taken hundreds of Israelis captive. Then, after two to three weeks of fighting, the IDF would have reached a catastrophic situation where its aircraft would have no bombs left to drop on Hezbollah forces, and its artillery would have no shellsleft to fire at them.
Fortunately, those who saved us from the disaster Gallant was about to bring upon us were Gantz and Eisenkot, who, together with Netanyahu and Dermer, rejected this reckless proposal.
While Gallant wanted to attack in the north as early as October 11, when Hezbollah was at its strongest and the IDF at its weakest, a few months later-after the IDF had strengthened, acquired ammunition, and its ground forces had gained combat experience in Gaza, while Hezbollah had been worn down by the IDF's gradual planned escalation and the continuous Air Force strikes on its missile stockpiles (as well as secret nightly IDF raids destroying weapons at its outposts during those months) and Radwan Force troops at the border-suddenly, the Defense Minister changed his stance 180 degrees regarding Lebanon and worked to end Operation Iron Swords without launchinga large-scale military campaign against Hezbollah.
On August 29, Gallant presented a document to the cabinet in which he proposed reaching a hostage deal not only to end the war in Gaza but also to facilitate an arrangement in the north to prevent war with Hezbollah and to soften Iran's intentions for revenge against Israel. In other words, Gallant proposed that Israel surrender in the south to Hamas and surrender in the north-before even confronting Hezbollah-so as not to provoke Iran.
Had the cabinet adopted Gallant's second irresponsible proposal regarding Lebanon, the consequences would have been as follows: The nauseating hostage-return ceremonies would have taken place with Yahya Sinwar presiding over the event; thousands of Hamas terrorists who have since been eliminated would still be alive; Nasrallah would be delivering victory speeches; Hezbollah's entire leadership would still be alive; Operation Beepers wouldnever have been launched; thousands of Hezbollah fighters would still have both eyes and ten fingers; and the Radwan Force would be stationed along the fence, right next to the northern communities, with the ability to inflict a disaster seven times greater than October 7.
Iran's air defense systems would still be fully operational, and its influence in the region would have reached new heights.
But Gallant didn't stop at trying to persuade the cabinet to halt the impending attack against Hezbollah. The day before Operation Beepers was launched, Gallant leaked a criminal disclosure to Ronen Bergman about "reckless steps the Israeli government is planning in the north." This criminal leak-which has yet to be investigated by the police and Shin Bet-could have led to the failure of Operation Beepers, which had been inpreparation for years, and prevented the severe blow we dealt to Hezbollah.
In an interview with Nadav Eyal, Gallant boasted about how he worked to assassinate Nasrallah in late September 2023, while Netanyahu hesitated in giving the authorization. This is an outright lie.
Gallant actually worked to prevent the assassination operation. Gallant insisted that Nasrallah's assassination could only proceed with American approval. Since the Biden administration opposed escalating the conflict in Lebanon and sought a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, it was clear that no approval would be given, and in such a case, the cabinet would not have approved action that explicitly contradicted American policy. Fortunately, Gallant's position was not accepted, and this crucial assassination went ahead.
Dr. Aaron Lernerheads IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis, Since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations.