Redeeming Captives
Over the generations, especially in the exile, on many occasions, Jews were kidnapped or taken captive, and large sums of ransom money were demanded for their release. The Sages of Israel were called upon to decide the proper response to this painful situation, and they formulated basic cardinal rules concerning the redeeming of prisoners, and the amount of money that could be paid toward their redemption.
Our Sages have taught that the redemption of captives is a great mitzvah for which a person should donate charity, placing it at the top of the list of worthwhile causes because the captive suffers greatly from hunger, medical problems, psychological trauma, and often subhuman conditions whereby his life is often in danger (Baba Batra 8B) Therefore, it is not proper to spare means in rescuing captives (Rambam, and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah252:1).
Nonetheless, Chazal postulated the halakhah that it is forbidden to pay an over exorbitant amount for pidyon shivuim (redeeming hostages), as is stated in the Mishna: “They must not ransom captives for more than their value, for the good of society” (Gittin 45A). The main reason given for this enactment, in both the Gemara and the Rambam, is to not create an incentive for highwaymen and kidnappers to seize more and more Jewish prisoners, since they know that we are willing to pay any price to set them free. There is another way of explaining this enactment – not to pressure the public to donate funds beyond their capability. However, most of the Rishonim, including the Rif, Rosh, Rambam, and the Tur, say the principle reason is not to encourage our enemies to kidnap more Jews, and this is the ruling in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 252:4)
An example is told about Rabbi Meir from Rottenberg, one of the great Torah scholars of his time, who was taken hostage in Alsace about eight-hundred years ago. The evil emperor, Rudolph, requested a staggering amount of money for his release. The Rabbi’s many students wanted to raise the funds in order to secure his release, since according to the halachah, in a case where a Gedol HaDor (leader of the generation) is taken captive, there is no limit to the amount that must be paid to set him free. Nevertheless, Rabbi Meir (known as the Maharam M’Rottenberg) instructed them not to agree to the emperor’s demand, believing that if they handed over an enormous amount for his release, the enemies of the Jews would kidnap more rabbis and demand extravagant sums for their freedom. Thus, the Maharam M’Rottenberg sat in prison for seven years until the day of his death. Because of his greatness of soul and self-sacrifice for the welfare of Clal Yisrael, he prevented the capture of other leading rabbis, and the economic collapse which could have shattered many congregations.
However, the rule prohibiting an overly excessive payment of money to redeem hostages applies when it is the public who must supply the funds. In contrast, if a very rich person is captured, and he wants to redeem himself with his wealth, he is free to pay whatever price is asked. This is because his case does not represent a danger to the general community, but only to the rich person himself, since the kidnappers may think to kidnap him again since they now know that he is willing to pay handsomely for his freedom. This decision is the personal matter of the rich person (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 252:4) However, in a case where a member of a wealthy person’s family is kidnapped, the rich man is not allowed to pay ransom more than the person’s worth. Regarding his wife, if she is kidnapped, the authorities are divided in their opinions whether he is permitted to redeem her by paying an excessively inflated ransom.
Redeeming Hostages Whose Lives are at Risk
What is the law in a case where kidnappers threaten to kill the hostage if their monetary demands are not met?
There are poskim who say that the prohibition against paying exorbitant sums applies in normal situations when the life of the hostage is not immediately at stake. However, in a case of pekuach nefesh when life is threatened, since all of the commandments in the Torah are broken to save a life, the enactment of the Rabbis not to pay overly excessive sums of money in order to free a hostage is certainly not heeded, and everything must be done to redeem him.
In opposition, many poskim, including the Ramban, state that even in a case where the kidnappers threaten to kill the hostage, we don’t give in, and it is forbidden to pay an exorbitant amount. The reason is, once again, that conceding to the kidnappers will only increase their incentive to kidnap other Jews and threaten their lives. Thus, out of concern for the overall welfare of the public, and because of the life-threatening danger to future captives, it is forbidden to surrender to the kidnapper’s threats and demands.
In practice, this question was not definitely decided, and the leading halakhic authorities amongst the Achronim were also divided on the issue (Pitchei T’shuva, Yoreh Deah252:4).
Whether or not to Surrender to the Demands of Terrorists
Since the founding of the State of Israel, on several occasions terrorists have kidnapped civilians or soldiers and threatened to kill them if we don’t free large numbers of Arab terrorists in Israeli jails. In cases like these, are we to accept the demands of the kidnappers and free their imprisoned comrades in order to save Jewish life, or should we refuse?
We previously saw that in a case where a hostage’s life is in immediate danger, the authorities were divided on whether or not to give in to their demands. Some say it is proper to redeem him, even at a price greater than his worth because his life is threatened, while others say it is forbidden, out of general concern for the wellbeing of the public.
These opinions are applicable when the kidnappers are normal criminals seeking monetary gain. But in a case of ongoing war between Israel and terrorist enemies, it is forbidden to give in to any coercion on their part, for it is clear that if we were to concede, our enemies would view this as a sign of weakness, raising their morale and increasing their incentive to strike at us further. And we have learned that every time terrorists have succeeded in getting their way, this has motivated others to join them in their war against Israel.
Additionally, if we give in, terrorists will not worry about getting caught, trusting that if they are apprehended and put in Israeli prisons, they will be soon freed in the next prisoner exchange. Also, it is a proven fact that a percentage of the freed terrorists will return to carrying out attacks against Jews. Therefore, despite the pain of the matter, we are not to give in to coercion and pay an excessive price for the hostage, above and beyond the customary payment demanded in kidnappings, meaning a one-man-for-one-man exchange.
The rule is that during a war we do not give in to any demand from the enemy, and if they take even one Jew hostage, we go to war to free him. It is written in the Torah: “And when the Kenaanite, the king of Arad, who dwelt in the Negev, heard that Israel came by the way of Atarim, then he fought against Israel and took some of them prisoners” (Bamidbar, 21:1). Rashi cites Chazal who explain that only one handmaid was captured from Israel. The Jews didn’t enter into negotiations to rescue her – they went to war. This is also what King David did when Amalek invaded Zeklag and took the women captive – he went to war to rescue the captives without bothering to negotiate first (Shmuel 1, 30.)
Even if the enemy came to only steal straw and hay, we wage war against them, because if we give in to them on a small thing, they will continue to fight against us with even greater resolve (Eruvin 45A).
All of this concerns terrorists and enemies who are perpetually at war against us. However, if the war has ended, it is permissible to exchange all the enemy prisoners in our hands for the Jews whom they have taken captive, even if the prisoners we set free substantially outnumber the Jews who are released. This is because exchanges of this sort are customary when ceasefires are formulated and all prisoners are set free. This is not considered paying more than the captives are worth on a prisoner-for-prisoner basis, and therefore we are not concerned lest the return of prisoners will encourage the enemy to continue to war their against us. If the enemy does return to its former belligerency, it is most likely for other reasons (see TachuminVol.4, pg.108).2
2. However, see “Aseya,” Vol.7, pg.8; and “Chavot Benyamin,” Vol.1:16, by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli who writes that it is permissible to exchange many enemy prisoners for our captives, according to the rule that a man can pay an excessive sum of his own money to redeem himself. He reasons that any soldier who enlisted in Tzahal did so under the assumption that if he were captured, the army would redeem him at any price. Thus, it is the army who acts on his behalf in deciding the terms of his release.
However, we have seen in the past that it is not always possible to depend on the decisions of Tzahal commanders, since some of them are likely to change their opinions for political expediency. It is clear that the mass exchanges of terrorists that we have agreed to in the past have increased the morale of the enemy, and many of the released prisoners returned to perpetrate further acts of terror, until the Jews they went on to kill numbered more than the Jews who were released in the exchange. Therefore, the opinion of the Rabbis today is that any exchange of prisoners at an exaggerated price is forbidden.
In this light, Rabbi Ortner in “Tchumin,” Vol.13, pg.262, writes that the claim that released terrorists are not certain to continue terrorist activity has been shown to be false. Therefore, as long as terrorism is waged against us, there is no permission to free terrorists at an exorbitant price. Rabbi Goren, in “Torat HaMedinah,” pgs.424-436, agrees that it is forbidden to surrender to the coercion of terrorists. However, regarding soldiers who were taken captive while carrying out their military duties, he wrote that it stood to reason that the State of Israel had an absolute obligation to redeem the captives at any price, without considering the damage it might cause to the security and welfare of the country.
He further stated that the State was obligated to impose the death penalty against terrorists, for without this deterrence, terrorists would continuing to murder, since they will be confident that if they are captured, they will be freed in a future prisoner exchange.
(Excerpted from "Peninei Halakha: Ha'Am ve' Ha'Aretz).