In addition to harsh criticism of the intelligence services, the Steinitz report also reveals that the US and the UK withheld information from Israel regarding Libya's nuclear program.
The report states: "The lessons of the Iraq war are a red light warning against the transformation of intelligence assessments from a tool to useless items; and against the danger that such assessments will turn out to be unreliable."
The harshest criticism in the Steinitz report is reserved for the intelligence failure regarding Libya's weapons of mass destruction project, developed, undetected, under Israeli noses. On the other hand, the report notes, the intelligence services of the United States and Britain hid information regarding the Libyan nuclear project from Israel.
Regarding Iraq, the Steinitz Commission found that Israeli intelligence services failed to take up the slack when United Nations weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998. That failure, the report states, also left Israel without precise information regarding Iraqi capabilities ahead of the US-led war against Saddam Hussein's regime. On the other hand, and in contradiction to the actual lack of data it had, the intelligence community inflated the actual threat from Iraq in its reports to political and military leaders. On the flip side, the Commission found that the expensive decision to prepare the nation for possible attack – including opening gas masks – was a reasonable one.
While recommending a series of legislative and structural changes to the intelligence services, including ministerial oversight and recruiting and training civilian experts, the Commission refrained from any conclusions regarding specific personnel. Commission chairman Knesset Member Yuval Steinitz (Likud) said that the responsibility for the failures cited crosses through all levels and the various jurisdictions are not clearly defined, in any case.
The report states: "The lessons of the Iraq war are a red light warning against the transformation of intelligence assessments from a tool to useless items; and against the danger that such assessments will turn out to be unreliable."
The harshest criticism in the Steinitz report is reserved for the intelligence failure regarding Libya's weapons of mass destruction project, developed, undetected, under Israeli noses. On the other hand, the report notes, the intelligence services of the United States and Britain hid information regarding the Libyan nuclear project from Israel.
Regarding Iraq, the Steinitz Commission found that Israeli intelligence services failed to take up the slack when United Nations weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998. That failure, the report states, also left Israel without precise information regarding Iraqi capabilities ahead of the US-led war against Saddam Hussein's regime. On the other hand, and in contradiction to the actual lack of data it had, the intelligence community inflated the actual threat from Iraq in its reports to political and military leaders. On the flip side, the Commission found that the expensive decision to prepare the nation for possible attack – including opening gas masks – was a reasonable one.
While recommending a series of legislative and structural changes to the intelligence services, including ministerial oversight and recruiting and training civilian experts, the Commission refrained from any conclusions regarding specific personnel. Commission chairman Knesset Member Yuval Steinitz (Likud) said that the responsibility for the failures cited crosses through all levels and the various jurisdictions are not clearly defined, in any case.