Middle East
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Israel’s relations with the so-called Islamic world are more extensive, contradictory and strategically important than the familiar diplomatic map suggests. From the Gulf monarchies to Central Asia, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, the supposed solidarity Muslim countries conceals a fascinating assortment of friendships, rivalries, commercial partnerships and geopolitical calculations.

An unimaginative habit among commentators, diplomats and assorted geopolitical sages is to speak of “the Muslim world" as though its constituent countries share a single foreign ministry, common strategic interests and a vibrant WhatsApp group.

They do not.

There are Muslim countries that recognize Israel, that refuse to do so, that purchase Israeli weapons, that prohibit Israeli passports, that rely on Israeli energy, and whose leaders denounce Zionism while being attracted to Israeli technology.

Geography, ideology, regime survival, economic necessity and historical experience produce vastly different policies. The resulting diplomatic landscape bears little resemblance to the simplistic division between Israel and Islam that dominates Middle East discourse.

The 2020 Abraham Accords accelerated an important transformation, but they did not create it. Israel’s relationships with Muslim-majority countries extend back to its earliest years and reach far beyond the Arab world.

What follows is a country-by-country survey of all 57 members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), including some countries that are not Muslim-majority, plus Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and the unique case of Somaliland.

Part 1: The Arab World

Part 2: Iran, Turkey and Central Asia

Part 3: South and Southeast Asia and Sub-Sharan Africa.

The distinction throughout is between diplomatic recognition and substantive relations. The two often overlap, but are not synonymous. Some governments maintain embassies while barely speaking to one another. Others communicate, negotiate or trade without recognizing each other’s sovereignty. And some have no meaningful bilateral relationship at all.

The differences tell us more about Israel’s position in the world than another off-key recital United Nations’ somnambulistic voting patterns.

THE ARAB WORLD: Peace, pragmatism and hostility

Algeria: No diplomatic relations.

Bahrain: Bahrain normalized relations with Israel in September 2020 under the Abraham Accords. They have established embassies and concluded a security cooperation agreement in February 2022.

Their relationship has weathered considerable political turbulence. Bahrain’s government has maintained diplomatic ties despite domestic opposition and Israel’s wars against Hamas in Gaza and Iran. Security considerations remain important, particularly given Bahrain’s vulnerability to Iranian pressure and its position as the US Fifth Fleet’s headquarters. The relationship is less commercially developed.

Comoros: No diplomatic relations.

Djibouti: No diplomatic relations.

Egypt: Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in March 1979, becoming the first Arab country to recognize the Jewish state. The agreement ended the state of war, returned Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty and altered the regional military balance.

The relationship is conventionally described as a cold peace, although that description disguises its strategic importance. They cooperate on security along the Sinai and Gaza borders, in counterterrorism, in regional diplomacy and energy.

Natural gas has become particularly consequential. In December 2025, Israel approved a $35 billion agreement to expand gas exports from the Leviathan field to Egypt. The arrangement creates a substantial economic relationship independent of the political temperature in Cairo or Jerusalem.

Egyptian public opinion remains deeply critical of Israel. Nevertheless, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has survived revolutionary upheaval, regional wars and almost half a century of political disagreements. It shows what durable strategic interests look like when stripped of diplomatic sentimentality.

Iraq: No diplomatic relations.

Jordan: Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in October 1994, establishing diplomatic relations and cooperation concerning borders, water, security and economic affairs.

Jordan’s strategic importance is difficult to exaggerate. It shares Israel’s longest land border, plays a central security role in the Jordan Valley and retains a special custodial role concerning Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.

The relationship is warmer between security establishments than the populations. Public hostility toward Israel, particularly during the Gaza war, has strained diplomatic engagement. Ambassadorial representation has also been disrupted.

Nevertheless, practical security coordination and treaty-based water arrangements endure. Neither government can afford the disorder that a collapse in peace would bring. Jordan illustrates a basic proposition often overlooked in diplomatic commentary, which is that peace can be indispensable without being popular.

Kuwait: No diplomatic relations.

Lebanon: Israel and Lebanon remain without diplomatic relations and war, cross-border violence and Hezbollah’s military presence in Lebanon have dominated the relationship.

The distinction between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah is strategically important. Hezbollah’s independent military power has repeatedly drawn Lebanon into conflicts that successive Lebanese governments have not wanted and failed to control.

There have, nevertheless, been important diplomatic openings. The countries reached a US-mediated maritime boundary agreement in 2022, and in April 2026 their representatives participated in unusually direct discussions in Washington. Subsequent efforts addressed ceasefire arrangements, troop withdrawals and Hezbollah’s weapons.

These contacts fall far short of normalization but reflect a potentially consequential change. Elements of the Lebanese state increasingly recognize that recovering sovereign control over Lebanese territory requires arrangements with Israel. Whether Beirut can translate diplomatic contact into enforceable security commitments is the crucial matter.

Libya: No diplomatic relations.

Mauritania: No diplomatic relations.

Morocco: Morocco resumed official relations with Israel in December 2020, reviving a relationship that previously existed through lower-level diplomatic channels. The agreement was facilitated by Washington and accompanied by US and Israeli recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Morocco is among Israel’s most promising Arab partners because the relationship rests on more than immediate security calculations. Moroccan Jewish heritage provides a substantial historical foundation.¹ Hundreds of thousands of Israelis have Moroccan family origins, creating cultural, linguistic and personal connections that few other Arab countries can match.

Security cooperation has become increasingly important. Morocco has acquired Israeli defense technology, and in October 2026 Israel’s Defense Ministry participated officially in the Marrakech Airshow, with major Israeli defense manufacturers hawking their wares.

The relationship was further strengthened in September 2026 with an agreement to upgrade diplomatic representation, pursue investment and taxation agreements and expand direct air services.

Morocco demonstrates that normalization can develop into something resembling a broad national relationship, although public support for the Palestinian Arab cause continues to constrain its political presentation.

Oman: Oman has no formal diplomatic relations with Israel but a history of direct political contact. They maintained commercial representative offices during the 1990s before these arrangements collapsed in 2000. Israeli leaders subsequently visited Muscat, most notably Benjamin Netanyahu in 2018, when he met Sultan Qaboos.

Oman’s distinctive diplomatic tradition favors mediation, careful neutrality and relations with competing regional powers. Its contacts with Israel have historically fitted this approach.

Nevertheless, the Gaza and Iran wars have made normalization unlikely. Oman has sharply criticized Israeli military operations while preserving its broader role as a regional intermediary.

So Oman is neither a committed adversary nor a prospective Abraham Accords signatory.

The Palestinian Arabs: The Israeli-Palestinian relationship is sui generis. Israel recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the Palestinian Arabs' representative in the 1993 Oslo process, while the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in theory but did not change its charter. The subsequent agreements established the Palestinian Authority and arrangements governing security coordination, administration, economic matters and transfers of tax revenue.

These arrangements have endured, in varying forms, despite peace not advancing at all and despite Palestinian Arab terror, the PA's pay-for-slay policy and more. Israel maintains extensive practical dealings with Palestinian Arab institutions despite opposing a sovereign Palestinian Arab state.

The division between the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria and Hamas in Gaza further complicates things. Negotiations, administrative coordination and military conflict consequently operate within overlapping, often contradictory political systems.

Qatar: Qatar does not recognize Israel but occupies an unusually important position in Israel’s regional diplomacy.

Doha has maintained relationships with Hamas while simultaneously hosting a major American military presence and serving as an intermediary in negotiations involving Israel, Hamas and the US.

Qatari mediation has played a central role in negotiations over hostages, ceasefires and arrangements for Gaza. The 2025 Israeli strike against Hamas figures in Doha severely damaged the relationship, but mediation efforts continued in 2026.

Qatar’s influence derives from its willingness to maintain access to parties that refuse to speak directly to one another.

The arrangement is strategically useful and morally complicated. From Israel’s perspective, Qatar has simultaneously helped facilitate negotiations with Hamas and provided political space for an organization committed to Israel’s destruction as well as funded the export of Islamism.

Doha’s regional importance is inseparable from that contradiction and its leaders’ duplicity.

Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia remains the most significant unrealized normalization opportunity in the Arab world.

Despite no formal diplomatic relations, they engaged in indirect diplomacy, exploring potential normalization arrangements and shared concerns over Iranian regional ambitions.

Before October 2023, an agreement appeared conceivable. It promised Saudi access to American security guarantees and advanced technology, while offering Israel diplomatic recognition from the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites.

The strategic environment has since deteriorated. The Gaza war, the 2025 and 2026 conflicts involving Iran, and Saudi concerns about being drawn into regional military confrontations have complicated the calculation.

Riyadh continues to insist that normalization requires a credible path toward Palestinian statehood. For Israel, Saudi recognition would remain an extraordinary diplomatic achievement. For Saudi leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, however, the potential benefits must exceed the domestic, regional and security costs.

Saudi Arabia is too important to dismiss and too independent to assume that it can simply be purchased with an elaborate American incentive package.

Somalia: No diplomatic relations.

Sudan: Sudan announced an agreement to normalize relations with Israel in October 2020 and signed the Abraham Accords Declaration in January 2021. However, the process was never completed. Sudan’s political upheaval and subsequent civil war prevented normal diplomatic representation, meaningful commercial links or sustained bilateral cooperation from developing.

Its inclusion among the original Abraham Accords countries also requires an important qualification. Sudan agreed in principle to normalization but did not establish the functioning relationship that the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco achieved. It is a diplomatic commitment in suspension.

Syria: Israel and Syria remain technically at war, having never concluded a peace agreement after the conflicts of 1948, 1967 and 1973.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the emergence of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government has altered the diplomatic landscape. Israel, however, continues military operations in Syria, citing security threats, while the Syrian government has demanded Israeli withdrawal from territory it considers Syrian.

US-supported security negotiations occurred in 2026, although an agreement has remained elusive. Damascus has indicated a willingness to negotiate arrangements addressing security and territorial questions without normalizing ties.

The Golan Heights remain central to the dispute. Any eventual normalization would require an accommodation of territorial, military and political claims that have defeated successive generations of diplomats. Still, the fact that direct security arrangements are being discussed is a meaningful departure from the Assad era.

Tunisia: No diplomatic relations.

United Arab Emirates: The UAE has developed the most extensive economic relationship with Israel of any Arab state to normalize relations under the Abraham Accords.

Since September 2020, the countries have established embassies, direct flights, investment relationships, commercial agreements and cooperation in technology, defense, agriculture, energy and healthcare.

The UAE-Israel Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement provides a formal foundation for expanding trade. According to the Emirati Foreign Ministry, bilateral merchandise trade reached approximately $3.21 billion in 2025, with cumulative trade reaching about $14.53 billion between September 2020 and May 2026.

The relationship has survived serious political disagreements over Gaza, Iran and Israeli policies toward the Palestinian Arabs.

Ever mercantile, the UAE’s approach is fundamentally transactional. It sees Israel as a source of technology, investment opportunities, security cooperation and regional commercial connectivity.

The Emiratis have decided that the relationships’ benefits outweigh the costs of abandoning it whenever a new regional crisis erupts. Clueless Western governments might profitably study this approach.

Yemen: Yemen has no diplomatic relations with Israel but is critical to Israel’s security environment.

The Iran-backed Houthi movement, which controls much of northwestern Yemen, has launched missiles and drones against Israel and attacked shipping in and around the Red Sea. Israel has retaliated against Houthi military and infrastructure targets.

The Houthis suspended attacks on Israel after the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire but resumed limited attacks during the 2026 Iran war.

The internationally recognized Yemeni government must be distinguished from the Houthis. The attacks do not represent a single coherent national foreign policy.

Nachum Kaplanis a journalist and commentator. He has 25 years media experience and held senior international roles at Reuters and IFR. He holds a B.A. in Politics and Indonesian from Monash University. He is also a practising psychotherapist. His substack, Moral Clarity: Truths in Politics and Culture, is having an event tomorrow, November 22, for paid subscribers entitled Six options other than the two-state solution, 7-8pm NY time.