Ultimately, in every strategic discussion about the northern front, we must keep our eyes firmly fixed on one goal: the security of northern Israel’s residents. To secure that goal over the long term, Israeli policy must rest on two clear foundational principles:
1. Setting firm red lines against Hezbollah’s rearmament, and
2. Breaking away decisively from the logic of proportional responses.
The first principle concerns Hezbollah’s military rebuilding, which is already underway. At present, the IDF does not have complete freedom of action to halt this process deep inside Lebanon. In recent weeks, IDF strikes have focused on southern Lebanon, within the security zone and its immediate surroundings, and appear largely aimed at eliminating immediate threats to IDF forces.
Yet while we concentrate on removing specific threats to troops on the ground, Hezbollah is rebuilding the strategic threat to northern Israel’s communities. It is doing so through continued smuggling and the development of local production and assembly capabilities for unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, rockets, and anti-tank missiles. Syrian authorities intercept only a small fraction of these smuggled shipments.
Under no circumstances must we grow accustomed to a situation in which the IDF holds a security zone in southern Lebanon while Hezbollah rebuilds its strength beyond it, punctuated by limited clashes here and there. History has already taught us that allowing such a situation to become entrenched not only fails to solve the problem but makes it worse. Conversely, the solution does not lie in a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon: Hezbollah has no interest in any negotiated settlement, refuses to disarm, and, in practice, disregards the Lebanese government’s decisions on the matter.
This leads to the second foundational principle: an unequivocally disproportionate response to any attack on Israeli territory or IDF soldiers. Playing the game of proportional responses and tit-for-tat formulas will drag us into a situation resembling the one that developed in the Gaza border communities over twenty years of sporadic attacks and a policy of containment, a situation whose outcome is all too predictable. To avoid repeating the tragedy of those southern communities or the years of attrition in Israel’s former security zone in Lebanon, a different operational doctrine is needed.
Israel’s failure at the beginning of this century stemmed from an inability to identify the point at which Hezbollah had completed its force build-up and considered itself ready for war. Our working assumption must therefore be that, as long as the ayatollahs’ regime in Tehran remains in power, Hezbollah will continue rebuilding its military capabilities while maintaining its civilian campaigns designed to preserve the support of its Shi'ite base.
We must not allow ourselves to be blinded by the fact that Hezbollah’s overriding interest at present is to rebuild, and that it is therefore refraining from terrorist activity against Israel, or by the possibility that Hezbollah may stay out of a conflict if there is an escalation with Iran. We must not become complacent over figures such as the destruction of 23,000 buildings in southern Lebanon, or lapse once again into the illusion of “deterrence" and quiet along the border.
The gains from the campaign Israel launched in September 2024 to weaken the organization, alongside growing domestic criticism of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Lebanese government’s decisions, will erode and ultimately be lost if we stop here.
Israel must define in advance, regardless of the composition of the government in Jerusalem or the administration in Washington, the thresholds at which it will initiate large-scale military action. The purpose of using force is not to 'create deterrence,' but to deny the enemy capabilities. The only 'deterrence' that exists in the Middle East is the denial of capabilities; once the enemy regains those capabilities, deterrence evaporates. For now, Israel has denied Hezbollah enough capabilities to create temporary 'deterrence,' but that balance could change.
A further consideration is that the decision on whether to activate Hezbollah in the event of an attack on Iran will be made first and foremost in Tehran, probably in line with how gravely the regime believes its survival is threatened. A scenario in which a military campaign in Iran ends without toppling the regime, while Hezbollah stays out of a war to preserve its strength, could create the false impression that 'deterrence is working.'
In reality, however, Israel would be left facing two enemy fronts rebuilding their military capabilities in parallel over the long term. Israel’s test in the north, therefore, is not today’s quiet, but its determination to deny Hezbollah tomorrow’s capabilities.