US Armed Forces
US Armed Forcesצילום: CENTCOM

Stephen M. Flatow is an attorney and the father of Alisa Flatow, who was murdered in an Iranian-sponsored Palestinian terrorist attack in 1995. He is author of A Father’s Story: My Fight for Justice Against Iranian Terror (now available in an expanded paperback edition on Amazon.com) and is the chair of the Religious Zionists of America-Mizrachi. An oleh chadash, he divides his time between Jerusalem and New Jersey.

If an Israeli invention can help protect an American soldier, should Washington encourage cooperation or first check whether a senator approves of Israel’s prime minister?

Twelve senators have offered a troubling answer.

Led by Maryland’s Chris Van Hollen, they are urging congressional leaders to strip provisions expanding American-Israeli defense technology and intelligence cooperation from the fiscal 2027 defense legislation. The signers include Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Tammy Duckworth and, to my particular disappointment as a New Jerseyan, Andy Kim.

Their campaign deserves scrutiny for what it could cost the United States.

The senators are seeking to remove proposed requirements for expanded cooperation, rather than abolish every existing joint program. That distinction matters. But so does their underlying argument: closer collaboration with Israel could undermine American independence, create technological dependencies and give Jerusalem excessive leverage.

They have identified risks that any competent defense agreement should address. They have failed to reckon adequately with the risks of forgoing useful cooperation.

Start with the American soldier inside an Abrams tank.

Israel’s Rafael developed Trophy, an active protection system designed to intercept incoming anti-tank threats. Working with Leonardo DRS, Rafael supplied systems ordered for American Abrams tanks. American and Israeli teams adapted the technology to American requirements.

Here is a tangible return from the relationship: technology developed in Israel to meet a deadly battlefield problem became an additional layer of protection for American crews.

Will the senators explain which American interest is served by making the next such collaboration harder?

Then consider the Marines.

In October 2024, Israel’s Defense Ministry reported successful Marine Corps live-fire training with a system combining American radar and command-and-control equipment with the Iron Dome interceptor and a launcher developed for the Marines. Rafael and Raytheon worked together on the effort.

American forces face missiles and drones, too. They have good reason to examine technology developed by a country compelled to confront those threats repeatedly.

That experience is valuable. Reproducing it independently would take time, money and testing. Delaying access to an effective defense can carry a cost far greater than the price of the equipment.

The benefits also reach American factories.

On October 8, Israel’s Defense Ministry announced delivery of the first Tamir interceptor fully manufactured and assembled in the United States, at the Raytheon-Rafael facility in East Camden, Arkansas.

Israeli engineering, American manufacturing capacity and a larger supply of defensive interceptors: that is a practical contribution to the defense industrial base that Washington keeps saying it needs to strengthen.

The Pentagon’s own missile-defense leadership supplies an even more direct answer to the senators. In testimony published by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Missile Defense Agency described sharing technology, data and lessons from Israeli missile-defense programs. It said interoperability between American and Israeli systems had been vital to defending both Israel and American forces.

The same testimony valued American workshare in these cooperative programs during fiscal years 2024 through 2026 at more than $3 billion.

Congress ought to weigh that evidence before treating deeper cooperation principally as a favor to Benjamin Netanyahu.

The senators’ strongest objection concerns intelligence. They say a proposed provision would prevent the administration from suspending or materially reducing intelligence sharing, potentially restricting decisions necessary to protect American security.

That warrants careful drafting. A president must retain the ability to protect sensitive sources and methods. Technology agreements also need enforceable rules covering intellectual property, export approvals, supply continuity and American operational control.

Write those protections into the legislation.

The senators cite Israel’s opposition to transferring Iron Dome batteries to Ukraine as evidence that joint production can create conflicting interests. Take that concern seriously, too. Negotiate transfer rights and contingencies before signing the next agreement.

A difficult clause is a reason to negotiate a better clause. It does not establish that America benefits from abandoning the proposed framework for broader cooperation.

Their letter repeatedly invokes disagreements with Netanyahu’s government over Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Iran. Those disputes belong in the political debate. They cannot substitute for an assessment of whether a particular technology will protect American personnel or improve American military capability.

Netanyahu will eventually leave office. So will Van Hollen. Defense systems developed today may protect soldiers serving long after both men have retired.

I have spent decades seeking accountability from Iran for the terrorism that murdered my daughter, Alisa. I need no lecture about the stakes of confronting dangerous regimes. But the case here can be made squarely on American grounds: Washington should seek useful capabilities, reliable production and better protection for its own forces.

Removing these provisions would not instantly dismantle existing defenses. It could, however, delay future projects, discourage investment and sacrifice opportunities that American commanders would otherwise have.

The senators may regard their initiative as a rebuke to Israel’s government.

They owe Americans an explanation of why American soldiers, engineers and taxpayers should bear the cost.