Most people I know have been appalled by the prominent former military officers now running on Israel's Democratic Party list. Figures such as Yair Golan and Nimrod Sheffer, both retired IDF major generals, have, in my view, brought discredit upon the uniforms they once wore. Yet there is another former senior officer seeking elected office who is not far removed: Gadi Eisenkot.
Eisenkot served as the IDF's Chief of Staff and is now one of the leading opposition figures challenging Benjamin Netanyahu. His popularity stems not only from his calm public demeanor but also from the personal tragedy of losing both a son and a nephew during the current war. Those losses have understandably earned him widespread sympathy and respect.
Nevertheless, it is crucial that voters, first and foremost, consider the positions he adopted during the war and during the years prior to the war.
Eisenkot argued that securing the safe return of the hostages was Israel's highest moral obligation, even if it took precedence over achieving what the government described as the "absolute defeat" of Hamas. In my opinion, this approach placed too little emphasis on Israel's long-term security. By signaling a willingness to make extensive concessions for the hostages' release, it strengthened Hamas' leverage and encouraged the organization to use innocent captives as a strategic weapon.
Critics warned that prolonged pauses in the fighting and phased diplomatic agreements would allow Hamas to regroup, rebuild its defenses, and prolong the conflict. When combat resumed, additional Israeli soldiers lost their lives. Eisenkot's strategy underestimated the military costs of allowing Hamas valuable time to recover.
My concerns about Eisenkot, however, extend well beyond the current war. In my view, many of the strategic assumptions that contributed to the October 7 disaster can be traced back to policies adopted years earlier, including those implemented during his tenure as Chief of Staff.
One revealing example involved Hamas' incendiary balloon campaign beginning in 2018. Hamas and other terrorist organizations launched thousands of helium balloons and kites carrying incendiary devices and, in some cases, improvised explosive devices across the Gaza border. These attacks destroyed thousands of acres of Israeli farmland and endangered civilians living in communities throughout the western Negev. Some explosive devices were attached to balloons, posing a particular danger to children.
As public frustration mounted, Israel's security cabinet debated how to respond. According to leaked transcripts, then-Education Minister Naftali Bennett argued that those launching the incendiary devices should be treated as legitimate military targets. Eisenkot disagreed, expressing concern that Palestinian Arab minors were often present near the launch teams. He argued that authorizing lethal force under those circumstances would violate both his operational judgment and his moral principles.
Eisenkot later defended a policy of what he called "proportional deterrence," maintaining that escalating to a broader conflict over what he described as "primitive aerial arson attacks" would be strategically irresponsible. I believe this assessment underestimated both the seriousness of the attacks and the message that Israeli restraint conveyed to Hamas. Failing to respond decisively encouraged the belief that Israel could be attacked repeatedly without imposing meaningful consequences.
To me, this reflected a broader military philosophy that placed excessive emphasis on restraint at the expense of deterrence. While moral considerations are essential in warfare, they must be balanced against the government's foremost responsibility: protecting its own citizens
Another revealing example is Eisenkot's sweeping military reforms. As Chief of Staff between 2015 and 2019, he introduced the Gideon Plan, a five-year restructuring program intended to modernize the IDF. The plan reduced the number of career personnel, cut senior officer positions, shortened mandatory military service for men from 36 to 32 months, and eliminated numerous reserve formations while shifting resources toward advanced technology, intelligence, cyber capabilities, and precision strike systems.
Supporters viewed these reforms as necessary modernization, but they represented a serious strategic miscalculation.
The Gideon Plan for a "small, smart army" substantially reduced reserve manpower, closed tank formations and artillery units, and placed greater reliance on a smaller standing force supported by advanced technology. Eisenkot believed that future conflicts would rely increasingly on intelligence, cyber warfare, precision air power, and highly mobile professional forces rather than large conventional ground formations.
That assessment proved disastrously incorrect. The wars that followed demonstrated the continuing importance of large, well-trained ground forces capable of sustained, multi-front operations. Following the October 7 attacks, Israel found itself fighting prolonged campaigns on multiple fronts while relying heavily on reserve mobilization. Critics argued that the large-scale reductions implemented under the Gideon Plan contributed to shortages of combat-ready forces and increased operational strain.
Eisenkot also placed significant emphasis on the "War Between the Wars" strategy, which relied primarily on precision airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria to disrupt Tehran's military entrenchment without triggering a wider regional conflict. Although these operations achieved important tactical successes, they did not prevent Hezbollah from continuing to expand its missile arsenal or strengthen its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. The strategy ultimately failed to eliminate the long-term threat.
One last inexcusable mistake Eisenkot made was his belief that Hamas’ tunnel system did not represent an “existential" threat to Israel. Although our eventual frontier defense system did, in fact, significantly limit Hamas’ ability to employ attack tunnels against southern Israel, our underground wall did absolutely nothing to prevent Hamas from constructing a massive underground fortress within Gaza proper. And it was these “defensive" tunnels that presented the greatest problem faced by the IDF when it was forced to invade Gaza after October 7.
Unfortunately, Eisenkot’s didn’t foresee that scenario. He believed that a defensive policy towards Hamas would obviate the need to ever actually invade Gaza. This is why he basically turned a blind eye to the creation of an underground fortress system by Hamas that was intended to inflict tremendous casualties on our troops should they try to go in and eradicate them.
To his credit, Eisenkot has acknowledged that mistakes were made. However, acknowledging errors does not automatically qualify someone for higher political office. Leadership requires not only integrity but sound judgment, particularly in matters of national security.
For these reasons, I do not believe Gadi Eisenkot should be entrusted with leading Israel. In my view, the strategic decisions he championed contributed to weakening the country's military preparedness at a critical time. Israel cannot afford to repeat those mistakes by placing him in one of the nation's highest offices.