Stephen M. Flatow is President of the Religious Zionists of America (RZA). He is the father of Alisa Flatow, who was murdered in an Iranian-sponsored Palestinian Arab terrorist attack in 1995, and the author of A Father's Story: My Fight for Justice Against Iranian Terror. The RZA is not affiliated with any American or Israeli political party.
The U.S. State Department recently delivered an unusually candid message to Congress: Turkey still does not qualify to rejoin the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.
In a July 22 letter to Representative Wesley Bell, the Department explained that Turkey must first eliminate its Russian S-400 air defense system and commit not to acquire similar Russian equipment in the future. But the letter went further. It cited continuing American concerns over Turkey's relationship with Hamas, including the terrorist organization's ability to access funds through informal financial networks and unauthorized trading houses operating from Turkish territory.
That should end the debate.
This is no longer simply a dispute over military hardware or a disagreement between Washington and Ankara. It is a question of whether the United States should entrust its most sophisticated military technology to a government whose policies increasingly conflict with American interests and threaten one of America's closest allies.
The answer ought to be "no."
Turkey remains an important NATO member. Its geography makes it strategically valuable, controlling access to the Black Sea and serving as a critical bridge between Europe and the Middle East. No serious observer disputes Turkey's importance to the Western alliance.
But strategic importance cannot excuse strategic misconduct.
For years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has transformed Turkey from one of Israel's closest Muslim partners into Hamas' most outspoken state sponsor on the international stage. Turkish officials insist their contacts with Hamas are diplomatic. Yet diplomacy does not explain why Hamas leaders have found safe haven in Turkey, nor why the State Department continues to express concern over Hamas' financial infrastructure operating there.
Those concerns are not coming from Jerusalem.
They are coming from Washington.
According to the State Department, Hamas continues to use informal financial networks inside Turkey to move money. American officials have pledged to disrupt those networks. That raises an obvious question.
Why would the United States work to dismantle Hamas' financial operations while simultaneously considering restoring Turkey to the world's most advanced fighter aircraft program?
The contradiction is impossible to ignore.
Nor is Hamas the only issue.
Turkey's purchase of Russia's S-400 missile defense system represented a fundamental breach of trust within NATO. American officials repeatedly warned Ankara that integrating Russian military technology alongside the F-35 created unacceptable intelligence risks. Turkey made its choice anyway, and Congress responded by removing it from the program.
That was not punishment.
It was prudence.
Today, the State Department has reaffirmed that Turkey still has not satisfied the legal requirements for reentry. Until the S-400 issue is fully resolved, there should be no discussion of restoring Turkey's participation.
For Israel, however, there is an even larger issue at stake.
For decades, the United States has maintained a bipartisan commitment to preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge-the principle that Israel must retain sufficient technological superiority to defend itself against numerically larger regional adversaries. Congress has repeatedly reinforced that commitment, recognizing that Israel's security contributes directly to American interests and regional stability.
That policy has worked remarkably well.
Israel has consistently demonstrated that advanced American military technology, when entrusted to a stable democratic ally, strengthens deterrence and promotes stability throughout the region.
Can the same confidence honestly be extended to Erdoğan's Turkey?
This is not the Turkey many Israelis remember.
There was a time when Israeli pilots trained in Turkish airspace, military cooperation flourished, and Jerusalem actively encouraged close strategic ties between Ankara and Washington. Turkey was one of Israel's few reliable Muslim allies.
That Turkey no longer exists.
Under Erdoğan, Ankara has embraced Hamas politically, demonized Israel with increasing frequency, cultivated closer relations with Russia and Iran when convenient, and pursued an increasingly independent foreign policy that often places it at odds with its NATO partners.
No one is suggesting that Turkey intends to attack Israel tomorrow.
That misses the point.
Advanced combat aircraft remain in service for decades. Governments change. Alliances shift. Regional conflicts evolve. Responsible policymakers must evaluate not only today's diplomatic landscape but tomorrow's strategic realities.
America's commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge was never intended to address only immediate threats. It was designed to anticipate future ones before they emerge.
Congress deserves credit for recognizing those realities.
As President of the Religious Zionists of America, I have long believed that support for Israel's security is inseparable from support for America's own fight against international terrorism.
That conviction is also personal.
More than thirty years ago, I began warning about Sami Al-Arian and the support networks that allowed Palestinian Islamic Jihad to raise money, recruit supporters, and spread its ideology within the United States. At the time, many dismissed those concerns as exaggerated. Years later, Al-Arian pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide services to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
The lesson remains relevant today.
Terrorist organizations do not survive on ideology alone. They depend upon financing, logistics, political legitimacy, and governments willing to tolerate-or even facilitate-their operations.
Those support networks matter.
The State Department's own assessment indicates that Turkey has not yet severed Hamas' financial infrastructure from its territory. If that is true, restoring Turkey to the F-35 program would send precisely the wrong message-not only to Ankara, but to every American ally and every adversary watching how the United States rewards governments that undermine shared security interests.
This should not be viewed as hostility toward the Turkish people or opposition to NATO.
It is about accountability.
Advanced American weapons are not entitlements. They are privileges extended to governments that demonstrate reliability, transparency, and a commitment to common security objectives.
Turkey can still earn back that trust.
But trust is earned through actions, not speeches.
Until Ankara permanently resolves the S-400 issue, dismantles Hamas' financial infrastructure, and demonstrates that it has chosen the Western alliance over organizations committed to terrorism, Congress should keep the door to the F-35 firmly closed.
The State Department has already explained why.
Congress should listen.