The Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement: Does it address Israel’s “End Game"?

Introduction

On 26 June 2026, the framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States, was published. It is intended to serve as the basis for a peace agreement and a long-term security arrangement between the two countries. The agreement presents an ambitious vision: the disarmament of all non-state armed groups, the restoration of the full sovereignty of the Lebanese government, the strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the reconstruction of the country, and the promotion of a gradual process that will lead to the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from Lebanese territory.

In March 2026, the Alma Research and Education Center published a policy paper addressing Israel’s “end game" in the campaign in Lebanon. The paper was based on a different underlying assumption: Hezbollah will not disarm voluntarily, and the Lebanese government is neither capable of-nor interested in-disarming Hezbollah without significant external pressure. Accordingly, Alma’s policy paper proposed an integrated model comprising sustained Israeli military pressure, civilian and financial measures against Hezbollah, both within Lebanon and in the international arena, strengthening the institutions of the Lebanese state, and profound reforms of Lebanon’s security establishment and armed forces.

A comparison between the two documents demonstrates that there is fundamental alignment regarding several central strategic objectives: the disarmament of Hezbollah, the restoration of Lebanese state sovereignty, the strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the prevention of Hezbollah’s financing. Nevertheless, substantial gaps exist between the vision of the framework agreement and the conditions that, in our view, are essential for enabling its implementation.

The principal gap lies in the fact that the framework agreement assumes that the Lebanese government will be able to lead Hezbollah’s disarmament through the strengthening of state institutions, whereas our assessment is that, without continued Israeli military pressure, profound reform of the state apparatus, dismantling Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure, and its continued weakening over time, the likelihood of successfully implementing the agreement is extremely low.

Moreover, if Hezbollah’s power as a “state within a state" is not weakened, the likelihood of a civil war in Lebanon will increase as implementation of the agreement progresses.

Objectives of the Framework Agreement

The framework agreement is based on several principal objectives:

• Ending the conflict between Israel and Lebanon.
• Disarming all armed groups, first and foremost, Hezbollah.
• Restoring the exclusive sovereignty of the Lebanese state.
• Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces as the sole monopoly on the use of force.
• Promoting economic and security reconstruction that will lead to a future peace agreement.
• Rehabilitating southern Lebanon and facilitating the return of its residents.

From a conceptual standpoint, this represents a significant departure from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Whereas Resolution 1701 focused primarily on southern Lebanon, the new agreement explicitly addresses the entirety of Lebanese territory and requires the disarmament of all non-state armed groups.

Furthermore, the agreement does not relate to “yet another ceasefire." Rather, for the first time since the 1980s, it seeks to lay the foundation for a peace agreement between the two countries and for mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty.

Disarmament of Hezbollah

Articles 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 of the framework agreement explicitly stipulate that the Lebanese government shall act to disarm all armed groups and restore the state’s exclusive authority over the use of force.

The policy paper that we published in March 2026 identified this objective as the cornerstone of any future arrangement. However, whereas the framework agreement views the Lebanese government as the entity that will lead this process, we doubt (indeed, seriously doubt) the Lebanese government’s ability and willingness to do so without the application of sustained military, diplomatic, and economic pressure.

Restoring the Sovereignty of the Lebanese State

The agreement seeks to restore the state’s exclusive monopoly on the use of force and designate the Lebanese Armed Forces as the country’s sole security authority.

Our policy paper consistently supported strengthening the Lebanese state but emphasized that this process must begin in Beirut, namely, by restoring government control over state institutions, the security apparatus, the economy, and the civilian sphere, all riddled with Hezbollah. Only thereafter should it proceed to southern Lebanon.

In this respect, the agreement adopts the objective but does not define a clear order of priorities for its implementation. It is possible that future supplementary agreements may contribute to this effort, and the true test will come during the implementation phase.

Preventing Hezbollah Financing

Article 11 of the framework agreement includes a commitment to prevent the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and to prevent reconstruction funds from reaching the organization.

This is a highly important provision that is consistent with the recommendations set forth in our policy paper, which emphasized the need for a broad international campaign against Hezbollah’s sources of financing.

However, as we wrote in our policy paper, clear operational measures must be specified and implemented, including:

• Closing the Al-Qard Al-Hassan Bank.
• Shutting down Hezbollah’s network of money changers.
• Conducting a global campaign against the organization’s criminal activities and imposing sanctions on all of the organization’s business activities outside Lebanon.
• International intelligence and financial cooperation.
• Excluding Hezbollah members from key positions within the Lebanese government (for example, the case of Ali Hamieh, the President’s Adviser for Reconstruction, who until recently served as a Hezbollah-appointed minister in the previous Lebanese government!).

At this stage, the public statements are limited to a general declaration and do not specify how this commitment will be implemented.

Reconstruction of Lebanon

Articles 10-11 address the reconstruction of the Lebanese state and international assistance. Under the agreement, the Lebanese government “explicitly undertakes to prevent reconstruction funds from reaching non-state armed groups or entities affiliated with them." This is a highly important provision, and its true test will lie in its implementation, in order to prevent any possibility that Hezbollah will control these funds or exploit them to strengthen its position.

Hezbollah as a State Within a State

Hezbollah is not merely a military organization, but a parallel governing system comprising educational, welfare, healthcare, construction, financial, and civilian charitable institutions, which constitute an integral part of the organization’s power structure.

Without addressing this civilian infrastructure, there is concern that Hezbollah will continue to preserve its political and social power and, consequently, will be able to rebuild its military strength.

Accordingly, and as we recommended in our March 2026 policy paper:

• Hezbollah should be declared an illegal organization, as it does not recognize the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and acts against its interests.
• Jihad al-Bina should be dismantled, as it served as the operational platform for constructing Hezbollah’s military infrastructure.
• The organization’s educational and welfare institutions should be closed, as they prepare the next generation of Lebanon’s Shiite community to support a foreign Iranian interest rather than the Lebanese national interest.
• The activities of its civilian associations and organizations should be terminated.
• A governmental alternative should be established for all civilian services.
• A significant portion of Hezbollah’s Shiite support base is currently displaced. This creates an opportunity for the Lebanese state to provide aid and oversee rehabilitation, while preventing Hezbollah from reestablishing its influence. Organizations affiliated with Hezbollah, (such as the Banin Association), should therefore be barred from providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons.

Reform of the Lebanese Armed Forces

The agreement assumes that the Lebanese Armed Forces will be the body responsible for disarming Hezbollah.

By contrast, the Alma Research and Education Center’s policy paper clearly recommends that, prior to any strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces, a profound reform of its command structure is required, including the removal of officers who cooperate with Hezbollah and the appointment of commanders committed to the interests of the Lebanese state.

The framework agreement does not address this issue at all, and it will be essential for it to be addressed in the subsequent detailed agreements.

Arms Smuggling

We attach critical importance in sealing the Syrian border and preventing the smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah via Syria or through the country’s seaports.

By contrast, the agreement addresses the dismantlement of existing weapons but makes almost no reference to preventing Hezbollah’s future force build-up.

Without effective action against the smuggling routes, there is a significant risk that the organization’s military build-up will resume.

Israel’s Freedom of Action - The IDF Becomes Responsive Rather Than Proactive

In the policy paper that we published, we emphasized that, even after any political settlement, Israel must retain the ability to act militarily against any attempt by Hezbollah to recover or rearm, throughout Lebanese territory.

Although the framework agreement recognizes the right of both states to self-defence, it does not explicitly recognize Israel’s right to continue pursuing a policy of sustained “strategic weakening" of Hezbollah.

The Israeli leadership has clarified that IDF forces in Lebanon will have the freedom of action to “remove threats." However, this expression is open to interpretation and could lead either to situations that endanger the lives of Israeli soldiers or, conversely, to unintended escalation. Hezbollah is likely to seek to create such situations, whether as a result of pressure on the organization itself or pressure from Iran.

Restricting Israel’s freedom of action enables Hezbollah to recover, rebuild the threat against IDF forces, and even escalate the situation whenever it chooses to do so.

Buffer Zone

In our policy paper, we recommended establishing a permanent buffer zone approximately 10 kilometers deep along the border, in which there would be no civilian presence and no reconstruction of villages that could once again serve as a base for Hezbollah infrastructure, as had occurred previously.

Although the agreement refers to the reconstruction of southern Lebanon and the return of civilians, in practice it effectively permits the current situation, whereby a security belt of approximately 10 kilometers remains in place for as long as the Hezbollah threat persists.

The concept of the pilot areas actually reinforces this approach. The two agreed-upon areas are located several kilometers from the border and from Israeli communities. This therefore constitutes an important achievement from Israel’s perspective-Lebanese recognition of a gradual IDF withdrawal that is conditioned upon demonstrable and effective achievements in Hezbollah’s disarmament, at the very least within the pilot areas.

At the same time, the agreement does not clearly specify which party is responsible for clearing the pilot areas of any terrorist presence, despite explicitly stating that the process will be conducted under U.S. supervision. This ambiguity leaves room for operational cooperation and coordination between the armed forces, and it is likely that the issue is addressed in greater detail in the unpublished security annex.

International Involvement

The agreement seeks to enlist the international community in supporting the reconstruction of Lebanon. However, it makes no mention whatsoever of an international commitment to act against Hezbollah.

On the other hand, it is clear that the agreement involves only three parties: Israel, Lebanon, and the United States. This raises the question of what this implies regarding Iranian involvement vis-à-vis Hezbollah, which received recognition in the framework agreement between the United States and Iran.

In practice, the two framework agreements-the Israeli-Lebanese agreement and the American-Iranian agreement-operate according to opposing rationales. The former seeks to weaken Hezbollah, while the latter strengthens it by recognizing Iranian influence in Lebanon.

Conclusion

The 26 June 2026 Framework Agreement reflects a significant shift in the international discourse surrounding Lebanon. For the first time, it abandons the official and traditional Lebanese position that linked a peace agreement with Israel to the Palestinian Arab issue and confined the conflict between the two countries solely to bilateral matters. It also constitutes a de facto Lebanese recognition of the existence of Israel.

The agreement provides for a mutual, gradual process, in contrast to Hezbollah’s demand for an immediate Israeli withdrawal irrespective of the issue of disarmament. This differs substantially from the previous agreements of 2006 and 2024, under which Israel undertook to withdraw without any timetable tied to Hezbollah’s disarmament. The current agreement adopts the opposite approach-every Israeli withdrawal is contingent upon demonstrable and effective steps toward Hezbollah’s disarmament.

Nevertheless, the agreement is based on the optimistic assumption that the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces will be capable of leading this process independently, with international assistance.

The Alma Research and Education Center’s policy paper presented a different working assumption: Hezbollah will not disarm voluntarily, and the Lebanese government will not act effectively against it so long as the organization preserves its military, economic, political, and social power.

Accordingly, while the framework agreement adopts a considerable portion of the objectives defined in the Alma Research and Education Center’s policy paper, it does not provide an adequate response to most of the means proposed for achieving them: effective enforcement mechanisms, dismantling Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure, reforming Lebanon’s security establishment, blocking Hezbollah’s force build-up routes, and preserving Israel’s freedom of action over time for the purpose of the organization’s continued strategic weakening.

There is concern that the gap between the agreement’s declarations and the reality on the ground will continue to exist in the coming years.

Consistent implementation, accompanied by sustained international pressure, may create a historic opportunity to strengthen the Lebanese state, weaken Hezbollah, and improve regional security and stability.

From an Israeli perspective, the agreement presents, for the first time, a clear political vision for peace between the two countries by conditioning Israel’s withdrawal on demonstrable action by the Lebanese government. However, the realization of this vision ultimately hinges on the central unresolved question: whether the Lebanese government will be both capable of-and, more importantly, willing to-take the necessary measures against Hezbollah.

Has the likelihood of a civil war in Lebanon increased as a result of the agreement?

In our assessment, the answer is affirmative. From Hezbollah’s perspective, which seeks to preserve the equation of the “Resistance" (as a defining element of its identity), the agreement represents a critical fault line that could leave the organization with its back against the wall. From that point, the risk of a civil war in Lebanon would increase significantly.

On 24 May, Naim Qassem warned against any action targeting Hezbollah’s institutions inside Lebanon and stated that “the base" would take to the streets…

On 27 June, Naim Qassem condemned the agreement as an act of “humiliation, disgrace, and a surrender of sovereignty," asserting that the Lebanese government had effectively placed itself “in conflict with more than half of the Lebanese people." He further declared the agreement “null and void" and stated that Hezbollah would continue to act by all means it deems necessary.