Dr. Avi Perry is a former professor at Northwestern University, a former Bell Labs researcher and manager, and later served as Vice President at NMS Communications. He represented the United States on the UN’s International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Standards Committee, where he authored significant portions of the G.168 standard. He is the author of the thriller novel 72 Virgins and a Cambridge University Press book on voice quality in wireless networks, and is a regular op-ed contributor to The Jerusalem Post and Israel National News.
I woke up this morning with a troubling thought.
I believe Iran may have already crossed the point of no return on its path to a nuclear weapon.
I cannot prove it. Neither can anyone else.
And that is exactly the problem.
The most important clue is not what Iran says. It is not what President Trump says. It is not even what intelligence officials say.
The most important clue is the destruction of access to the location where the enriched uranium was believed to be stored.
I keep asking myself a simple question:
Why?
Why make access to the uranium more difficult?
Why create obstacles that delay inspection and verification?
The most logical explanation is that the uranium is no longer there.
Iran had every incentive to move its most valuable strategic asset before access was denied. Centrifuges can be rebuilt. Facilities can be rebuilt. Highly enriched uranium is far more difficult to replace.
If the material was moved before access was blocked, inspectors may spend weeks or months trying to verify a location that no longer contains the uranium.
And that delay comes on top of the 60-day ceasefire and negotiation period during which verification is postponed.
That creates exactly what Iran needs most: time.
Time to operate without meaningful supervision.
Time to move the material.
Time to hide evidence.
Time to complete the very outcome the negotiations are supposed to prevent.
Supporters of the current negotiations tell us not to worry.
How do we know Iran will never have nuclear weapons?
- Trump said so.
- Iran promised.
Look at that and stop laughing.
Meanwhile, the one thing that actually matters-the location of the enriched uranium-remains uncertain.
If my theory is correct, the tunnel was not destroyed to conceal what is inside. It was destroyed to conceal what is no longer inside.
Some will say this is speculation. Perhaps.
But the real lesson here is not about Iran. It is about October 7.
Before October 7, Israel possessed extraordinary intelligence capabilities. Human intelligence. Signals intelligence. Surveillance. Drones. Intercepts.
The problem was not the absence of information. The problem was a flawed assumption.
The prevailing belief was that Hamas wanted quiet. Hamas wanted stability. Hamas was deterred. That assumption became the lens through which information was interpreted.
And then October 7 happened.
Today I see the same danger. The assumption now is that Iran wants a deal. Iran wants sanctions relief. Iran wants stability. Iran wants to avoid confrontation.
Maybe. Or maybe we are watching another dangerous assumption take shape.
The greatest intelligence failures do not occur because information is unavailable. They occur because decision-makers become prisoners of their own assumptions.
There are reports that CIA Director Ratcliffe remains skeptical of Iran's willingness to compromise on the nuclear issue. That concerns me far more than political declarations of success.
Why? Because intelligence officers are paid to challenge assumptions, not sell agreements, and he is challenging it now.
But ultimately, even that is secondary.
The central issue is not what Ratcliffe thinks. The central issue is not what Trump thinks.
The central issue is where the uranium is.
And nobody seems able to answer that question with confidence. Some people will object that we do not have proof.
They are correct. We do not.
But when the potential consequences are catastrophic, waiting for certainty is not an option
Insurance exists for a reason. People insure their homes not because they expect them to burn down, but because the consequences would be catastrophic if they did.
The same principle applies here.
The question is not whether my theory can be proven today. The question is whether the consequences of being wrong are severe enough that waiting for proof becomes an unacceptable risk.
The burden of proof should not be on those who are worried. When the potential consequences are catastrophic, the responsible course is to take such warnings seriously and act as though they may be correct until the evidence proves otherwise.
The burden should be on those who claim everything is under control.
Show me the uranium.
Show me the inspections.
Show me the verification.
Do not show me promises.
Because if the strongest evidence that Iran will never have nuclear weapons is that Iran promised not to have nuclear weapons, then we may already be repeating the very mistake history warned us about on October 7.