The latest developments in the negotiations between the United States and Iran raise an obvious question: Are the two sides moving closer to an agreement, or further apart?
Negotiations are supposed to narrow differences. Yet the recent rounds of talks appear to have done the opposite. Disagreements over uranium enrichment, sanctions, inspections, ballistic missiles, the Strait of Hormuz, and regional security remain unresolved. New issues seem to emerge faster than old ones disappear.
This raises a more fundamental question: What is the actual purpose of these negotiations?
Most observers assume that negotiations exist to produce an agreement. But what if both sides currently find the negotiations more attractive than the concessions required to conclude them?
President Trump and the Iranian regime may have very different goals, yet both appear more comfortable with the status quo than with the compromises necessary to close a deal.
For Trump, the alternatives are unattractive. Military action carries significant risks. Americans have grown weary of Middle Eastern conflicts. Every president understands that war can reshape a presidency and dominate the political agenda. As the midterm elections draw closer, the political costs associated with military action become increasingly difficult to ignore.
For Iran, the alternatives are equally unattractive. A direct military confrontation with the United States or Israel could threaten military assets, economic stability, and perhaps even the regime itself. Yet making the concessions demanded by Washington would require abandoning objectives Tehran has pursued for decades.
As a result, both sides continue talking.
The problem is that continuing negotiations and reaching an agreement are not the same thing.
The gap separating the two sides may simply be too wide to bridge under current conditions. Neither side appears to have sufficient motivation to change the status quo by making the concessions necessary to close a deal.
In other words, the current incentive structure favors delay over compromise.
The United States seeks meaningful restrictions, verification, and limitations on Iran's nuclear and missile programs.
The disagreement is not merely technical. In my opinion, it is rooted in fundamentally incompatible objectives. Iran's leadership has repeatedly expressed ambitions that extend far beyond civilian nuclear energy. Its strategic goals are influenced not only by geopolitical considerations but also by a religious ideology that shapes its long-term vision for the region. It seeks greater regional dominance and continues to support forces openly committed to the destruction of Israel. The United States and Israel stand in the way of those ambitions.
That is why the negotiations remain stuck. The parties are not simply debating enrichment levels, inspection procedures, or sanctions. They are confronting fundamentally incompatible objectives, strategic interests, and ideological visions.
The gap between the two sides is wide, and it is likely to remain wide as long as Iran's leadership continues to view its strategic and ideological objectives as achievable. Religious and ideological convictions are rarely abandoned through persuasion alone. They often persist for generations.
The critical question is therefore not whether Iran's leaders can be persuaded to change what they believe. The critical question is whether they can be convinced that certain objectives can never be achieved.
History suggests that when deeply held ambitions become unattainable, behavior sometimes changes even when beliefs do not. Until Iran concludes that its most dangerous objectives are beyond reach, the gap between the two sides may remain as wide as ever.
The result is a process that increasingly resembles motion without movement.
Iran may have an additional advantage: time.
Unlike democratic governments, the Iranian regime does not operate under election cycles. President Trump will leave office in January 2029. Tehran faces no comparable deadline. It can think in terms of decades rather than years.
If Iranian leaders believe that a future American administration may be less confrontational, less willing to use military force, or more willing to tolerate partial compliance, then delay itself becomes a strategic asset.
From that perspective, negotiations need not produce a breakthrough. They merely need to continue.
This difference in time horizons may be one of the most important factors shaping the current talks. Democracies must respond to public opinion, political pressure, and election calendars. Authoritarian regimes can afford patience.
Yet another question remains unanswered.
Who exactly is President Trump negotiating with?
Iran's political structure often appears opaque. Is the ultimate decision-maker the president, the foreign minister, the Revolutionary Guards, the Supreme Leader, or some combination of some or all of them? Can any individual negotiator make a commitment that will remain valid tomorrow?
Negotiations require not only trust but also clarity regarding authority. Without knowing who has the power to say yes, it becomes difficult to know whether any agreement can truly be considered final.
The challenge extends beyond nuclear enrichment alone.
Much of the public discussion focuses on nuclear weapons, but ballistic missiles present a related strategic concern. Even without nuclear warheads, large missile arsenals can threaten civilian populations, critical infrastructure, and regional stability. Any lasting agreement must address the broader strategic picture rather than a single component of it.
Iran's leverage does not come from its ability to defeat the United States militarily. It comes from its ability to impose costs. The Strait of Hormuz illustrates this principle perfectly. Tehran does not need to control the Strait indefinitely. It only needs the ability to disrupt it long enough to create economic and political consequences that leaders would rather avoid.
That is why the current negotiations continue. Both sides are attempting to avoid costs. Both sides are trying to preserve the status quo while hoping the other side eventually yields.
But diplomacy succeeds only when compromise becomes less costly than resistance.
At present, neither side appears willing to pay that price.
If that remains true, the negotiations will continue, the headlines will continue, and the gap between the two sides will remain largely unchanged.
Which leaves only one unanswered question:
If negotiations cannot change Iran's calculations, what will-and is President Trump prepared to find out?
Dr. Avi Perry is a former professor, telecommunications executive, and technology innovator with a Ph.D. in Operations Research and Statistics. He worked at Bell Labs and later served as Vice President and General Manager at NMS Communications. Dr. Perry is the creator of the Perry Conjugate Gradient optimization algorithm, which has been used in optimization, engineering, machine learning, artificial intelligence, MRI systems, financial modeling, and large-scale scientific computing applications worldwide. He also contributed to advanced defense and communications systems, including technologies used by the IDF. Dr. Perry is the author of several books spanning technology, geopolitics, fiction, and human behavior, including The Winner’s Playbook, AI Playbook for Solution Architects, Principles of Voice Quality in Wireless Networks, and the thriller novel 72 Virgins. See www.aviperry.org.