Is the threat of explosive drones placed in optical fibers really an unsolvable threat? Could this threat also be realized in Judea and Samaria? Arutz Sheva-Israel National News spoke with Brigadier General (res.) Amir Avivi, chairman of the "Bitchonistim".
In his opening remarks, Avivi notes that this is a threat that has been developing in recent years, and in the Ukraine-Russia war we saw how rapidly its development has progressed. "Ukraine has produced more than eight million drones in the past year. We have seen how explosive drones are capable of causing strategic damage, sinking almost the entire Russian fleet and damaging strategic aircraft and many soldiers. The Russians are also using these capabilities, and this is a significant change on the battlefield."
"In Lebanon, we see the tip of the iceberg of the potential damage from this capability. We see single drones powered by fiber optics, and it could be a swarm of dozens of drones that could be AI-powered. This is an evolving threat, and there are threats that appear on the battlefield that do not have a magic solution, but rather a variety of solutions that are also not perfect. This is the case with the drone threat, which we have known for decades. Several solutions have been developed to deal with it, and we are still losing many fighters to optic fiber drones. We are developing solutions, but the other side is also developing and the threat exists. So are anti-tank missiles. Now this is another threat and we need to invest in a variety of response capabilities. There is no single solution."
Avivi elaborates a bit on the solutions and says that it involves a combination of drones against drones, an intelligence focus on supply chains, a focus on operators, detection systems that will provide a solution to the difficulty of detecting these drones, which are both small and fly low, and for this, a combination of lasers and long-range and dispersion firing capabilities that can bring down the drone is required, and at the end there is also the possibility of protection by a network.
"The better the grip on the territory, the better intelligence and the better the countermeasure capability, the significantly reduced threat," says Avivi, noting that "on October 7, Hamas used a serious amount of fiber-optic drones that exploded on our detection systems and disabled them, and for many weeks after October 7, there were drones with fiber optics over the Gaza Division until we entered the area and dealt with it." Those drones were the ones that began the October 7 attack by destroying radars, observation devices, and antennas, and later those fiber-optic drones were used to destroy IDF observation drones operating over our forces and over the Gaza Division. "This is not a new threat," he emphasizes, adding: "When we went inside, the phenomenon gradually disappeared."
On the other hand, "when the army is static in Lebanon and is limited by ceasefires and restrictions imposed by the Americans, it makes it very difficult to carry out the mission in the best possible way."
Regarding the scenario of using these explosive drones in Judea and Samaria against Jewish communities, IDF bases, vehicle traffic on traffic routes, and more, Avivi says that indeed, "this threat also exists in Judea and Samaria, but the difference is that in Judea and Samaria the IDF has freedom of action and the ability to enter every home and neighborhood and arrest people and collect intelligence. It is control over the entire area of Judea and Samaria that makes the difference. This is not a line from which Hezbollah does whatever it wants above or below the ground and where it assembles drones and trains. These are two different realities. As long as an offensive trend is maintained in Judea and Samaria, the danger will be less. This is why there are no rockets in Judea and Samaria and there were rockets in Gaza."
Avivi adds to all this and concludes with the statement that "a complete solution can come in dismantling Hezbollah. If you dismantle Hezbollah, there will be no drones."