After “Operation Roaring Lion," although it will signal an end to the Iranian nuclear threat, Israel will need to make core adjustments to its strategic deterrence posture. Above all, these adjustments should focus on essential nuclear doctrine and strategy. More specifically, Jerusalem should plan for an incremental but defined end to "deliberate nuclear ambiguity."
Why should this recommendation be persuasive to Jerusalem? Hasn’t Iran’s nuclear military potential recently been degraded or even eliminated? During any future war with Iran, wouldn’t Israel already be in an unchallengeable position to maintain “escalation dominance?"
The correct answers will have multiple particulars. Though a non-nuclear Iran would risk greater harms than would Israel in any future war, the more powerful Jewish State could still suffer grievous consequences. These harms would include Iranian CBW (chemical-biological) or radiological attacks and operational misunderstandings or policy miscalculations.
Moreover, looking ahead, Iran could call upon nuclear allies (most plausibly North Korea) to act as witting nuclear proxies or sub-state terror groups. These violence-driven insurgents (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthi) would include Sunni and Shiite surrogates. Their actions, prima facie, could inflict variously force-multiplying costs.
For Israel, there will be additional derivative issues. In several ways, the Israel-American war against Shiite Iran has simultaneously imperiled and strengthened Sunni states in the region. Now, ipso facto, there will be new reasons to expect nuclear military initiatives by Turkey, Egypt and/or Saudi Arabia. Correspondingly, scarcely predictable actions by China or Pakistan could further undermine Israel’s national security.
What should Israel do? A partial but key remedy would be calibrated policy shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity" (Amimut in Hebrew) to “selective nuclear disclosure." Though nuclear ambiguity has seemingly worked thus far, it could not work indefinitely.
For Israel, strategic truth must sometimes emerge through paradox. Accordingly, Israel’s greatest risk of catastrophic deterrence failure may lie in the prospect of nuclear threats that are apparently “too destructive." Oddly, but plausibly, nuclear threat credibility could on some occasions vary inversely with nuclear threat destructiveness.
To be suitably deterred, an enemy state would require continuing assurances that Israel’s nuclear weapons were effectively invulnerable and "penetration-capable." This second expectation would mean that Israel's nuclear weapons not only appear protected from adversarial first-strikes, but are also able to "punch through" enemy active defenses.
Adversarial judgments concerning Israel’s ultimate willingness to engage with nuclear weapons would depend on acquiring certain foreknowledge of these weapons and their operational capabilities. Enemy perceptions of mega-destructive, high-yield Israeli nuclear weapons could undermine the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. Bringing a measured end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity," on the other hand, would offer a promising corrective for Israel’s ultimate and existential vulnerability. Furthermore, if an enemy state should ever appear willing to share nuclear military assets with a surrogate terrorist group, Jerusalem would then need to prepare for viable nuclear deterrence against sub-state adversaries.
The main point of any shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity" to “selective nuclear disclosure" would be to signal that Israel’s “bomb" lies safely beyond enemy reach and could reliably punish all levels of enemy aggression. By removing the bomb from its “basement," Israel could best enhance overall strategic deterrence. Inter alia, a properly-calculated end to “deliberate nuclear ambiguity" would underscore Israel’s willingness to use measured nuclear force in reprisal for both first-strike and retaliatory attacks. A properly-defined shift from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity" to “selective nuclear disclosure" could also convince Iran or any other non-nuclear enemy state of Israel’s willingness to use calibrated nuclear force against a non-nuclear aggressor.
What about the so-called “Samson Option?" While generally misunderstood, this option could support Israel’s unrelieved task of strategic dissuasion. For Jerusalem, the reinforcing benefits of “Samson" would lie not in any supposed eagerness to “die with the Philistines," but in its presumptive deterrent advantages.
These expected advantages would lie at the “high end" of Israel’s deterrence options and serve any ultimate requirement of “escalation dominance." In essence, an explicitly-revealed and still-plausible Samson Option could magnify survival benefits of “selective nuclear disclosure," not by threats of devastation (such as US President Donald Trump’s warnings to Iran of “obliteration"), but by reminding any enemy that Israel’s nuclear force calibrations would remain functional even at the eleventh-hour.
In assessing optimal levels of “selective nuclear disclosure," Israel ought continuously to bear in mind that Jerusalem’s strategic nuclear objective must always be deterrence, not revenge. If, however, nuclear weapons should be introduced into an escalating conflict with Iran or other enemy state, one form or another of tangible nuclear war fighting would ensue. At that inherently chaotic point, Israel’s deterrence objective would need to shift from nuclear war avoidance to nuclear war termination.
To prevail in future wars, Israel will always need to be the “fittest" adversary. Recalling Charles Darwin and his interpreters, this signals a continuing capacity to “adapt" as required. For Jerusalem, survival through adaptation means recognizing that “deliberate nuclear ambiguity" is approaching the end of its useful life and that it should be replaced in increments by “selective nuclear disclosure."
Louis René Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) was Chair of Project Daniel (PM Sharon, 2003-2004). He is the author of many works on nuclear strategy and nuclear war, including publications in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Israel Defense; Herzliya Conference Papers (Israel); The Strategy Bridge; The National Interest; JURIST; Princeton Political Review; Yale Global; Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School);The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs; The Professional Journal of the US Army War College; Special Warfare (Pentagon); Modern War Institute (West Point); Air-Space Operations Review (USAF); and The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. His twelfth book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy, 2016 (2nd ed., 2018) In 2016, Professor Beres authored a monograph on Israeli nuclear strategy and US national security at Tel Aviv University with a special postscript by retired US Army General Barry McCaffrey: Israel's Nuclear Strategy and American National Security