Rachel Avraham is the CEO of the Dona Gracia Center for Diplomacy and an Israel-based journalist. She is the author of "Women and Jihad: Debating Palestinian Female Suicide Bombings in the American, Israeli and Arab Media."
In April 2026, statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan were widely interpreted in Israel as rhetorical escalation tied to the recent war with Iran. However, this interpretation reflects a deeper analytical mistake. The assumption that Turkey’s nuclear trajectory is reactive-and therefore dependent on Iran’s program-fails to account for the structural motivations behind Ankara’s position.
[Note: This analysis is based on the results of a February 2026 expert survey conducted by the Dor Moriah analytical center, which brought together fourteen specialists from diverse disciplinary and ideological backgrounds to assess the evolving structure of regional threats.]
The findings of the survey converge on a critical conclusion: Turkey’s potential nuclear program should not be understood as a response, but as an attribute of a broader strategic transformation. All fourteen experts independently classified Fidan’s statements not as rhetorical improvisation, but as part of a coherent and internally consistent strategic logic.
Three dimensions underpin this conclusion.
The first is legal. In a context where the global non-proliferation regime is weakening, public discussion of nuclear capability by major regional actors acquires a self-reinforcing character.
The second is technical. Turkey already hosts approximately fifty American B61 tactical nuclear bombs under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. While these weapons are not under Turkish sovereign control, their presence significantly lowers the technical and operational barriers to an independent program.
The third-and most decisive-dimension is ideological.
Within the expert panel, this third dimension was conceptualized as “Sunni nuclear sovereignty." The logic is structural rather than situational. In a region where Israel possesses nuclear capability and Iran has pursued it as a Shi’a power, the absence of nuclear status for a major Sunni actor creates an asymmetry incompatible with claims to regional leadership. From this perspective, nuclear capability is not driven by threat perception alone. It becomes a requirement of status.
This interpretation explains why Turkey’s trajectory is not dependent on the outcome of the Iranian case. Even under conditions of complete neutralization of Iran’s program, the motivational basis of Turkey’s nuclear ambitions remains intact. As several experts noted, the foundation of the program is not Iran-it is the claim to leadership within the Sunni world.
Comparative analysis further clarifies this distinction. Pakistan’s nuclear program emerged as a response to India and remains strategically confined to that rivalry. It has not evolved into an ideological project tied to broader Islamic leadership. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, operates within a transactional framework, where nuclear capability-if pursued-would likely be acquired externally rather than developed as part of a national strategic doctrine.
Turkey differs from both models. Its discourse integrates military capability with civilizational ambition, linking technological development to a broader geopolitical narrative.
This narrative is constructed through the convergence of neo-Ottomanism and political Islam. Neo-Ottomanism frames Turkey as the successor to an imperial center seeking to restore its historical role. Political Islam, particularly through networks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, extends this framework beyond the state into a transnational Sunni identity. In combination, these elements produce a strategic logic in which nuclear capability functions simultaneously as a symbol and an instrument of leadership.
The durability of this trajectory is reinforced by its technical feasibility. Turkey’s integration into NATO nuclear infrastructure provides operational familiarity with nuclear systems. At the same time, its domestic missile program-combined with ongoing development in both ballistic and hypersonic technologies-suggests that delivery capabilities are advancing in parallel with strategic intent. Civilian nuclear infrastructure, including reactor development projects, further expands the technological base.
A critical but often overlooked factor is the spatial dimension of threat perception. Turkish missile systems approach from a different azimuth than those historically associated with Iran, reducing response times and placing additional strain on existing defense architectures. Israel’s early-warning systems have traditionally been oriented toward eastern vectors. A northern or northwestern vector introduces structural challenges that cannot be addressed through incremental adjustments alone.
The implications for Israel are significant.
First, the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue does not close the regional nuclear question; it transforms it.
Second, the temporal horizon shifts. Unlike Iran’s program, which developed under immediate geopolitical pressure, Turkey’s trajectory is long-term but structurally embedded, making it more resilient to external disruption.
Third, the available policy instruments differ fundamentally. Turkey’s position within NATO and its integration into Western systems limit the applicability of sanctions or military deterrence strategies.
This creates a strategic gap. The tools developed in response to Iran are not directly transferable to the Turkish case. Instead, the situation requires a different approach-one based on long-term diplomatic engagement, coalition-building, and structural containment. Such an approach demands a strategic culture oriented toward persistence rather than resolution.
The Dor Moriah survey also highlights a deeper issue: the gap between structural reality and its perception. Israeli public discourse continues to interpret Turkey’s actions through a reactive framework, assuming that nuclear ambitions emerge in response to immediate threats. This interpretation fails to capture programs rooted in identity and long-term strategic positioning.
The concept of Sunni nuclear sovereignty provides an alternative analytical frame. Within this frame, nuclear capability is not simply a tool of state security, but a defining attribute of a broader political and civilizational role. Programs of this type are inherently resistant to external pressure because their motivation is internal rather than reactive.
Fidan’s statements should therefore be read not as escalation, but as clarification. They signal that Turkey’s strategic trajectory extends beyond the Iranian context and is guided by its own internal logic. The central challenge for Israel is not the emergence of this trajectory, but the failure to fully recognize and conceptualize it.
Until this gap is addressed, Israel risks responding to a structural transformation with analytical tools designed for a different strategic environment.