
The required objective is the security of the residents of the north.
The required goal is the strategic weakening of Hezbollah and its distancing from the border.
A political agreement with the State of Lebanon will not bring about actual peace and will not be worth the paper it is written on if the Hezbollah problem is not addressed, as the terror organization will not agree to disarm voluntarily.
To achieve this, a multidimensional strategy is necessary for managing negotiations with both Lebanon and the international system, incorporating civilian, financial, and political efforts alongside the continuation of military operations.
Contrary to the guiding principle of previous agreements (1701), which required the Lebanese government to begin implementing its sovereignty in southern Lebanon, it is necessary to demand that the Lebanese government begin applying its sovereignty in Beirut (less talk, more action):
On the civilian and diplomatic level:
· To outlaw and act against all of Hezbollah’s civilian and economic systems (such as education networks, healthcare, welfare, and financial activity).
· To sever its diplomatic ties with Iran and close the Iranian embassy in Beirut, which serves as a central terrorist headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards.
· Dismissal of Hezbollah ministers from the government and the prohibition of appointing its representatives in the future, including any senior figures affiliated with it in key decision-making positions.
On the security level:
· A comprehensive purge is required within the Lebanese army and all security organizations, including the replacement of all personnel who collaborate with Hezbollah.
· Appointment of a security organization that operates directly under the presidency in order to maintain increased presence in the Dahieh, to prevent Hezbollah from reestablishing its military infrastructure.
· Halting the smuggling of weapons from Syria to Lebanon, through:
- A coordination mechanism between the Lebanese government and the regime in Syria.
- Construction of a barrier along the border line.
- Exclusion and arrest of any party cooperating with Hezbollah at border crossings (under international supervision).
The agreement with Lebanon must rely on clear international assistance and supervision mechanisms:
·Outlawing Hezbollah in its entirety in all the countries that guarantee the agreement.
· These states will act IN GOOD FAITH, with genuine intent, to work with additional countries worldwide to outlaw Hezbollah.
· Assistance in establishing civilian alternatives to substitute the services currently provided by Hezbollah to the Shiite population.
· International monitoring of border crossings with Syria, along with proactive support to prevent smuggling.
·Assistance to the Lebanese army - will not be provided by states that do not have full diplomatic relations with Israel, and in any case will be under United States supervision. Here, there is great importance in international assistance to increase salaries in the Lebanese army.
- As with the previous agreement, it must be guaranteed that Israel retains a “green light" (via a side letter) to act against any threat, violation, or military activity by Hezbollah that jeopardizes its security, anywhere in Lebanon and at any time, (including threats related to force buildup or deployment).
What can Israel provide?
Israel will declare that the occupation of Lebanese territory is not an objective in itself, and that the presence of the IDF in Lebanon is a TOOL to achieve security.
In the short term, Israel can offer a number of goodwill measures-some to be implemented immediately, and others contingent upon actions taken by the Lebanese government.
In a document published by the “Washington Institute" in October 2025 and written by Robert Satloff, Ehud Yaari, and Hanin Ghaddar, several examples were given that, in our view, may be relevant, such as: supply of natural gas, joint water management of the Hasbani River and coordination on wastewater treatment, permits for supervised pilgrimages to holy sites (Christian and Druze) in both countries, and opening the Rosh Hanikra crossing for the movement of foreign tourists.
One should not assume that the Lebanese government will carry out these measures in the near term. Responsibility for safeguarding the residents of northern Israel lies with Israel. Accordingly, over the longer term, any halt to IDF operations in southern Lebanon, withdrawal of IDF forces from the area, or the return of Lebanese residents to villages in southern Lebanon (with the precise line to be determined in negotiations) must be contingent upon demonstrable actions by the Lebanese government in line with the principles outlined above.
Additional details can be found in the “Policy Paper - What is Israel’s Endgame in the Campaign in Lebanon" that we published on March 15, 2026.