Stephen M. Flatow is an attorney and the father of Alisa Flatow, who was murdered in an Iranian-sponsored Palestinian terrorist attack in 1995. He is author of A Father’s Story: My Fight for Justice Against Iranian Terror (now available in an expanded paperback edition on Amazon.com) and is the president of the Religious Zionists of America-Mizrachi. An oleh chadash, he divides his time between Jerusalem and New Jersey.
For decades, Western media have described the militaries of hostile regimes and terror organizations with a strangely generous vocabulary. Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard was “elite." Hezbollah’s Radwan units are “elite." Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is “elite." The word appears so reflexively that it has become a kind of journalistic punctuation - a way to signal danger, sophistication, or mystery.
But the more one examines the actual battlefield performance of these forces, the more the label dissolves. What, exactly, is elite about them?
The problem begins with the source. Authoritarian regimes and terror groups are masters of self‑mythology. They brand certain units as “special forces" not because of demonstrated excellence, but because the label helps maintain internal loyalty and external intimidation. Iran calls the IRGC “elite" because it is ideologically reliable, not because it resembles a Western special operations force.
Even Hezbollah markets its Radwan fighters as commandos because it wants Israelis and Lebanese alike to believe it possesses capabilities it has never actually demonstrated in open battle.
When Western media adopt these labels uncritically, they unintentionally launder propaganda into the public conversation. “Elite" becomes a borrowed adjective, not an earned one.
In reality, many of these units are simply better equipped than the rest of a weak force. Saddam’s Republican Guard had newer tanks than Iraq’s conscript army but collapsed quickly in 1991 and again in 2003 when confronted by modern combined‑arms warfare. Hezbollah’s fighters gained experience in Syria but also suffered heavy casualties and relied heavily on Iranian and Russian support. Iran’s IRGC has political clout and a large missile program, but its conventional forces remain outdated and brittle.
These are not the hallmarks of elite military performance. They are the hallmarks of organizations that survive through ideology, intimidation, and asymmetric tactics.
Performance under pressure tells the real story. When these so‑called elite forces face modern militaries, the results are consistent: commanders are rapidly eliminated, units struggle to maneuver under fire, logistics break down, morale collapses when propaganda meets reality, and airpower exposes their vulnerabilities. Hezbollah’s recent losses in Lebanon - including senior commanders and critical infrastructure - reveal a force far less formidable than its own messaging suggests. Iran’s proxies across the region show the same pattern: capable of harassment and rocket fire, but unable to sustain high‑intensity combat.
Elite forces do not measure success by the number of rockets fired blindly into civilian areas. Elite forces do not rely on human shields. Elite forces do not crumble when their leaders are targeted.
And this is where the contrast with Israel becomes unavoidable. Israel also uses the term “elite," but the meaning is fundamentally different. When Israel calls a unit elite, it refers to demonstrated capability, rigorous selection, and a decades‑long record of operational performance - not political branding.
Units like Sayeret Matkal, Shayetet 13, Shaldag, Yamam, Maglan, Duvdevan, and Egoz undergo multi‑stage psychological screening, grueling physical standards, and training pipelines that last more than a year. Their reputations are built on outcomes: hostage rescues, deep reconnaissance, counter‑terror operations, maritime interdictions, and high‑risk urban combat. Their successes and failures are documented, scrutinized, and studied - not buried under layers of regime propaganda.
Even Israel’s conventional brigades - Paratroopers, Golani, Givati, the 7th Armored - earn their reputations through repeated performance, not slogans. And when they fall short, the failures are investigated publicly. That transparency is itself evidence of seriousness.
The contrast is not ideological. It is structural. Israel’s elite units earn the label through performance, accountability, and continuous training. Its adversaries claim the label through branding, intimidation, and the absence of scrutiny.
Words matter. When media outlets describe adversaries as “elite," they inadvertently elevate them and sometimes exaggerate the threat. This distorts public understanding and obscures the real dynamics on the ground. A unit can be dangerous without being elite. A group can be well‑armed without being well‑trained. And a regime can be ruthless without being competent.
It is time for more honest language. Instead of repeating self‑serving labels, journalists should describe these forces as what they are: politically loyal, better equipped than their peers, skilled in irregular warfare, vulnerable in conventional combat, and heavily reliant on propaganda. That is not elite. That is simply the nature of modern asymmetric adversaries.
The public deserves clarity, not mythology.