Erfan Fard is a Middle East political analyst born in Iran. His latest book, Tehran’s Dictator, examines the theocratic era of Ali Khamenei (1989-2026). Twitter/X: @EQFard
The entire legacy of 47 years of brutality and violence by Iran’s ruling clerical regime-the so-called Islamic Caliphate of Velayat-e Faqih-can be reduced to four H’s: Hashd, Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas.
In times of escalating tension and the looming prospect of war, regimes under pressure often resort to unconventional and controversial measures to preserve their grip on power. One such scenario is the reported movement of Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) units from southern Iraq toward Iran. From a security and strategic standpoint, this development deserves careful analysis-not merely as a military maneuver, but as a reflection of the Iranian regime’s internal vulnerabilities and its reliance on proxy forces.
At its core, the entry of Hashd al-Shaabi elements into Iran should not be interpreted as a traditional defensive measure against external threats. Rather, it appears to be primarily aimed at reinforcing the regime’s internal security apparatus. In moments of crisis-particularly during widespread civil unrest or the possibility of urban conflict-the regime may seek to supplement its domestic forces with loyal, battle-hardened militias that are ideologically aligned and operationally dependent on Tehran.
One of the primary security motivations behind such a move is the strengthening of internal repression capabilities. The Islamic Republic has long relied on its own security institutions, including the police, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and affiliated Basij paramilitary forces, to control dissent. However, these forces are not immune to fatigue, fragmentation, or even reluctance when faced with sustained popular uprisings. In such scenarios, foreign Islamic terrorist proxy forces like Hashd al-Shaabi can serve as a backup force, stepping in to maintain order through coercive means when domestic units are overstretched or unreliable.
The possibility of urban warfare within Iran-whether due to civil unrest or broader instability-further underscores the regime’s need for such reinforcements. Hashd al-Shaabi thugs, many of whom have experience in asymmetric warfare and urban combat in Iraq and Syria, could be deployed to manage or suppress large-scale protests. Their presence would not only augment the regime’s manpower, but also signal a willingness to escalate repression by any means necessary.
Beyond immediate tactical considerations, the deployment of these forces may also serve a broader strategic purpose: the consolidation of a transnational security network under the control of the IRGC. By integrating Iraqi militia units into operations inside Iran, the regime effectively conducts a field test of its regional proxy system on its own territory. This allows Tehran to evaluate the loyalty, coordination, and effectiveness of these groups in a high-stakes environment, while simultaneously preparing them for future contingencies-whether internal or external.
Another key objective lies in the reallocation of forces from border regions to the interior. By bringing in external militias to handle internal security tasks, the regime can free up its own forces for deployment elsewhere, including along sensitive borders or in regional operations. In this sense, Hashd al-Shaabi units function as an internal rapid response force, capable of addressing crises within the country while allowing the regime to maintain flexibility in its broader military posture.
Equally important is the regime’s effort to reduce its dependence on domestic law enforcement agencies. Over the years, widespread public dissatisfaction and distrust toward these institutions have grown significantly. In moments of severe tension, relying solely on local forces-who may share cultural and social ties with protesters-poses a risk. Foreign militias, by contrast, are less constrained by such considerations and may be more willing to carry out harsh measures without hesitation.
Reports of convoys bearing Iraqi and Iranian flags moving from southern Basra toward Iran further reinforce the perception of a coordinated and deliberate operation. Hashd al-Shaabi, widely regarded as one of the most significant proxy networks aligned with Tehran in Iraq, has long operated as an extension of Iran’s regional strategy. Its mobilization in this context suggests not only logistical readiness but also political intent.
Some analysts have argued that the involvement of religious authorities in Iraq, including figures such as Ali al-Sistani, has indirectly facilitated the growth and legitimacy of these forces. While the complexities of Iraqi politics and clerical influence should not be oversimplified, it is clear that Hashd al-Shaabi has evolved into a powerful actor whose actions increasingly intersect with Iran’s security priorities.
The timing of these developments is particularly significant in light of recent unrest and reported violence inside Iran. Allegations that tens of thousands of Iranian citizens were killed during the January 2026 upheavals-whether fully verified or not-highlight the intensity of the crisis and the regime’s willingness to resort to extreme measures. In such a context, the introduction of additional militia forces could be seen as both a deterrent and a preparation for further confrontation.
Yet, it is crucial to emphasize that the Iranian people themselves do not require foreign militias to rebuild or save their country. On the contrary, the presence of such forces risks exacerbating tensions, deepening divisions, and undermining any prospect of national reconciliation. For many Iranians, the reliance on external proxies is not a sign of strength, but of weakness-a government that no longer trusts its own people.
Ultimately, the potential entry of Hashd al-Shaabi into Iran appears to be less about defending the nation and more about defending the regime. It reflects a broader pattern in which the survival of the political system is prioritized above all else, even at the cost of sovereignty, legitimacy, and human lives. The regime’s reliance on terrorism and proxy warfare, both abroad and potentially at home, underscores the extent to which its survival is intertwined with coercion and control.
At the same time, one must consider the possibility that these movements are, at least in part, performative. The display of military convoys and the signaling of proxy mobilization can serve as a psychological tool, intended to intimidate opponents and project strength. In this sense, the strategy may be as much about perception as it is about operational reality.
In conclusion, the reported movement of Hashd al-Shaabi Shia terrorists toward Iran should be understood within a broader framework of regime survival strategies. By reinforcing its internal security apparatus, testing its proxy networks, and signaling readiness for escalation, the Iranian regime seeks to navigate a period of profound uncertainty. Whether this approach will succeed in stabilizing the system or further destabilize the country remains an open question. What is clear, however, is that such actions carry significant risks-not only for Iran, but for the region as a whole.