Washington is once again flirting with the idea of a “limited strike" on Iran - a calibrated military action meant to signal seriousness, apply pressure, and improve negotiating leverage over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
The theory is seductive: apply controlled force, avoid full war, increase diplomatic leverage.
But history suggests that half-war is often the most dangerous form of war.
A limited strike that leaves Iran’s retaliatory capabilities largely intact would not end the confrontation. It would begin a new and far more volatile phase of it.
The Fatal Illusion of Calibrated Violence
Limited strikes assume that adversaries respond proportionally.
But regimes under pressure do not respond proportionally - they respond politically.
Iran’s doctrine is built around retaliation capacity: ballistic missiles, proxy networks, maritime disruption, cyber operations, and regional escalation channels. If those remain operational after a U.S. strike, Tehran retains the ability to inflict meaningful damage.
At that moment, the strategic initiative shifts.
The United States fires first.
Iran decides what comes next.
That is not deterrence. That is gambling.
World War II and the Lesson of Incomplete Force
History offers brutal clarity.
In the 1930s, European powers attempted incremental deterrence against Nazi Germany - diplomatic protests, partial mobilizations, symbolic resistance. None altered Hitler’s calculus because Germany retained capability and initiative.
It was only when the Allies abandoned incrementalism and embraced overwhelming force - industrial mobilization, strategic bombing, and unconditional surrender - that the war’s trajectory fundamentally shifted.
The lesson was not subtle: when confronting a regime whose ambitions are structural, not transactional, half-measures prolong the conflict.
Consider the Pacific theater.
After Pearl Harbor, the United States did not seek a “limited strike" against Japan to restore balance. It mobilized its entire industrial capacity and pursued decisive victory. The objective was not symbolic punishment. It was the removal of Japan’s ability to continue the war.
The war ended not when Japan was pressured - but when its capacity to resist collapsed.
History’s harsh truth is this: wars end when one side no longer has the means to continue them.
Escalation Control Through Dominance
Modern strategic theory often speaks of escalation ladders - calibrated moves designed to manage risk.
But escalation control does not rest on moderation alone. It rests on dominance.
If one side retains credible retaliation capability, escalation remains symmetrical. Each action invites counteraction.
Escalation becomes unstable when both sides believe they still hold leverage.
Stability emerges only when one side’s ability to escalate is fundamentally broken.
This is why limited wars so often expand. Korea, Vietnam, and numerous Middle Eastern conflicts demonstrate the same pattern: partial force creates prolonged conflict because it fails to alter the underlying balance.
The most volatile position is not overwhelming superiority.
It is partial superiority.
The Political Dimension
There is also a domestic dimension.
A limited strike followed by Iranian retaliation - missile strikes, proxy attacks, cyber disruptions, or Israeli casualties - would immediately shift the political landscape in Washington.
The narrative would transform from “strategic pressure" to “avoidable escalation."
Public support collapses when the first move fails to secure tangible safety gains.
Political leadership weakens when the adversary retains the ability to strike back visibly.
Symbolism is politically fragile. Decisive outcomes are politically durable.
The Vietnam Precedent
The danger is not immediate catastrophe.
The danger is prolonged entanglement.
The Vietnam War did not politically damage President Lyndon Johnson because of one decisive battle. It eroded his presidency through sustained attrition - rising casualties, unclear objectives, televised escalation, and a perception that limited force was neither winning nor ending the conflict.
Johnson did not lose political standing because America used too much force.
He lost it because the force used did not produce decisive clarity.
A limited strike on Iran risks creating a modern version of that dynamic.
-Missile exchanges.
-Proxy attacks.
-Naval skirmishes.
-Cyber disruptions.
-Regional instability.
Not total war - but ongoing confrontation.
A grinding, televised, economically visible conflict without finality.
That is the political danger.
The Core Strategic Question
The real issue is not whether force is morally desirable or diplomatically convenient.
It is whether force achieves finality.
A limited strike would likely:
• Preserve Iran’s retaliation capacity
• Legitimize Iranian escalation
• Transfer initiative to Tehran
• Increase regional instability
• Risk domestic political backlash
If force is used while leaving intact the adversary’s capacity to respond meaningfully, it does not deter - it destabilizes.
History does not reward ambiguity in moments of strategic confrontation.
The Hard Conclusion
The most dangerous course is not decisive force.
The most dangerous course is half-force.
A limited strike would preserve Iran’s retaliation capability, legitimize escalation, and transfer initiative to Tehran. It would create the illusion of strength while inviting response.
If military action is chosen, it must not be symbolic. It must be overwhelming.
Overwhelming force is not escalation for its own sake. It is escalation designed to end escalation.
History shows that conflicts conclude not when an adversary is pressured, but when its capacity to continue meaningful resistance collapses. Germany and Japan did not surrender because they were warned or nudged toward moderation. They surrendered when they were strategically broken.
The same logic governs deterrence.
As long as Iran retains the ability to inflict significant damage on the United States or Israel, escalation remains unstable. Retaliation remains viable. Initiative remains contested.
Overwhelming force changes that equation. It removes the adversary’s confidence in its ability to retaliate effectively. It restores deterrence through dominance rather than signaling.
Half-measures create cycles.
Decisive superiority creates closure.
If the United States acts, it must act with the clarity that the objective is not leverage - but resolution.
Anything less risks lighting a fuse without extinguishing the powder.
Dr. Avi Perry is a former professor at Northwestern University and a former researcher and executive at Bell Labs. He served as Vice President at NMS Communications and represented the United States on the UN International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Standards Committee. He is the author of the thriller novel “72 VIRGINS", and of “Voice Quality Engineering in Wireless Networks." Recently, he published “Unlocked: A Practical Guide to Learning and Applying Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Solve Real-World Problems" as well as “A Winner’s Playbook: How to Win by Spotting and Using the Rules Governing Human Behavior," practical rules that guide the path to success. He is a regular op-ed contributor to The Jerusalem Post and Israel National News.