Stephen M. Flatow is President of the Religious Zionists of America (RZA.) He is the father of Alisa Flatow, who was murdered in an Iranian-sponsored Palestinian terrorist attack in 1995 and the author of A Father’s Story: My Fight for Justice Against Iranian Terror now available in an expanded paperback edition on Amazon. Note: The RZA is not affiliated with any American or Israeli political party.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad was widely welcomed as the end of one of the Middle East’s most brutal and stagnant regimes. For many Syrians-and for outside observers exhausted by a decade of carnage-the emergence of a new leader promised at least the possibility of change. Months into the transitional presidency of Ahmed al-Sharaa, however, it is no longer enough to speak in hopes or hypotheticals. The time has come to assess what his rule has delivered-and where it has already fallen short.
To his credit, al-Sharaa has achieved what many thought unlikely. Syria did not immediately fragment after Assad’s ouster. The regime change avoided a nationwide bloodbath of reprisals against former officials. Rebel factions that once fought one another have, for now, remained largely aligned under a single authority. In a region where post-revolutionary chaos is often the norm, that alone is no small achievement.
Al-Sharaa has also demonstrated a degree of political discipline. He has avoided the triumphalist rhetoric that often follows a successful insurgency and has spoken instead of unity, order, and reconstruction. For Syrians exhausted by war, these signals matter. They explain why some governments have been tempted to treat the new regime as a potential stabilizing force, or at least as an improvement over the alternative.
But revolutions are judged by what they overthrow; governments are judged by what they protect. And here, the record grows troubling.
Al-Sharaa’s background as the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was never a footnote-it was the central concern. His assurances that ideology would yield to governance were always going to be tested first not in speeches, but in how the new authorities treated Syria’s minorities. That test has already come, and the results are deeply concerning.
Syrian forces loyal to the new regime have carried out attacks against the Druze community in southern Syria-an ancient, non-Sunni minority that has historically sought to stay out of Syria’s civil wars. Reports of assaults, intimidation, and violence against Druze towns punctured the narrative of moderation and exposed the sectarian instincts that still animate elements of the new leadership.
The most telling response did not come from Damascus or Washington, but from Jerusalem.
Israel intervened militarily in defense of the Druze, carrying out strikes against Syrian military positions threatening Druze communities. These were not symbolic gestures. They were operational decisions taken because Israel concluded that, absent intervention, a vulnerable minority would be left exposed to ideological violence.
That reality alone should give pause to anyone eager to label Syria’s new leadership a force for stability.
Israel does not intervene lightly across its borders, nor does it do so to make political statements. It intervenes when it judges that passivity will produce greater danger-either humanitarian or strategic. That Israeli aircraft were needed to protect Druze civilians speaks volumes about the limits of al-Sharaa’s control and the character of the forces acting in his name.
Meanwhile, American troops remain deployed in Syria under rules of engagement so restrictive they function more as spectators than deterrents. Unable to meaningfully respond to threats or prevent abuses, their presence risks becoming symbolic rather than stabilizing-an invitation to escalation rather than a barrier against it.
Supporters of the new Syrian leadership argue that these are growing pains, that a transitional government cannot instantly erase years of radicalization and militia culture. That may be true. But minority protection is not an advanced benchmark of liberal democracy; it is the most basic test of legitimacy. A government that cannot-or will not-protect its minorities reveals more about its future than any diplomatic talking point.
This is not a call to restore the past. Assad’s fall was necessary, and few mourn his departure. But realism demands clarity. Replacing a tyrant with an ideologue (under Turkish dominance?) does not automatically produce peace. Stability is not achieved by rebranding armed factions or postponing hard questions about sectarian rule.
Israel’s actions in defense of the Druze were not acts of provocation; they were acts of necessity. They underscore a simple truth: when new regimes fail early tests of responsibility, others will step in to fill the vacuum-sometimes with force.
Syria’s future is still being written. Ahmed al-Sharaa has time to change course, to demonstrate that power can be exercised without persecution and authority without ideology. But time is not unlimited. Governments earn trust through conduct, not origin stories.
The first report card is in. The results are mixed-and the warning signs are already flashing.