The latest wave of anti-regime protests in Iran has intensified discussions of regime change across policy, media, and security circles in Israel and the West. Yet history suggests that removing a regime, however unpopular or hostile, is only the beginning of a far more consequential question: what comes next?
Iran now stands at a critical crossroads, and the outcome will matter not only for the Iranian people, but also for the regional balance of power in ways that will directly affect the strategic interests of the West and its allies in the Middle East.
The prevailing assumption in many strategic debates is that democracy is a luxury-perhaps even a liability-in volatile regions, and that stability must therefore come first. Yet the experience of the past three decades points in the opposite direction. Where authoritarian collapse has not been paired with a credible democratic transition, the result has rarely been order. Instead, it has produced fragmentation, proxy warfare, radicalization, and persistent insecurity-burdens that, in many cases, have weighed more heavily on Western interests than the regimes they replaced.
Iran is no exception. How the current regime ends is critical. An outcome defined by authoritarian replacement or territorial disintegration would almost certainly produce deeper, longer-lasting strategic dangers, as clearly demonstrated by cases such as Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.
The False Stability of Authoritarian Outcomes
Authoritarian regimes tend to project an illusion of control. Their collapse often opens a vacuum that is difficult to manage and even harder to reverse. The Middle East offers sobering examples: states that dismantled dictatorships without building democratic institutions did not become freer or more stable; instead, they became arenas of competition among militias, foreign powers, and extremist networks.
In Iran, a post-collapse scenario lacking democratic legitimacy would face similar dynamics. The country’s size, ethnic diversity, and geopolitical location make it particularly vulnerable to centrifugal pressures. An authoritarian center in Tehran, combined with competing armed actors in the periphery, would be more likely to generate prolonged internal conflict than national renewal. Such conditions rarely remain confined within national borders.
The High Cost of Fragmentation
Regime collapse in Iran followed by state disintegration would carry tremendous risks for the region. A fragmented Iran would not be a contained problem. It would likely become a hub for transnational militancy, illicit networks, and proxy competition. Such environments have historically proven fertile ground for extremist movements and external manipulation.
Moreover, prolonged instability would require constant external management. Rather than resolving the Iranian challenge, Western powers would inherit an open-ended security commitment-one that would divert attention and resources from other strategic theaters around the world.
Perhaps most paradoxically, the beneficiaries of such chaos would not be Western democracies, but the very actors seeking to undermine them-namely Russia and China. Failed states are easier to penetrate, co-opt, and exploit. In that sense, disorder in Iran would serve revisionist interests far more than Western ones.
A Democratic Iran as a Strategic Asset
From a realist perspective, a democratic Iran is not an idealistic aspiration; it is a strategic asset. First, legitimacy matters. A government that derives its authority from popular consent is far better positioned to maintain internal cohesion without constant reliance on repression. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of recurring unrest, insurgency, or civil war-conditions that have historically invited foreign interference and regional spillover.
Second, democratic governance enables economic integration. A normalized Iran, open to free trade with its neighbors and global markets, would be incentivized to prioritize growth, stability, and predictability. Economic interdependence is not merely a development goal; it is also a security mechanism. States that trade tend to calculate risks differently than those that survive through isolation and confrontation.
Third, and most critically, a democratic Iran would fundamentally alter Eurasian geopolitics. An Iran anchored in liberal norms would be structurally incompatible with the strategic designs of revisionist powers such as Russia and China. Rather than serving as a pressure point against the West, Iran would become a balancing force-linking the Middle East to Europe and Asia through cooperation rather than coercion. This would represent a decisive shift in the global order.
Strategy Over Impulse
There is a temptation in international politics to equate the removal of rogue regimes with victory. Yet durable strategic gains come not necessarily from the instantaneous dismantling of adversaries, but from shaping environments in which adversarial behavior becomes structurally unsustainable. As such, any approach that prioritizes short-term weakening or removal of the regime over the long-term integration of Iran risks repeating the mistakes of the past.
For Western and regional policymakers, the central issue is not whether the current Iranian regime will survive-it will not, and its eventual demise is only a matter of time-but whether change will produce a stable partner or another permanent crisis.
As protests in Iran intensify and debates in Israel and the West over the fate of the regime continue, one conclusion should guide strategic thinking: a democratic Iran is not only better for Iranians, but essential to regional stability, global security, and the long-term durability of the Western order.
Dr. Reza Parchizadeh is a political theorist and international affairs analyst specializing in Middle Eastern politics, regional security dynamics, and great-power competition. He has advised U.S. and Israeli government institutions, think tanks, and major media outlets on national security and foreign policy issues, and has been invited to brief members of the U.S. Congress on developments in the Middle East.