Stephen M. Flatow is President of the Religious Zionists of America (RZA.) He is the father of Alisa Flatow, who was murdered in an Iranian-sponsored Palestinian terrorist attack in 1995 and the author of A Father’s Story: My Fight for Justice Against Iranian Terror now available in an expanded paperback edition on Amazon. Note: The RZA is not affiliated with any American or Israeli political party.
Australia is grieving after the antisemitic terror attack at a Hanukkah gathering at Sydney’s Bondi Beach-an atrocity that left multiple people dead and many more wounded. In the immediate aftermath, Australian leaders reached for a familiar lever: more gun control.
That reaction is understandable. It is also the wrong lesson.
Australia already has some of the most restrictive firearms laws in the democratic world, built on the 1996 National Firearms Agreement after the Port Arthur massacre. Over the past three decades, that framework has imposed licensing and registration requirements, tightened controls on categories of firearms, and narrowed access to certain weapons to an extent far beyond what most Americans or Israelis would consider normal.
And in at least some jurisdictions, “self-defense” is not treated as a valid reason for firearm ownership. In other words: the law is not merely designed to reduce gun misuse. It is designed to ensure that ordinary citizens are not armed for personal protection.
So, when officials now talk about “more gun control,” we should be honest about what that means in practice: not disarming terrorists-who do not follow laws-but further restricting lawful citizens, many of whom already have limited avenues to protect themselves.
The Bondi reality check: strict laws, still mass murder
Authorities recovered multiple guns from the scene. That fact matters. It means the system did not fail because Australia was a “Wild West.” It failed despite an already restrictive regulatory regime.
That should force a hard question: if a country with stringent licensing, registration, and controlled categories can still suffer a mass-casualty terrorist shooting, what exactly will the next layer of restrictions achieve?
A cap on how many firearms a lawful owner may possess might satisfy a political demand for action. But in a terror scenario it is a resounding error. A single gun is enough to kill. A single radicalized person is enough to shatter a community’s sense of safety.
If the Bondi attack teaches anything, it is that the core problem was not the number of pages in a statute book. It was the presence of violent extremism-and an inability to stop it before it reached a crowded public event.
“Gun reform worked” is not the same as “gun reform stops terror”
Australia’s post-1996 gun reforms are often credited with reducing firearm deaths and ending a long stretch without certain kinds of mass shootings. Reasonable people can debate how much is attributable to gun laws versus broader social trends, and serious researchers do.
But even if you accept the strongest claims for Australia’s gun reforms, it still does not follow that “more of the same” will prevent terrorism.
Terror plots are not stopped by press conferences. They are stopped by intelligence work, community vigilance, targeted policing, and rapid interdiction-plus meaningful security at likely targets.
Australia’s leaders can tighten licensing intervals, add audits, and impose new numerical limits. But none of that answers the simplest question: how do you identify and stop the next radicalized individual before he reaches a public square, a synagogue, a school, or a holiday gathering?
What would actually make Jews-and all Australians-safer?
If Australia’s leaders want a response that saves lives, they should start where the danger actually is.
First: treat antisemitic terror as a national-security emergency. That means dedicated counterterror resources, intelligence coordination, and a relentless focus on radicalization pathways.
If officials believe people can become radicalized “over time,” then the answer is not merely a shorter license duration. It is smarter, continuous risk monitoring and faster intervention when warning signs appear.
Second: enforce and modernize what already exists. If the attacker was licensed, the question is not “why didn’t we have one more rule?” It is “what did the vetting miss-and what did authorities fail to connect?” Systems tend to fail at the seams: incomplete records, siloed agencies, delayed disqualifications, and weak compliance follow-up.
Third: harden soft targets-especially religious and communal events. Synagogues, Jewish schools, and public holiday gatherings are not theoretical targets anymore. They are real ones. Security is not paranoia; it is prudence. That means visible policing at major events, rapid-response planning, and trained security personnel who can delay an attacker until police arrive.
Fourth: stop pretending prohibition is the only safety tool. When lawful self-defense is off the table, governments implicitly assume a total duty to protect. When that protection fails, citizens pay the price. A serious conversation should include narrowly tailored options for vetted, trained community protection models-designed for high-risk events and locations, with strong oversight and accountability.
That is not an argument for “more guns everywhere.” It is an argument against a comforting illusion: that the public is safer simply because ordinary people are less able to defend themselves when evil shows up in a public place.
The real test after Bondi is coming. After every atrocity, politicians feel pressure to “do something.” But doing something is not the same as doing what works.
Bondi is not a referendum on hunting or sport shooting. It is a referendum on whether a modern democracy can confront extremist violence with clear eyes-without defaulting to symbolic gestures that leave the underlying threat untouched.
Australia can respond by tightening screws on people already following the rules. Or it can respond by dismantling the networks and ideologies that produce terrorists-and by ensuring the next Jewish gathering, the next school event, the next public celebration has layers of protection that do not depend on luck.
The dead at Bondi deserve more than a slogan and a legislative cycle. They deserve a strategy.