Jonathan Pollard
Jonathan PollardArutz Sheva

The Chinese aerospace firm, Lingkong Tianxing, has recently debuted a new Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) dubbed the YKJ-1000, which threatens to disrupt global defense markets with cheap, but effective Mach 7 hypersonic weapons. Nicknamed the “cement coated” missile, the YKJ -1000 uses inexpensive civilian grade foamed concrete instead of pricey specialized ceramics, carbon composites, or tungsten that’s needed to withstand the extreme temperatures encountered when traveling at hypersonic speeds.

With its production cost of approximately $100,000 per unit, an adversary could easily afford the means to overwhelm existing high cost ballistic missile defense systems like the American THAAD or the Israeli Arrow 4, by deploying a large number of these cheaper missiles in a swarm attack.

HGVs maneuver unpredictably after being launched by a ballistic missile, making them extremely difficult to track and destroy. As a result, a large number of interceptors must be used to deal with them, which would quickly deplete an air defense system’s magazine strength. What’s clear, then, is that an inexpensive HGV will challenge- if not totally undermine, traditional missile defense doctrines and their associated interception technologies.

What really concerns me, though, is if our regional enemies manage to acquire large numbers of these YKJ-1000s, which seems highly likely. Should this occur, they would be able to deploy an extremely potent first strike weapon. However, what’s even worse, in my opinion, is the fact that the IDF doesn’t seem interested in developing a comparable HGV type weapon system.

Why is this the case?

For many years, Israel’s “long arm” has been the IAF’s fleet of fighter bombers. Piloted by exceptionally skilled professionals and provided with range extending conformal fuel tanks, our F-16Is, F-15Is and F-35Is have excelled at eliminating distant high value targets with pinpoint precision. Indeed, their performance during both the so-called “12 Day War” against Iran as well as the series of retaliatory strikes the IAF conducted against various Houthi targets, was nothing short of spectacular.

Equipped with extended range ballistic missiles and protected by superb tactical intelligence provided by the F-35 “Adirs”, our fighter bombers were able to destroy most of Iran’s air defenses and a range of other critical military targets, which included command/control facilities, missile production centers, and nuclear weapons related installations.

But a closer look at the satellite bomb damage assessments revealed some glaring problems: namely, that many secondary targets were not hit while the priority ones in our targeting bank weren’t completely destroyed. The reasons for this can be blamed on the relatively few numbers of strike aircraft in our inventory and the limited number of weapons carried by these planes due to their need to carry extra fuel and defensive armaments.

So, while our air campaign against Iran inflicted an incredible amount of accurate damage, it simply wasn’t heavy enough to inflict a decisive defeat on the Iranian regime. Indeed, many critical industrial targets and energy export related facilities were avoided for political reasons, as well.

What could have happened, though, had we had a large number of YKJ-1000 HGVs at our disposal? I ran a simulation and the results were astounding.

First of all, the speed and weight of our initial strike would have been something the world has never seen before.

-All primary surface targets such as air defense batteries, early warning radars, command/control headquarters, ballistic missile production centers, deployed missiles, and nuclear weapons establishments were totally destroyed- not partially disabled.

-Moreover, nearly all of the secondary targets, which included Iran’s main electrical generating stations, water pumping facilities, fuel storage tank farms and telecommunications centers, were also completely obliterated.

What impressed me the most about this simulated HGV strike, though, was the nearlysimultaneous elimination of these targets. Within 30 minutes of launch, Iran would literally have been flat on its back. It wouldn’t have been so much a case of “shock and awe”, as much as it would have been a case of total national paralysis. This is what a surprise simultaneous launch of 2,500 YKJ-1000s would have accomplished within the first half hour of our war with Iran. After that, our Air Force could have probably completed the destruction of Iran well within 6 days, not 12.

Lastly, as far as the issue of Iran’s oil and gas related industry is concerned, my simulation ran two scenarios, one involving its immediate destruction during the opening strike and another assuming our government wanted to hold it hostage. By adding an additional 500 HGVs to the opening strike, virtually the entirety of Iran’s oil and gas extraction, refining, and export capabilities were destroyed.

Although our government was put under enormous pressure at the time by both the Americans and Gulf states not to target these facilities due to their fears of Iranian retaliation against Arab oil production sites, if we had eliminated Iran’s ability to finance the rebuilding of its ballistic missile production factories, they probably wouldn’t be able to run them round-the-clock as they currently are.

When I asked Air Force personnel for their opinion of my simulation, their responses were uniformly negative. Yes, they recognized how useful and important air launched ballistic and cruise missiles were. But unless these weapons were deployed by manned aircraft, these officers didn’t accept their effectiveness.

In a sense, I was hearing the same arguments the American bomber “mafia” made against the reliance on Army controlled ICBMs in the early 50s, until the missiles were placed under USAF control.

Even when I suggested that the same arrangement could be made here, by placing a HGV force under the control of the IAF, it was rejected on the grounds that large numbers of such weapons would necessarily take away funds that could be used for additional manned aircraft.

My last argument that a large force of cheap HGVs could allow us to quickly destroy either the Turkish or Egyptian navies, made absolutely no impression on the IAF officers with whom I was dealing. From their perspective, high seas naval threats were something that could be taken care of with a few manned fighter bombers equipped with cruise missiles and precision guided ballistic missiles. I said that as a follow on force they were right, but if we wanted to pull off a Pearl Harbor type scenario or the rapid destruction of a widely deployed outer naval blockade, we absolutely needed a large HGV force. The IAF officers simply dismissed my argument.

After the discussion I had with these IAF personnel, who I deeply respect, I left convinced, more than ever, that the IDF’s High Command needs to create a new strategic division that would be responsible for both long range HGVs and ballistic missiles equipped with multiple maneuvering warheads. We clearly have the ability to manufacture these weapons. All we need is the vision to order their production at whatever cost to the treasury and the manned fighter bomber “mafia.”