After the Operations Division’s initial investigation into the events of October 7 was disqualified, the Chief of Staff is expected this week to receive the updated version, which examines the connection between those nighttime conversations and the level of preparedness on the ground when the assault began.
According to findings published by Channel 12 News, the military leadership operated under confusion and severe intelligence fog in the critical hours before the massacre.
Around 3:00 a.m., a “situation assessment” call was held, led by Southern Command chief Maj.-Gen. Yaron Finkelman, with Gaza Division commander Brig.-Gen. Avi Rosenfeld and Shin Bet officers participating. About half an hour later, at 3:30, Finkelman presented to senior officials three warning indicators, including the possibility of a “surprise-initiated operation with an emphasis on a raid.” However, the main directive was to increase readiness without raising the IDF’s profile - no tank movements, no scrambling of aircraft - so as not to provoke a response from the enemy. Then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi adopted this approach later that night.
The report further states that Finkelman presented several steps that were considered but ultimately not implemented: tracking Hamas senior operatives for potential preemptive action, deploying UAVs for intelligence gathering, and transferring attack helicopters to Ramon Airbase - a decision later reversed. His instruction to the Air Force to increase alert levels in the air-defense array and to add an Iron Dome battery was also not carried out. By morning, the air-defense system collapsed in the opening minutes of the attack.
Later that night, two additional consultation calls took place, led by the Chief of Staff and attended by Maj.-Gen. Oded Basyuk and Finkelman. In these calls, Halevi focused on a potential underground attack and requested an immediate examination of the border barrier and any suspicion of a tunnel breach into Israel. According to the investigation, even after the attack began, the first question Halevi asked the division commander was about a possible tunnel - despite Hamas not using tunnels at all in the assault.
In other arenas as well, directives failed to translate into action: despite the Chief of Staff’s request to sharpen alertness to a maritime threat, all seven Hamas boats crossed the naval barrier. And although the assessed likelihood of an aerial attack was considered low, drones and UAVs disabled IDF observation systems, while infiltration squads used motorized gliders to enter Israel.
At 4:30 a.m., two hours before Hamas launched its assault, another directive summary was issued by the head of the Operations Directorate. In this document, Basyuk repeated previous instructions, noted that readiness measures were “not relevant in the coming hours in terms of availability,” and emphasized the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources. In practice, no significant steps were taken to alter IDF preparedness.