On Friday IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir sent commanders the summary of the work of the Turjeman Committee.
“IDF took responsibility and investigated itself, but the event is not the IDF’s alone, and it would not be appropriate to direct all the attention solely toward it,” Zamir wrote. “To reach the truth and full national-level conclusions, an external and objective commission of inquiry must be established, as was done after the Yom Kippur War.”
“It is necessary to investigate the interface between the political echelon and the military echelon; the political and security concepts that preceded the war; the ‘conception’; the intelligence and the warnings presented to decision-makers; the oversight and monitoring processes; and the interaction and division of responsibility between the various bodies.”
“The committee did not address personal responsibility - the failure of October 7 is systemic and long-standing. Imposing personal responsibility on commanders who devoted their lives to the security of the state is a heavy decision, and such decisions should not be influenced by external pressures and must be taken with utmost caution.”
According to Zamir, “There is no doubt that every position holder whose name has been linked to the events will carry a heavy burden for the rest of their lives. Only a commission of inquiry with a full, broad and in-depth picture can make further weighty and fair personal determinations. However, this does not diminish the responsibility of the IDF and its commanders.”
In the letter, the Chief of Staff wrote that Hamas’ Jericho Plan, or “the plan to defeat the Gaza Division,” as he referred to it, “was initially exposed to intelligence in 2018 and fully in 2022. The plan was not thoroughly analyzed nor internalized as required. The discovery of such a plan is a rare situation that any intelligence body or military strives for - access to the enemy’s attack plan and the ability to build an appropriate operational deployment based on it, as an ‘operational compass’ for concepts, planning and force buildup.”
“General Staff officers in Military Intelligence and Operations who were exposed to the plan were required to address it - to hold discussions, draw conclusions, and guide IDF bodies. The same, and even more so, applied to Southern Command and the Gaza Division. It should have been expected that in-depth processes would be carried out regarding the plan: examining its relevance, holding discussions, elevating its priority, and monitoring indicators on the enemy’s side. The command should have ‘rung the bells’ and ensured that the General Staff was aware of it and was addressing it in situational assessments, dedicating focused discussions to it.”
“During 2023, several warnings were sent to the military and political echelons (by the head of the Research Division, the head of Military Intelligence, and the Chief of Staff). These warnings were general and addressed the identification of an emerging perception among our enemies (Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas) that Israel was undergoing internal weakening, harming its deterrence and increasing the likelihood of escalation. It is necessary to examine the interface between the political and military echelons with regard to these warnings and, at the same time, to examine why the military echelon, which issued the warning, did not adjust forces and readiness accordingly.”