Three decades after the Oslo Accords reshaped the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a new international push is taking shape to design Gaza’s political future. The emerging plan-driven largely by American pressure and regional expectations-promises “demilitarization,” “local leadership,” and “stability.”
On paper, it looks like a fresh start. In practice, however, it is drifting toward the very architecture that made Oslo a monumental strategic failure.
The uncomfortable truth is this: If Hamas remains intact, if disarmament is unenforceable, and if Israel is expected to sit quietly behind a “ceasefire” while terrorists rebuild, then we are not creating peace. We are rebuilding the runway for the next war.
In that sense, the new plan risks becoming Oslo 2.0-a repeat of the same structural mistakes that brought unprecedented violence in its wake.
Before Oslo: Not Perfect, But Manageable
To understand why Oslo failed, and why the new Gaza plan is headed in the same direction, we must recall the reality before the 1993 accords.
Contrary to the mythology of the time, Judea, Samaria (aka :West Bank") and Gaza were not peaceful utopias. Palestinian Arab nationalism existed long before 1993, and the First Intifada (1987-1993) was proof of deep political unrest. But despite periodic turmoil, the situation was manageable:
- Daily movement was open. Tens of thousands of Palestinian Arabs crossed into Israel for work every day without checkpoints or barriers.
- The IDF presence was light. There were no deep military deployments inside cities.
- The economy was improving. Palestinian Arab GDP per capita, life expectancy, and infrastructure rose sharply from 1967 to 1993.
- Terror groups existed-but were external. The PLO operated from abroad: Jordan, Lebanon, and finally Tunisia.
Palestinian Arab society inside the region was fragmented, politicized, and often resentful, but not militarized. There was no armed proto-state, no heavy infrastructure of terror, no rocket factories.
Israel faced tension, but not a ticking bomb.
Oslo’s Fatal Error: Importing Arafat and His Armed Apparatus
The core flaw of Oslo was not its aspirations but its architecture. In a stunning act of diplomatic naïveté, Israel and the international community imported Arafat and the Tunis PLO apparatus-armed, corrupt, radicalized, and unaccountable-straight into the heart of the "West Bank" and Gaza.
Arafat arrived with:
- Tens of thousands of Fatah fighters
- A political system steeped in authoritarianism
- A doctrine centered on “liberation through stages”
- A leadership culture built on double-speak, not compromise
Not only did the new Palestinian Authority fail to enforce peace-it actively helped undermine it.
Arafat publicly shook hands while privately preaching jihad in Arabic. His security forces coordinated with Israel by day and sheltered militants by night. Foreign aid meant for nation-building flowed instead into:
- militias
- weapons
- incitement
- corruption
- the salaries of convicted terrorists
Within months of Oslo’s signing, terrorism inside Israel exploded, culminating in suicide bombings that were nearly nonexistent before. What followed was a decade of bloodshed that dwarfed the years before Oslo.
It was, by every strategic objective measure, a disaster.
The New Gaza Vision: A Repeat of the Same Structural Mistake
Fast forward to today. The world, once again, is promoting a “vision” for Gaza’s future. The language sounds promising: local governance, international guarantees, disarmament, reconstruction.
But the reality shaping up behind the scenes tells a different story.
1. Hamas is not being removed.
Despite initial talk of driving Hamas out, no military force- American, Arab, or multinational-is willing to enforce such an outcome. Israel is being prevented from doing so by Trump's ceasefire. Hamas is already reasserting its authority in parts of Gaza, reorganizing “police units,” and intimidating rivals.
2. Disarmament is not enforceable.
Demilitarization sounds impressive until you ask a simple question:
Who will enforce it?
- Not Israel-it would have to reoccupy Gaza permanently, which Trump will not allow.
- Not Egypt-it wants no entanglement.
- Not the U.S.-politically impossible.
- Not Arab states-they refuse to confront Hamas militarily.
- Not the Palestinian Authority-it collapses at the first sign of confrontation.
A promise of disarmament without an army capable of disarming anyone is not a plan-it is a fantasy.
3. Israel will be pressured to “maintain the ceasefire.”
This is perhaps the most dangerous component. If Israel is prevented from disrupting Hamas’s rearmament because doing so would “violate the terms of the ceasefire,” then the situation will follow the exact trajectory of Oslo:
- terrorists rebuild
- rockets multiply
- tunnels expand
- morale improves
- deterrence erodes
- the next war becomes inevitable
This was the Oslo pattern from 1994 to 2000. It was the Gaza pattern from 2007 to 2023. There is no reason to believe it will be different now.
4. Hamas is gaining political legitimacy through backchannels.
Unofficial or semi-official meetings with Hamas-linked figures-even exploratory ones-grant de facto recognition. A leader like al-Hayya does not need a formal title; the mere fact that he is treated as a stakeholder signals Hamas’s political survival.
Once a terror group is treated as a governing authority, it becomes exponentially harder to uproot.
This was true of the PLO.
It is true of Hezbollah.
And it is now becoming true of Hamas, thanks to the US peace plan.
Hamas’s Ideology Has Never Changed - And Never Will
Any peace plan that assumes an ideological shift is doomed.
Hamas has never amended its founding principles:
- Israel has no right to exist
- All of Palestine must be “liberated”
- Jihad is a religious obligation
- Ceasefires are tactical tools, not endpoints
Every negotiation Hamas enters is designed for one purpose: time.
Time to rebuild, rearm, recruit, and prepare for the next confrontation.
This was not accidental. October 7 was not an aberration. It was the culmination of decades of planning-made possible because Hamas was allowed to rule territory, tax civilians, import weapons, build tunnels, and operate with international protection behind “truces.”
If Hamas survives the war politically or militarily, the cycle will repeat.
Not possibly.
Not maybe.
Inevitably.
The Emerging Plan: Oslo 2.0 by Another Name
The essence of Oslo was:
- Empowering a violent leadership
- Restricting Israel’s ability to respond
- Assuming disarmament without an enforcer
- Creating autonomous mini-states that became terror hubs
- Applying international pressure to freeze Israel’s hand
The emerging Gaza plan checks all five boxes.
Peace cannot be built on illusions.
Security cannot rest on unenforced promises.
Stability cannot grow from an ideology committed to perpetual war.
If Israel is pressured to accept a Hamas-ruled Gaza dressed up with cosmetic “local administrators,” the world will be reconstructing-brick by brick-the exact structure that failed under Oslo.
What followed Oslo was the Second Intifada.
What followed Gaza disengagement was October 7.
What follows a Hamas-governed Gaza-protected by a ceasefire and Western pressure-will not be peace.
Conclusion: A Hard Lesson, Learned Once and Ignored Again
Oslo did not fail because of bad intentions.
It failed because it misunderstood the nature of the leadership it empowered.
The new Gaza plan is on track to make the same mistake.
As long as Hamas exists as an armed, ideological, territorial authority, every “peace plan” is merely an intermission between wars.
Unless the world is prepared to enforce disarmament with real force-and it is not-then the only outcome of this new vision will be a more sophisticated, more dangerous version of Gaza 2007-2023.
Israel cannot afford Oslo 2.0.
The world should not impose it.
And Gaza deserves better than a recycled disaster wrapped in the language of diplomacy.