The US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on Wednesday against 32 individuals and entities operating across Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine. These networks are accused of supporting Iran's ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production.
"Across the globe, Iran exploits financial systems to launder funds, procure components for its nuclear and conventional weapons programs, and support its terrorist proxies," said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley. "At the direction of President Trump, we are putting maximum pressure on Iran to end its nuclear threat."
The sanctioned networks reportedly threaten US and allied personnel in the Middle East, as well as commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The Treasury's actions aim to disrupt the procurement of missile propellant components and deny Iran access to the US financial system. This marks the second round of nonproliferation sanctions since the September 27, 2025, reimposition of United Nations sanctions on Iran.
The measures are pursuant to Executive Orders 13382 and 13224, targeting weapons of mass destruction proliferators and terrorist supporters, respectively. The IRGC and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) had previously been designated under these orders.
OFAC designated a multinational procurement operation centered around the "MVM partnership," which, since 2023, has sourced ballistic missile propellant ingredients such as sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid from China for Iran's Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI). PCI and its parent organization, Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO), are under US and UN sanctions.
Key figures in the MVM partnership include Marco Klinge (UAE), Majid Dolatkhah (Iran/Türkiye), and Vahid Qayumi (Iran/Türkiye), all sanctioned for supporting PCI. Companies controlled by Klinge, including MVM Amici Trading LLC (UAE), Farmlane Private Limited (India), and EVA Handelsgesellschaft UG (Germany), have also been designated. Qayumi is linked to Iran-based firms Zagros Shimi Fars and Furqan Novin Pars, both sanctioned alongside UAE-based Vahid Ghayoumy Goods Wholesalers LLC.
Iran-based Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), previously designated for aiding the IRGC-Qods Force, was again targeted along with subsidiaries Iranian Baspar Puya Company (PARPO) and Pars Navandishan Artificial Intelligence Projects Company (ARIAPA). Both firms have supported UAV manufacturing and development.
OFAC also sanctioned KIPAS affiliates Seyyed Ali Abtahi, Seyyed Mohammad Ruhani, Hosein Sayyadi Turanlu, and Ehsan Mohaghegh Dolatabadi, citing their involvement in producing, acquiring, and shipping UAV components.
China-based Ma Jie and 11 associated entities were designated for supporting Oje Parvas Mado Nafar Company (Mado), an Iranian UAV engine manufacturer. Ma coordinated Mado's China operations and directed multiple firms, including Yiwu City Xianma, Qian Xi Long, and Hin Yun.
Payments involving companies in Türkiye and Hong Kong were traced through Ma's network. Türkiye-based firms Arkedya, Intro Oto, Own Ucar, Royal Yapi, Loris, Ozkam, and Artas, and Hong Kong-based Yiren Zhuang Trading Co Limited, were all designated for aiding Ma's operations.
OFAC also sanctioned procurement efforts tied to Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA), a MODAFL subsidiary. Iran-based Bahram Tabibi used Ukrainian firms GK Imperativ Ukraina LLC and Ekofera LLC to acquire aerospace components for HESA. Others designated include Iran-based intermediaries Batoul Shafiei and Saeed Pahlavani Nejad.
The SDN List entry for the vessel SHUN KAI XING has been updated to reflect its new name, HONESTAR. The ship was identified in June 2025 while attempting to transport sensitive machinery to Iran. OFAC said the vessel is stateless and using false flags.
All US-based property of designated persons is now blocked. US persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions involving these entities. Foreign financial institutions may also face secondary sanctions for dealings with designated individuals or entities.
OFAC reiterated that the ultimate aim of sanctions is to encourage behavioral change and provided information for individuals seeking removal from the SDN List.