Context: Motives and End-State
Since 1979, Iran’s clerical regime has blended revolutionary Islamism with regional power politics, creating a unique fusion of ideology and statecraft. Opposition to Israel has served not merely as a foreign policy stance but as a foundational pillar of the Islamic Republic’s identity. Ayatollah Khomeini declared Israel an “illegitimate tumor” implanted by the West to divide Muslims-a view that endures in every official communiqué and Friday sermon.
For the regime, enmity toward Israel achieves multiple goals. Domestically, it diverts attention from corruption, repression, and economic collapse by channeling public frustration outward. Regionally, it positions Iran as the self-appointed defender of the Muslim world, seeking to outflank Sunni rivals like Saudi Arabia. And strategically, it provides moral cover for exporting the revolution through Hezbollah, Hamas, and a lattice of militias stretching from Yemen to Lebanon.
In practical terms, Tehran’s strategic goals can be distilled into three interlocking ambitions:
- Deterrence through nuclear latency.
Iran has pursued the technical capacity to build nuclear weapons without openly crossing the line. Its goal is to stand perpetually at the edge-a posture that deters adversaries while avoiding an international consensus for war. The IAEA’s September 2025 report documents roughly 9,875 kg of enriched uranium, including 441 kg at 60 percent purity-dangerously close to weapons-grade material. With the right equipment, that stockpile could yield several warheads within weeks. - Regional coercive power.
Tehran has invested heavily in missile and drone arsenals capable of threatening every major city in the Middle East. New iterations such as the Khorramshahr-4 and the hypersonic-branded Fattah-2 demonstrate advances in range and guidance accuracy. Whether or not their “hypersonic” claims are exaggerated, these systems complicate Israeli and Western defense planning. - Negotiating leverage without negotiations.
Iranian leaders understand the diplomatic value of ambiguity. By refusing direct talks with Washington and rejecting limits on enrichment, Tehran sustains tension that can be traded for concessions later. The June 2025 “12-Day War” effectively froze what remained of the Vienna process, leaving Iran free to rebuild while blaming the West for intransigence.
The Rebuild: What Iran Is Doing-and Saying
In the months following Israel’s June 2025 strikes, Iran moved rapidly to repair and reconstitute its nuclear infrastructure. Satellite imagery and IAEA field notes indicate expanded activity at Isfahan and Natanz, renewed centrifuge fabrication at Karaj, and possible new underground tunnels near Fordow. These moves underscore a deliberate policy: to build back stronger, deeper, and harder to hit.
IAEA inspectors continue to face restrictions. Cameras remain offline in key sites, and Tehran’s pattern of limited cooperation has made it increasingly difficult to verify enrichment levels or centrifuge numbers. The opacity itself is a weapon, allowing Iran to play for time while claiming compliance.
On the missile front, Iran is similarly advancing. Large-scale drills in late August rehearsed coordinated, time-compressed salvos aimed at overwhelming air defenses. The 2024 and 2025 missile exchanges revealed that while Israel’s layered defense-Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome-performed impressively, saturation remains a constant risk. Each salvo teaches Tehran more about timing, radar evasion, and stress points.
Diplomatically, Iranian officials have doubled down on defiance. Foreign Minister Abdollahian declared in September that “Iran will not negotiate under threat” and that enrichment “at any level we deem necessary” would continue as a “sovereign right.” The message is clear: Tehran prefers confrontation over compromise, confident that Western unity will fracture before its regime does.
What Israel (and the U.S.) Can Do
1. Rebuild the Legal and Financial Perimeter
Sanctions matter only when enforced. The re-imposed UN and EU snapback measures are a critical start, but loopholes remain wide enough for oil tankers to sail through. The United States and Europe must jointly target maritime insurers, brokers, and banks that facilitate Iran’s exports. Without access to hard currency and specialized components-vacuum pumps, carbon fiber, maraging steel, precision bearings-Iran’s centrifuge program stalls. Secondary sanctions should extend to any entity, Chinese or European, found trading these items.
Financial warfare is not glamorous, but history shows it can be decisive. The 2012-2015 sanctions reduced Iran’s GDP by nearly half and forced Tehran to the negotiating table. A renewed, relentless enforcement campaign could again slow the regime’s ambitions without a single missile fired.
2. Deny “Left-of-Launch”
Cyber operations and covert sabotage remain among Israel’s most effective tools. The Stuxnet worm of 2010 proved that digital code can achieve what conventional explosives cannot: precise, deniable disruption. Future campaigns should focus on cascade control systems, power grids serving enrichment sites, and the transportation networks that move UF₆ gas cylinders.
Parallel efforts must interdict critical imports before they reach Iranian soil. This includes covert seizure or destruction of shipments of high-tensile aluminum tubing, composite propellant ingredients, and guidance electronics. Every month that a critical component fails to arrive is a month Iran cannot test, build, or deploy.
3. Calibrated, Follow-on Strikes-if Required
If diplomacy and covert action fall short, selective air or missile strikes remain a last resort. The objective should not be a single knockout blow-an impossibility against a dispersed and fortified program-but a systematic degradation of key capabilities.
Targets should include centrifuge workshops, metrology labs, and energy nodes supporting enrichment complexes. Hardened sites like Fordow may require U.S. assistance with heavy penetrators and refueling logistics, but other facilities can be neutralized through precision standoff munitions. The focus must be on slowing reconstitution, not on symbolic destruction.
4. Shield the Home Front While You Squeeze
Iran’s retaliatory strategy depends on missile and drone saturation, using proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Israel must therefore continue integrating Arrow-3, Arrow-2, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome into a seamless, regionally networked system with U.S. and Gulf sensors. In April 2024 and June 2025, this layered defense intercepted roughly 95 percent of inbound threats. Continued integration can keep that rate high, transforming Iran’s most expensive weapons into public demonstrations of futility.
The Silent Front: Mossad’s Reach Inside Iran
Behind the visible air battles lies an invisible war-a contest of intelligence and counter-intelligence that has defined Israeli-Iranian confrontation for decades. Much of Israel’s success during the 12-Day War derived not from hardware but from human networks painstakingly cultivated within Iran.
According to multiple open-source accounts, Mossad operatives and local recruits supplied detailed, real-time information on command meetings, missile-fuel depots, and transit routes for mobile launchers. These insights enabled Israel to strike with astonishing accuracy. Iranian generals were killed or wounded in locations that should have been secret; radar and communication hubs went dark at critical moments.
Even Iran’s own officials conceded that the level of infiltration was unprecedented. One Revolutionary Guard officer lamented on state television that “the enemy knew our movements before we did.” That sentence revealed everything: Israel was inside the system.
Tehran responded with fury and fear. In August and September 2025, it claimed to have arrested dozens of “Mossad agents,” releasing confessions and photographs through state media. Yet most of these claims remain unverifiable and likely inflated. Intelligence networks are not a single organism but a series of semi-autonomous cells-redundant, replaceable, and compartmentalized. Dismantling one group rarely collapses the whole.
Mossad Director David Barnea recently declared that Israel retains “operational capabilities even in the heart of Tehran.” Western intelligence assessments support that assertion: while Iran’s purge may have disrupted some channels, Mossad’s presence remains active through a mix of human assets, cyber penetrations, and logistical pipelines operating from the Caucasus to the Gulf.
These covert capabilities are not ancillary; they are the indispensable backbone of Israel’s deterrence. Airstrikes can destroy hardware, but Mossad’s human intelligence ensures that new facilities cannot rise unseen. Every successful penetration shortens the time between discovery and action. It is the invisible deterrent that grants visible force its precision-and keeps Israel several steps ahead in a war where knowledge is as lethal as firepower.
Chances of Success-and of a Short War
Can Iran’s nuclear and missile resurgence be stopped? Not permanently-but it can be contained, delayed, and rendered strategically futile. The key lies in endurance and coordination. A campaign that combines relentless sanctions enforcement, continuous cyber and covert disruption, and precise, repeatable strikes can extend Iran’s breakout timeline indefinitely.
A single, massive attack might set the program back months or years, but without follow-through, Tehran will rebuild. The difference between a short war and a long one hinges on persistence after the first salvo. If Israel and the United States sustain economic, cyber, and intelligence pressure beyond the initial confrontation-while denying Iran propaganda victories-the war can end quickly, on Israel’s terms.
Conversely, if the response stops at a symbolic raid, Iran will exploit the pause to rally proxies, resume enrichment, and transform the conflict into a drawn-out campaign of attrition. That scenario would drain Israel’s resources, destabilize global oil markets, and embolden every adversary watching from the sidelines.
The 2024 and 2025 engagements revealed that Iran trains not for decisive victory but for durability-to survive, absorb punishment, and remain standing. Israel and its allies must therefore fight for the opposite principle: speed, precision, and sustained denial.
The Policy Bottom Line
Preventing Iran from emerging as an existential nuclear threat requires a campaign mindset, not a raid mentality. The following imperatives define success:
- Enforce snapback sanctions rigorously, closing maritime and financial loopholes.
- Disrupt the repair chain continuously through covert interdictions and cyber strikes.
- Target reconstitution hubs, not only enrichment halls, and strike again when necessary.
- Maintain fully integrated missile defenses with U.S. and regional partners.
- Condition all diplomacy on full, verifiable inspection access.
This doctrine is not about endless war-it is about permanent prevention. Through disciplined coordination of intelligence, economic leverage, and selective force, Israel and its allies can ensure that Iran’s ambitions remain just that: ambitions. The goal is not annihilation but denial; not occupation but obstruction.
In that steady balance of pressure and precision lies the best hope for peace-a peace defined not by illusionary treaties or temporary pauses, but by a simple strategic fact: Iran cannot win. And when the regime finally realizes that, the region will at last move from crisis management to genuine stability.